


JPRS-UPA-92-001
9 JANUARY 1992



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Political Affairs

Central Eurasia

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-92-001

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9 January 1992

NOTICE TO READERS: Given the course of events in the former Soviet Union, the titles of JPRS and FBIS Soviet publications have been changed to Central Eurasia. The Central Eurasia: Political Affairs report will cease publication and pertinent material will subsequently appear in either the Central Eurasia: Russia report or the Central Eurasia: Baltic and Eurasian States report.

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**Yakovlev Views Political Situation; Offers
'Revitalization' Program**

924B0179A Moscow TRUD in Russian
27 Dec 91 pp 1-2

[Article by A. N. Yakovlev: "Prospect of Revival"]

[Text] The name of the author of this article is quite familiar to readers of TRUD. A well-known politician Aleskandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev has always attracted attention for his untrivialized views of events, facts, and phenomena occurring in our society. He is one of the founders of the Democratic Reform Movement and at the recent constituent session was elected as cochairman and member of the political council of the DDR [Democratic Reform Movement]. One must assume that his thoughts about the political situation that has formed at the present time will be of interest to our readers.

Today it is impossible to keep up with the events. Then again it is not at all necessary to immediately stamp evaluations on each one of them. Life is not a bureaucrat's questionnaire. Sooner or later it rejects superficiality, haste, and all claims to competence in all questions. That is why I shall limit myself to the elaboration of a few conceptual questions connected with understanding of fundamental elements of democratic transformations under specific conditions currently in our country.

Point One—Characteristics of the Moment.

The main factor in today's situation is its most profound internally paradoxical nature and intricacy. It seems that everything that firmly maintained us in the past and kept out long overdue changes has collapsed or been destroyed. And the road toward the most progressive changes appears to be open. In real life, however, there is a growing manifestation of tendencies that make democratic prospects increasingly more difficult and remote. Such tendencies are present in all spheres without exception. These tendencies increase the probability of chaos and violence and thereby also of authoritarian aspirations as allegedly the only effective method of overcoming all that is destructive. The direct and daring attack by Khrushchev ended in defeat but the Brezhnev restoration also failed. A time of uncertainties has arrived. The denouement approached and it arrived in the form of perestroika. But the revolution of perestroika, designed as a peaceful measure, is an elitist revolution and it could be nothing other than that. It was born in the politically most active part of the CPSU and society. There it immediately encountered very fierce resistance and rejection.

Today it is clear that the revolution "from above" has exhausted itself. It stood at a fork in the road probably as early as the summer of 1988. Either transcend itself and become a revolution that is really popular and democratic, far reaching, and actually bringing society the full range of freedoms, or remain true to itself and confined within its own circle. But then we have an either - or:

either suffer defeat at the hands of Stalinist reaction and Brezhnev conservatism or risk being stolen by forces that merely camouflage themselves with its words and slogans, and in reality aspire only to redistribute power within the framework of former social relationships.

Perestroika was unable to master itself and the popular forces awakened by it remained unrecruited. At the same time old structures stayed and continued to function against transformations. From the autumn of 1990 reactionaries and conservatives arose in open combat. Their inspiration, I feel certain, was failure to adopt programs of "the 500 days". That was a mistake with severe consequences. It indicated that perestroika was prepared to retreat in the face of sufficient pressure. This opened the road to the bloodletting in Vilnius and the general rehearsal for the putsch on the day of the opening of the Russian Congress on 28 March of this year. Finally, the proposal for removal of the President of the USSR from the post of party general secretary, which symbolized an open break between the newly reactionary CPSU and the very idea of the transformations. The strange absence among leaders of perestroika of a true mutual understanding with the leftist democratic forces, and among the latter—lack of a clear program became increasingly apparent. The August putsch did not simplify the situation, but in many regards complicated it.

It would, of course, be naive to assume that transformations would not sooner or later touch the very foundations of the state structure. Our state itself was cut out to suit Stalinism and its needs. Therefore it is impossible to handle Bolshevism without affecting its main instrument—the totalitarian, militarized, and highly bureaucratic state. It was expressly its structures and institutions that were the bearers of all the qualities of the preperestroika society. It was specifically in this capacity that it stood against perestroika: at first covertly, through simple unwillingness to cooperate, through inertia. Then, during 1987-1990, increasingly more openly and frankly. And finally, in 1991, it came to bloody provocations, to detrimental economic and financial policies, to the joining of ranks with organized crime in some cases, and in the end to the August putsch.

Such a state is incompatible with renovation. It must either win, again suppressing and subjugating society to itself, or collapse giving way to radically new relations, both along the vertical and the horizontal lines of the state structures. Most importantly the state must cease being the total owner and turn into a leveler of the balance among interests of a large number of different owners having equal rights.

Having said all this it is also necessary to see something else as well. Ties that are simply impossible to break without the greatest shock to the entire society have formed by proper and iniquitous means and became intertwined over decades and centuries on the expanses of the USSR. It is impossible without economic and cultural decline, without human tragedy, without loss to the international positions of the country, including

those in crudely materialistic manifestations. All these are not hypotheses but, unfortunately, bitter facts of life. This, however, certainly does not mean that in order to rectify the situation it is necessary to return to Brezhnev's constitution, to the old Union. It is necessary to build the state anew in accordance with those requirements that would suit the goals of freedom, democracy, and primacy of man over state. There is nothing impossible in that.

Point Two—Human Rights.

It is specifically they that are the key to true revitalization. These human rights, however, are threatened now and will be threatened by much—from economic crisis, interminority and other clashes, and crime, to the despotism of old and new authorities or Bonapartism. From this viewpoint the real position of people did not improve, moreover, it became more vulnerable. We are already seeing how national detachment leads to additional and cruel violations of human rights, including the right to life. The new forms and subjects are yet to take a single step to satisfy the needs of the people, have not introduced any freedoms, do not have to their credit even the most modest achievements, but despotism is already at hand: blood is flowing, refugees number in the thousands. Once again the state is looming over the individual along with the interests of groups indifferent to the fate of people. Our own and world experience is convincing: the higher the internationalization of life the more reliable the insurance of human rights. At the other end, the more closed the society, the more it is partitioned from others, the greater the possibilities for despotism within it. The very first thing that any dictatorship does when it comes to power is isolate itself from the outside world.

Discourse about state and power to the individual, and not the opposite—is not just a new collection of words that sound good. This is the only method today of avoiding an unprecedented social catastrophe. But we are already watching with alarm the antidemocratic tendencies in numerous places, and see how black reaction, national chauvinism, and an imperial psychology are closing ranks in counteraction to the reforms. With the partitioning of the country by nationality these dangerous phenomena may receive new possibilities, including the rapid growth of neofascism. If we are unable to handle that then it will be simply senseless to speak about all the rest of it because there will just be no room left for democracy and freedom.

Third Point—The Drama of Our Democracy.

In my opinion democratic forces and tendencies are currently going through a very dangerous period. Dangerous not due so much to an external threat, as the possibility of an internal revival, capable of culminating with new authoritarianism. Democracy also at present found itself without opposition—strong, virulent, but constructive and civilized. Of the type that would rest on skilled parliamentary compromises.

Democracy began life powerfully and convincingly—with the support of the people clearly expressed in the elections. It is based on the acute and justified dissatisfaction of people with former power structures and individuals who represented and personified them and with the results of their activity. As well as on hopes for renovation, the prospects for which were linked with the appearance of new forces and individuals and the mandate for restructuring of life issued as a result of the elections.

Can we say that these hopes have been realized or even started to be realized in some clear manner understandable to the people? That there are no new causes for dissatisfaction? The answer, unfortunately, is negative. Real restructuring is being sabotaged by old forces that rapidly changed their appearance. They visualize the sense and purpose of renovation in the preservation of posts, positions, authority, privileges, and possibilities. The level of lawlessness and corruption increased by at least one order, the existence of restraining centers, however, and their effectiveness decreased just as much if not more. The individual lost some rights. He lives worse, he is hungry and angry, dangerously angry. He turned away from the old system, but is also already turning away from what is associated in the social consciousness with democratic power. If we do not intercept these tendencies from the start it will mean the opening of a gate to fresh troubles. That will mean mass hysteria, aggravated by clashes between minorities and settlement of accounts by everyone with everyone. That will be a triumph of the basest passions which will sweep away the new democracy and yesterday's ultra conservatism.

That is why great significance is acquired by tasks of counteracting spontaneity and selfishness, appearing in the guise of democracy, as well as by counteraction to phenomena of mercenary attitudes, political and social myopia, and the psychology of favoritism.

Point Four—On the Program of Revival.

To me this program appears as incorporating seven elements: eradication of parasitism, demilitarization, denationalization, decollectivization, ecological deindustrialization, abolition of monopoly, and elimination of anarchism.

Eradication of parasitism—the systematic elimination of all that makes any form of social parasitism possible and even advantageous. Life at one's own expense, but that which is earned through labor, must become an inevitable moral requirement for all—for the individual, for the collective and for the state. Our state is the only one in history which for decades prohibited the individual from earning as much as he can, calling such aspirations self-seeking, degenerate, and self-centered interests. At the same time, by the most modest estimates, at the present time there are millions of parasitic posts in the country and their number is growing with every day. This includes the unprofitable enterprises, and

kolkhozes and sovkhozes. All of us are prone to parasitism by nature, it is a good thing that we are not wealthy. Envy of earned sufficiency—these are the stones along the way on which the democrats are going to stumble at every step. How can one avoid falling? Private ownership, hierarchy of law, wealth through work as the main principle under conditions of private ownership, and a sharp decrease in the state and other apparatus at all levels. Eradication of parasitism is the toothache of perestroika and the market is a dentist. Only it determines the quality of labor and fairly evaluates it.

Denationalization. In 1990 it was made public that of the country's wealth 96 percent belongs to the state, to its structures of the type of state kolkhozes, state industrial cooperatives, and nationalized public associations. Denationalization is the acquisition of property by a real owner. Taking away the right of ownership from the people, they were not freed, but transformed into a collective slave, placing them in total dependence not only on the state, but on any petty bureaucrat, at the same time creating unique possibilities for the merging of criminality with the state.

Denationalization—is the accelerated revitalization of small and medium-size enterprises and types of production. Encouragement of economic initiative and the independence of citizens, their associations and societies. The free economic activity of millions of free economic units, collective and private, the existence of all types and sizes of enterprises, the filling of all potential niches in the market and the possibility of competing for them and occupying them—that is what is capable of saving our country!

Ecological deindustrialization is a demand of life itself. No one's property, general indifference, haphazard control by agencies, total mismanagement, the psychology of favoritism "at the top" and "at the bottom," absolute irresponsibility, and all of this with consideration of the might of contemporary technology, threatens to leave us in a desert. This, in turn, will force us into a struggle for biological survival. The chain reaction of destruction within systems of self-reproduction in living nature is nearing a fatal outcome. Further violation of the mechanism of wisdom in natural ecosystems is akin to death.

Demilitarization—it is the withdrawal of the economy from the servicing of the arms race and the military-industrial complex. This is particularly urgent because a number of republics, not even having started anything practical in the interests of the individual, are already hastening to acquire their own military machine. Also, according to various data, until now a lion's share of our economy is working purely for the military sphere. The second largest share—for industry. And only around six percent for the individual, i.e. the socially useful action of the socialist economy is somewhere at the level of a steam locomotive.

Demilitarization of society—it is not the elimination of defense and the army, as preached by those for whom speculation with pseudopatriotism long ago become a bottomless feeding trough. Demilitarization is the shifting of defense and the army to rational rails, unconditional demand for effectiveness, professionalism, an ability to correlate expenditures and results, and accountability to organs of authority and society as a whole. It is necessary to recognize clearly and frankly the fact that military-economic competition is not within our abilities, it was intolerable to rush into it to start with, it is long past the time to stop it.

Decollectivization—it is the freedom of management in the countryside and ownership of land, all-round development of farming, and transformation of kolkhozes into true cooperatives appearing on the market on a common basis. Without private ownership of land it is impossible to create a middle class which, on the one hand, would be able to withstand bureaucracy, and on the other hand—lumpen of any sort. Without it it is impossible to halt the destruction and ruining of land, water, forests, all that is alive and vital.

Abolition of monopoly—is direct prohibition in accordance with law of any forms of monopolism, in the absolute majority of cases the breaking up of monopolies that have formed, recognition of competition as a normal, natural and socially necessary part of life, protection of competition by all legal means, and rigid economic sanctions for violation of legislation against monopoly. Monopoly not only rots on its own, it drags the economy and society into an abyss as well, sows corruption around itself, and objectively reinforces and multiplies authoritarian tendencies in public life.

A paradox in our society is that the cruelest totalitarianism coexists with unprecedented anarchism. The possibility of despotism from above creates freedom for despotism to exist at all other levels as well. Elimination of anarchism is elevation to the absolute of law, rights, and legality, it means the end to any despotism, any power, and adoption of civil, domestic, technological and any other discipline and inevitability of responsibility for all lawlessness.

A particular face of this problem consists of the custom of law violations by the legislator and executive officer that has taken root. Legal nihilism reached a catastrophic level. If the new authorities do not catch on to it in time, if the new bureaucracy does not become wise to it, then all the democratic undertakings will be buried under debris from the destructive onslaught of boundless nihilism.

If decisive steps are not taken in all of these directions it is hardly worth hoping for changes in the situation.

Projects for Averting Anarchy Assessed

PM0412112691 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Dec 91 pp 1, 3

[Anatoliy Salutskiy article under the "Reality and Predictions" rubric: "Coalition"]

[Text] After the August events, once the new powers had established their supremacy in the country, many people, including some who do not agree with Yeltsin about everything and even some who do not share his views at all, heaved a sigh of relief: Things had become clear, and so an opportunity of extricating ourselves from the crisis had appeared. Maybe not the way some people would have preferred it, maybe without the Communists, maybe through "historical compromise," as Gorbachev subsequently described socialism's total surrender—but this no longer mattered in the face of the burning need to keep the country from falling over the precipice. People not hampered by ideological or nationalist blinders—and they are in the majority—gave the Russian White House an unprecedented vote of confidence.

The question of perestroika also became clear. It had simply ended, or rather, quietly passed away, taken French leave. A method that we had encountered before since 1985: In just the same way, without publicity, without any announcement, the slogan of acceleration was taken off the agenda, though it was allowed to remain on the posters for the time being. A method which, it is useful to note, allows the leader to avoid giving the people an account of himself, of his work.

So, about perestroika. At the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies Gorbachev never once uttered that word, which he used to repeat thousands of times, like an incantation. A new and equally vague term has been brought into use—"transitional period." From what and to what is again left unstated, naturally.

But at the moment of the secret burial of perestroika, it finally became clear what lay behind this chimera. Perestroika was, it turned out, simply a period of acute ideological struggle with the objective of changing the social system. And it logically came to an end when the Communists' monopoly was replaced by the democrats' monopoly. The only thing that appears illogical is that the new monopoly is headed by the same old personnel. But as I have had occasion to write before now, in the period of the French Revolution first the Jacobins were sent to the guillotine, then the Directory was disbanded, but the ardent Jacobin and general of the Directory Napoleon Bonaparte became first consul. And it is the same with us: The Communist Party which elected the last general secretary has been banned, the Congress which elected the first president has disbanded itself, yet Gorbachev is head of the State Council!

Of course, it is no use looking for personal analogies here: Napoleon was to become one of the proud symbols

of France. It is simply a question of certain general laws of revolution, laws that establish the domination of the ruling class.

But the inglorious end of perestroika has brought us some benefits too. If you do not go into details, but look at the people's mood, it is clear that along with perestroika, ideologization as such has gone to its grave. The desperate struggle between Communists and democrats totally confused ordinary people, preventing them from forming a picture of the rapidly changing social world. Since August 1991 everything has become simpler: Only two major forces are left in the country—the authorities and the people. There are no propagandist or ideological veils capable of masking the features of the authorities and hiding them from the people's eye.

Everything has fallen into place. If the authorities start sorting life out, even if this only emerges as a trend at first, the people will unconditionally accept them, firmly setting aside all talk of bourgeoisification and "all that." But if life continues to get worse, the people will reject these authorities, even if they had a dozen "Good Evening, Moscow!" video channels brashly extolling middleman entrepreneurship, predatory privatization, and other "benefits" of the market run wild.

There is no need to reiterate the concerns that are on everyone's lips. But in order to clarify my train of thought I will tell you about my personal position. While by no means wholly approving of Yeltsin's program, I sincerely welcomed his election as president, as I wrote in an article for one of the former communist publications (the article was not published). If Yeltsin had not been elected president, a disastrous social split would have occurred. Yeltsin's move from opposition to power was necessary in order to give this major politician and his supporters the chance to use their opportunity for social restructuring. The people intuitively made what was, in my view, the only right choice at that moment.

The August events strengthened Yeltsin's prestige still further and made it possible to say that the age of Caesarism is developing into the age of Bonapartism. The stagnation period of "lifetime" rule by the top party leadership can be compared, without stretching the point too much, to Caesarism, which relied in one way or another on the support of the main bulk of the population, although it also belittled the role of the strong individual. Yeltsin certainly brought with him features of Bonapartism, and contrary to the widespread opinion of earlier years, this is to be welcomed, since at turbulent moments in history the people particularly need a strong leader.

But alas, taking into account everything that has been said in recent weeks about Yeltsin's policy, you regretfully come to the sad conclusion: It is not working yet... Hope is not yet lost, and God grant that something may begin to work out. But the stake is so great—the people's fate!—that the rapid flow of events prompts us to

wonder what may lie in wait for us all at the height of the icy winter or an early and hungry spring.

Incidentally, life itself encourages this: Even the head of the Russian KGB is talking about the likelihood of social upheavals. But it is important to consider how the authorities could behave in these circumstances—it is extremely important, not least for the authorities themselves, to prevent a repetition of the Chechen mistake on a disastrous scale.

Today many people are talking about the dictatorship that will grow out of the population's general dissatisfaction. But I am convinced that there can be no political dictatorship here—neither right-wing nor left-wing: Society has for a long time lacked the potential for this. The attempt to impose dictatorship with shaking hands appeared farcical. As for those who assert that there are forces today that are ready to use tanks to impose their own power, I would advise them to ask any officer they happen to meet. He will tell them that the Army will not come out of its barracks against the people any more, and that there is no politician and no general who could force it to do so.

Others assert that Yeltsin himself will install a dictatorship. But this too is physically impossible today, as the Chechen events show. Facts are facts: Our country has entered a period of development in which a dictatorial regime is unlikely. But we should not be complacent: There is a very real threat of the worst kind of dictatorship—dictatorship of anarchy and crime. And this prospect, in a country with 30,000 nuclear weapons of various sizes, is enough to terrify the whole world.

I read with wry amusement the statements of Western leaders demanding that central control be established over the Soviet nuclear weapons. Profound naivety, based on a lack of understanding of Russian realities! Of course such an agreement will be reached between the center and the former republics. Of course, under pressure from the United States and especially Canada, the Ukraine will subscribe to it. But I see this treaty as just as much a mere "piece of paper" as the other agreements currently being concluded via the center. I am afraid that in desperate times of anarchy and ruin there will be armed formations, maybe even among the national guards, which will venture to seize missile launchers for the purpose of political blackmail. And then there will be skilled men, frantic with grief because their wives have been raped and their children killed; despite all code barriers, they will succeed in bringing these terrible weapons into their combat state, and then—good-bye, planet Earth! Can anyone doubt that the Croats would have refused the chance of a "final salute" today, if they had had nuclear weapons? But Russia is not Yugoslavia, in Russia no one will be able to take nuclear installations under reliable guard, if anarchy comes.

I wish once again to insist that we have no political forces today that are capable of violently overthrowing the legitimately elected authorities—I am talking about the

former republics; the center, having had its day, will collapse of its own accord. But there is too great a danger that these authorities—especially in Russia!—in the face of cold weather, transport paralysis, local social rebellions and outbreaks of nationalism, the total collapse of finances, and mass unemployment, will voluntarily withdraw, plunging a great country into the abyss of anarchy.

Indirect indications of this decline of power are already visible. If you examine the habits of some politicians on a local—though very large—scale, you cannot fail to notice the strikingly large number of highly paid posts—in hard currency, too!—that they hold simultaneously. Judging by their positions, their salaries must run to many tens of thousands of dollars. There are other indications too, which, taken together, create the impression of the feverish preparation of bridgeheads for possible emigration.

And I do not rule out that when the great Russian upheavals reach their peak some of the present power-lovers will flee abroad, declaring themselves to be the fourth, political wave of emigres. But in fact they will be common criminals who have robbed the country and plunged the people into a quagmire of criminal piracy.

The time has now come to think about the possible withdrawal of those in authority, of the means by which the country can be kept afloat and the people protected from great suffering. In this connection the arrival in Russia of Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich Romanov strikes me as particularly noteworthy.

The Russian television news recently showed an item about the Venerable Nestor [11th-12th century chronicler] and quoted the famous words from his chronicle: "Our land is plentiful and rich, but there is no order in it." But the reporter, maybe through ignorance, did not tell the television viewers whose words these actually were and on what fateful occasion they were spoken. It was with these words that the Russians invited the Scandinavian House of Rurik to reign over them.

The practice of inviting rulers "from outside" was widespread not only in pre-Muscovite Rus. Hidden within this tradition is a purpose developed over harsh centuries of strife, formulated by the Russian historical Sergey Solovyev. A homegrown prince is inevitably linked by close bonds to his own clan which brought him to power, and this often led to internecine strife. An "outsider" is free from group bias and obligations, and can treat everyone equally.

Of course, today this medieval method of smoothing over internal conflicts, in its primitive form, is unacceptable. Although I believe that some of the former union republics and present autonomous formations of Russia, ravaged by the onslaughts of nationalism and internecine conflicts, will themselves voluntarily start inviting Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian leaders to "reign" over them, and will only benefit by it. But as for Russia, it

seems that the good Lord himself has prepared its salvation, in the shape of the outsider Vladimir Kirillovich Romanov.

Naturally, it is politically unrealistic to talk about the restoration of the monarchy. First and foremost because that would change precisely nothing in the country's socioeconomic situation, but would add drastically to the instability and could lead to civil war. And the wise old prince, who, unlike communist and democratic rulers, frequently utters the sacred words which they had forgotten, "our Motherland," understands the situation well. Therefore he came to Russia not with a political program setting forth the possibility of restoration, but with a motto capable of showing our Motherland the way out of the coming impasse. The heir to the throne held firmly to his line.

"The throne does not matter to me, what matters to me is the Fatherland's salvation..."

That is the view of a man on the extreme right wing of the political spectrum, the personification of the monarchy that was overthrown in 1917. He set a devout example, and now it remains to be hoped that one of the authoritative Communists on the far left of the political spectrum, one who has not, of course, turned into a democrat and who is in opposition to Gorbachev, who has abandoned the party, will, in turn, state publicly:

"Communism does not matter to me. What matters to me is the Fatherland's salvation."

If two political figures at opposite extremes, personifying the forces that fought to the death in 1917, can come together, in a new hour of doom for the homeland, for the sake of the sacred goal of the Fatherland's salvation—it will mean the end of a civil war that began 74 years ago, and will open the way to the broadest possible coalition of political forces casting aside their differences and—if only for a time!—rallying for the sake of the life of a state with a thousand years of history.

A coalition... If Yeltsin, under the pressure of insoluble problems, has to leave his post, the brief era of Bonapartism will come to an end: There is no leader in the country who could single-handedly hold power. And in order to prevent the worst case—anarchy—the time has come today to consider, legally and openly, rather than in out-of-town residences or offices with wave-proof windows, the formation of a power coalition capable, in the event of extreme necessity, of rescuing the declining power.

This should not be a coalition of parties, as in a parliament, because that kind of leadership will finally drown the state in verbiage. It is a question of a coalition of leaders, individuals, to whom the representative bodies will temporarily entrust the running of the country. And of course there can be no question of any "triumvirate," in which, as history shows, a struggle for leadership would inevitably break out immediately—the coalition should be sufficiently broad, balanced, and united in

only one thing—the aim of saving the Fatherland! It could be made up of so-called "heavyweight politicians," people who are well known and enjoy the confidence of various social strata.

Such a coalition can hardly be expected to emerge immediately on the scale of the former USSR, but for Russia it is not only realistic, but apparently inevitable. And if Russia, rallying for the sake of its own salvation and setting aside ideological strife, begins to escape from the trap that lay concealed beneath perestroika, this will be a powerful incentive for a new unification of the former republics.

The terrible specter of anarchy is stalking the country. In this context the political ambitions of leaders and parties appear trivial and irresponsible. And so I wonder, should we wait for the final collapse, should we not take precautions beforehand? Why should the present authorities not show initiative in this matter? After all, the state's affairs could go downhill all too quickly. The new local administration, doing away with experienced practical workers for political reasons, is ruining oblast economic links as we watch—just as the radical architects of perestroika ruined the unionwide economic complex.

Russian history has already experienced much of what is happening now—as far as political trends are concerned, as well as certain immutable foundations of the structure of Russian life which are not subordinate to any ideology. In this connection it is interesting to recall the Duma's [early 20th century] vacillations over the land question. On the insistence of Count Witte a draft law was drawn up on the compulsory confiscation of a proportion of privately owned land in return for fair compensation. The preamble said: "Excessively staunch adherence to the principle of inviolability of private property... could lead, in present-day conditions, to the property owners' losing everything, and in the most devastating conditions for themselves and for the whole country." Even the palace commandant Trepov stated at that time: "I will be very glad to hand over half my land for nothing, since I am convinced that only on that condition will I be able to keep the other half."

However, this view was crushed by the radical landowners. Stolypin's reform mainly put communal lands into circulation, leading to mass landlessness among the peasantry. The result is all too well known: 1917... The landowners, being unwilling to share the part, lost the whole, and in the most devastating conditions for themselves and for the whole country.

Is it not time to make our preparations in case of possible anarchy?...

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

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Future Political Scenario for Military Takeover Posited

924B0117A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 2

[Commentary by Igor Makarov: "Power Will Shift to the Military: Political Prognosis of an Orthodox Ideologue"]

[Text] It has already become a common saying: "In August, democracy suffered an ultimate victory." It seems, the last one. The first days after the putsch—with Communist Party newspapers being closed, monuments demolished, and telephone numbers announced for the people to call to report on citizens' behavior during the putsch—were reminiscent of the 1930's. In the village of Lovets, Nevelskiy Rayon, Pskov Oblast, where my parents own half a house, a village assembly was held with the agenda "On the behavior of residents during the putsch..." Later enthusiasm seemed to wane, but the confusion in the democratic ranks remained. Attacks on the CPSU continued under their own momentum. Central Television was demonstrating how brilliantly Yu. Afanasyev debates V. Ivashko, and how wittily V. Shostakovskiy "smashes" V. Kuptsov. Oh, such convenient opponents! It must be so pleasant, having "defeated" a confused party official now deprived of power, to believe that you have dealt the communist idea a death blow. Yes, the party hierarchy (where the majority of current rulers belonged at some time) called themselves communists. However, by building for themselves "communism on an individual dacha," they had betrayed and sold out the idea.

August 1991 did become a new phase in the development of events in the country. An avalanche of social cataclysms swept off for good the CPSU's official structures that used to seem unshakeable. Still, there is no joy in the victors' camp. For the avalanche keeps moving, gaining speed. Who is next?

In the initial phase, it is radical democrats who are already becoming victim. Behind the current confrontation between the Supreme Soviet and the president, the Moscow Soviet and the mayor, is not only and not so much a struggle between legislative and executive power as a confrontation between sincere democrats, who believe that democracy is a value in itself, and the new oligarchy that justifiably believes that in the environment of growing chaos democratic methods of governing will not bring big political dividends. The appointment of A. Murashev instead of V. Komissarov by those who had advocated professionalism and had spoken against the nomenklatura principle in cadre selection is only the first among future defeats of radical democrats. Not only will the soviets have to be done with; organs of representative power in general will have to be sacrificed. The people who are appearing on the arena of big politics are "personal representatives," "prefects," and "governors general..."

The ruling elite, over saturated with former high-ranking party officials and other power-holders of the Brezhnev era, will easily crush the trade unions, too, should they dare to step out from under the control of the "firm Yeltsinite" I. Klochkov and conduct an independent policy. Pressure will be increased on any other public or commercial structures that becomes infected with the spirit of opposition.

However, the worsening of the economic situation and the impoverishment of the bulk of the population is a process that cannot be reversed for the next two to three years. Holding on to power in these circumstances that objectively require increasing repression will objectively force the authorities to shift from authoritarian to dictatorial methods of governing. I think it is here, at the second phase, that it will become clear that Yeltsin and Popov will simply not have enough time to saturate the punitive organs with nomenklatura physicists and to conduct a purge of cadres to the extent sufficient for implementing the measures of suppression that will become "needed" by 1992. Even the "national guard" formations, subordinated to who knows whom and bearing suspicious resemblance to storm troops, will not save the situation.

The power will shift to the military. It can happen in a legitimate (Yeltsin resigns, a decisive vice president assumes power), semi-legitimate (all-out resignation under the pressure of the Ministry of Defense), or completely illegitimate way. But it will happen even against the will of the military themselves. For it will be in principle impossible to maintain at least some manageability in the country without leaning on the army as the administrative structure.

At that point, it will be the Russian army, into which the skeleton of the Soviet Army will be transformed in the course of the next draft. The army will maintain order mainly on the territory of the RSFSR, while the functions of the former all-Union structures will be reduced to coordinating the positions of Ministries of Defense of the large republics and to smoothing assignation of controls over the nuclear button to "UN observers."

The main adversary of the army will be the pogrom-populist movement, the prototype for which can be seen in the actions of Mr. Zhirinovskiy. We will have another proof of the maxim that the mob—especially a hungry mob—likes not the politician who tells the truth but the politician who says what the man in the mob wants to hear. The ascent of this kind of politicians to power in certain territories of the disintegrated RSFSR will be the hallmark of the third phase.

What is the solution? Democrats who sincerely want to avoid dictatorship, should immediately revise their attitude toward communists. They should reminisce hard about why all Latin American dictators found it necessary to ban the activities of Communist Parties. Fascism started the same way.

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We have to leave behind the illusion borne of the current disarray and vacillations in the communist camp. For no ban on the Communist Party or communist ideology can countermand the objective reality. And the reality is that as long as there is inequality in society, as long as there are rich and poor, patricians and plebeians, aristocrats and commoners, proprietors and hired labor, their interests and values will be different. That is why it is necessary to return to the idea of a "round table," of a "government of national consensus," and start thinking about creating a popular front against dictatorship and fascism. This dialog should reflect not the momentary distribution of faces in the current political game of patience, but objective social interests standing behind them. For one can deceive the poor by depriving them of political representation in the power structures, but one cannot deceive the poverty which in the final count will explode these power structures. In this chaos, hunted and persecuted semilegal and illegal communist organizations will turn out to be far more dangerous opponents than the fattened official structures in the plush offices on Staraya Square.

Immense work is ahead for socialists and communists. In forming an efficient political force capable of protecting the interests of the have-nots, they will have to travel between the devil of the tamed apparat opposition and the deep blue sea of the Stalinist "Bolshevik Platform" with its potential terrorist branches. They will have to overcome the glee in regard to upcoming failures of the democratic movement and learn to see the difference between the pseudo-democratic oligarchy (of the State Committee for the State of Emergency type) from among the former communist top brass and truly democratic "raznochineti" [19th century Russian intellectual not of the gentry].

With the support of trade unions and the workers movement, it is possible that such a political bloc will be able to stop the country from sliding into the depth of chaos and terror.

Union Disintegration Viewed From Standpoint of International Law

924B0132A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 7 Dec 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by Yu. Kolosov, doctor of juridical sciences:
"One Cannot Simply Get Up and Leave"]

[Text] A specialist answers the reader.

"Just what, from the standpoint of international law, is the acquisition of sovereignty by the Baltic republics: a dividing up of the USSR, or a separation from the Soviet Union of parts of its territory? And what is to be done now with the common property which is claimed by both the Union and the republics which are joining it or are separating themselves from it (Georgia and Moldova, for example)? For they also have a right to their share of the inheritance!"—S. Mishin (Novosibirsk).

It is not so easy today to get to the heart of the situation—does the USSR exist only from a formal juridical standpoint but actually has disintegrated, or, on the contrary, does it actually continue to exist but formally has been divided up?

The answers to these questions are of interest not only to us. Members of the international community of states are tirelessly scrutinizing us, trying to find out whom to do business with. Modern international relationships are a dense fabric impregnated with mutual rights and responsibilities among the components of this fabric of cells—which are sovereign states. The Soviet Union's rights and responsibilities have taken shape from the content of the 15,000 bilateral and 600 multilateral agreements that it has concluded.

Who today has the right to enjoy the benefits of these existing agreements and who should meet the obligations of the Union of SSR's?

Over the centuries many times new states have been created and former ones have disappeared. They have been divided, united, separated, arisen on territory that did not have state status (for example, colonies), and so on. And the neighbors have deliberated: how does the new member of the family of nations conduct itself, what can be counted on in mutual relationships with it?

In international law, customs which regulate this sort of problem have gradually taken shape. With time, these customary and legal norms moved into the language of two international conventions—the Vienna Convention of 1978 on the Legal Continuity of States in Regard to Treaties, and the Vienna Convention of 1983 on the Continuity of States in Regard to State Property, State Archives, and State Debts. Neither one of them has gone into effect yet, but their principles can be used as a reflection of the norms of international custom. The conventions help to support stability in the sphere of mutual rights and responsibilities in international relationships. This stability is reached through legal continuity, that is, when rights and obligations are transferred from one subject to another. In this case the first is named the predecessor, the second the successor.

According to the above-named Vienna conventions, the procedures for legal continuity are not identical for the different kinds of emergence of new states. This relates completely to the republics of the Soviet Union. Some republics consider that they have become new and independent states. Others consider that they have separated from the USSR. Disintegration of the Union is often mentioned.

It would be correct to consider that the exit of one former Union republic or another from the USSR (regardless of the procedure for accomplishing the exit) is nothing other than the separation of a part of the territory of a state and the forming of some states, where the predecessor state continues to exist. The absence of an act of dissolution of the Union, which was proclaimed 30 December 1922, testifies in favor of such a definition. In

paragraph 7 of the Decree of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies that was adopted 5 September 1991 mentioned "separation" of the republics that were acquiring independence and had decided to reject entry into the new Union. From the content of the USSR Statute, "Organs of State Power and Control of the Union of SSR's During the Transitional Period," of 5 September 1991, it follows that the predecessor state continues to exist (in this case, whether the name changes is not significant).

Which former USSR republics should be concerned about solving the problems of legal continuity? For the Baltic states, everything is clear—they have become successor states. But what is to be done about the other republics?

In the Agreement on Economic Association of 18 October 1991, they were named as "independent states," which reflect the will of their peoples for political and economic "sovereignty," which was secured in the acts that were adopted by the highest legislative organs of the states. According to the 19 November 1990 agreement between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, the sides recognized each other's "sovereignty" and decided to develop their international relationships on the basis of "generally recognized principles and norms of international law."

Similar formulas are being used also in other bilateral interrepublic agreements. These facts enable the situation to be clarified: the USSR juridically exists formally and it does not exist. The absence of logic in this answer is explained by the clear contradictions between the law and the Decree of the Congress of People's Deputies of 5 September 1991, on the one hand, and the principles of the Agreement on Economic Association and Interrepublic Agreements, on the other.

From the standpoint of international law, one must not consider as sovereign a state that enters into the Union, which also is an independent sovereign formation. The one excludes the other.

The problem can be solved partially on the basis of multilateral agreements between the former parts of the USSR, as was done in the Agreement on Economic Association in regard to the USSR's foreign debts. Each republic which had proclaimed sovereignty and independence became a successor state in regard to agreements concluded previously by the USSR.

According to international law, the following procedure should be considered correct. Any agreement of the predecessor state that relates to its whole territory continues to operate in the relationships of each successor state, the same way it does in the relationships of that part of the territory where the predecessor remains. For example, the international pacts about the rights of man that the USSR ratified in 1973 automatically remain in force for each republic that proclaimed sovereignty and independence of the Union of SSR's. It stands to reason

that any of them has the right to get out of one international agreement or another, after it makes an announcement renouncing it. If any agreement that has not been renounced is violated by the new independent state, it will bear international responsibility for this. And pleas that the agreement had been concluded by the former Union will not be considered.

But there are nuances here. For example, agreements about borders are not subject to renunciation. Automatic participation in agreements that international organizations have established is not recognized if they call for a special procedure for the acceptance of new members. Thus the republics that have separated themselves from the USSR cannot automatically become members of the UN without the appropriate decision of the Security Council and the General Assembly. On the contrary, problems of membership in international organizations do not arise for predecessor states.

Now about foreign debts. A successor that has separated itself is obligated to absorb its proper share of the predecessor's debt. The problem of a "proper share" should be resolved on the basis of negotiations between them. The participants of the Agreement about Economic Association have agreed on this, having recorded in article 32 the fact that they consider it necessary to conclude a special agreement about determining the share of each subject of the former USSR in the total amount of payments for the Union's foreign debt and the total of the debts of other countries of the Union.

Latsis Criticizes 'Modus Operandi' of Commonwealth Founders

PM1312152191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Dec 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by Otto Latsis: "Still a Chance"]

[Text] All that has happened so far in connection with the preparation of a treaty on a Union of Sovereign States will not have pleased any sincere supporter of the Union. It has all been like an attempt to clamber out of quicksand onto a dune. We have found it all alarming. In this sense, the reference by the founders of the triple commonwealth to the unsatisfactory Union Treaty situation and impasse is fair. But the question remains: Will it be any better now?

There is one—very important—positive fact for sure: It appears that a way of collaborating with Ukraine has been found. This generates hope that one of the problems that has been worrying everyone will be solved. The significance of the economic accords is obvious. But new problems have arisen. Even if one admits that the agreements are an undoubted achievement, even if one does not doubt that all the declaration and promises for the future will be implemented, one still cannot approve the *modus operandi*, one cannot be satisfied with the way it was done.

Only a few days ago the participants in the talks on a Union of Sovereign States did not even agree to initial a far from radical document, citing the need to consult with the republics' parliaments. Now, in a matter of hours, they have not just initialed but actually signed [a treaty], and it is effective immediately, what is more. There was a manifest disregard for the Supreme Soviets, and therefore for the voters, especially since the agreement scarcely tallies with the results of the March referendum on the Union (I am referring not to the name "Soviet Socialist," which is what certain people have been concerned about so far and which the referendum was about, but the very idea of the Union).

The reasons why the three Slavic republics (let us assume the RSFSR is a Slavic republic) opted for making their own decision without any attempt to reach agreement with the others, and giving the others an associate role, are totally incomprehensible. It was manifest disregard for the other partners after so much talk about the equality of all the components of sovereign statehood.

What justification is there for this selective approach? Perhaps it can be found in the complexity of the current situation, although this *modus operandi* is going to make it more rather than less complex. What justification is there for the improvisational approach, which has been repeatedly discredited in recent years? The reference to the center's shortsighted policy by the three heads of state in their statement makes it incumbent on them not to be shortsighted. The whole fragile sociopolitical equilibrium in the country, which is daily under threat, rests on trust of nationally elected leaders—nothing more than that. There is precious little of this, and trust has to be jealously preserved. But can a citizen believe in anything if, when he goes to bed at night, he does not know what state he is going to wake up to in the morning?

The strange dyarchy (if not to say "tridecarchy"), with an ill-defined demarcation of the functions of the USSR president and the republics' presidents, did a great deal to poison the atmosphere in the country. Something had to be done, and it was hoped that the Treaty on a Union would solve the problem, but the Treaty was not a success—that is true. But are things better now? One would like to hope that all this was done not just to keep one president in the Kremlin. Incidentally, Minsk, for purely technical reasons, could not remain the capital of any major interstate entity for long. Look how much greater Germany's economic potential is than ours, yet it is reluctant to move the capital to Berlin, whose infrastructure is probably stronger than Minsk's.

The main thing now, it seems to me, is to keep calm and not forget for a moment about the vital tasks. God forbid that Russia should be distracted even for an hour from the projected economic reforms, postpone them even for a day. And if the new commonwealth assist the reforms, it would be the prime justification of it.

What has happened has happened. The reality is that it is not the destruction of the Union that is taking place—it was destroyed long ago, the coup *de grace* having been delivered by the August putsch. Let us hope that the site is being cleared for the construction of a new home—a commonwealth of all our peoples; and if so, then perhaps there will be compensation for the bulldozer's blundering movements during the clearance. Essentially, we have been offered an opportunity of choosing a new version of the Union Treaty. Whatever it is, it must not be missed.

The decades of stagnation are a luxury no modern state can afford with impunity. We will be paying for it for a long time to come. We are paying with the present situation, where the traditionally correct actions are impossible and do not work. Circumstances demand a quickening of pace, a break in the continuity, an abandonment of the normal sequence of actions. But speed must not be combined with rashness—on the contrary, it requires precise steps every time. We are dangerously close to the moment when the man in the street will say: We cannot believe anyone any more. I would not envy the politicians who would have to take responsibility for the state at that moment.

Death of Union, Future of Commonwealth Viewed

PM1812144591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Dec 91 Union Edition p 2

[E. Gonzalyez article: "The Union Is Dead! Long Live the Commonwealth?"]

[Text] There is at least one thing we are good at: Explaining to ourselves what is happening to us. We can explain anything, anyhow. Without a moment's hesitation. Calmly. Without any effort.

We have already explained to ourselves why we live badly. Why there is war in the south, cold and epidemics in the east, and strong reluctance to risk investing capital in our country in the West. We have already guessed why the first coup failed and why a second could perfectly well succeed. We have grasped why prices must be rapidly freed and why privatization must be confined to apartments, stores, and hairdressing salons.

Now we are explaining to ourselves why our country has fallen apart. Some say it is the result of intrigues by ambitious politicians. Others—that it is a normal reaction to years of enforced friendship between our peoples. Some believe that the pendulum of state independence has passed the lowest point and, through force of inertia, smashed everything to smithereens. Others say: Where do we go from here? We will go on living side by side as we have always done—we will just be called something different. We were the USSR and now we are going to be the Commonwealth of Independent States, or something else.

Usually, people do not agree as to whether this phenomenon is a blessing or a disaster. On the other hand,

everyone agrees that it was clearly a historical inevitability. They find comfort in the argument that, if it was inevitable and, moreover, historically inevitable, why agonize, fret, and fuss over every action?

Incidentally, this historical inevitability promises very respectable long-term results. We will calm down, we say, and realize that independence cannot be spread on bread. We will each endure misfortune and then reach out to one another again. I think that anyone who has mastered the law of probability will be able to estimate how many years will have to pass before the Azerbaijanis reach out to the Armenians, for example, or vice versa. I am sure that the result will force us to stop and think about whether it is worth reducing relations between peoples to this state. From this viewpoint, the talks held in Minsk were most definitely a blessing!

We simply do not know any other way to try to bring the former republics together. But it is obvious that even the Minsk solution will not be easy. First of all, the union is rather fragile and superficial, existing only on paper. It is held together by intentions rather than by actions. There is no guarantee that the commonwealth will survive if we achieve our immediate aim: to rid ourselves of the unloved center.

Alas, as is the custom in our country, we have once again united against someone rather than for something. The founders of the new commonwealth proudly said afterward that they had been able to reach agreement starting from scratch and in record time—just two days. They have thereby managed to prevent something that we simply could not grasp—the departure of Ukraine. It has been prevented by a compromise reached in negotiations. To put it another way, the commonwealth is still only words held together by signatures. This means that, in principle, it could be overturned by other words (from those opposed to this form of unification, for example) and other signatures. If more impressive ones can be found.

Unfortunately, we know only two ways of dealing with interrepublic problems: war or talks. We simply cannot imagine any other way. It is good that war and any other solutions based on force are now recognized as being inadmissible. So that leaves appeals and talks. What did the president do to try to preserve the USSR? He appealed to the various parliaments to continue the Novo-Ogarevo process. In other words, he said: Let us sit down, talk, convince one another, and sign some sort of document.

And what will change? Until recently, we had an equally sacred belief in the miraculous power of resolutions issued by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. None of these bodies exists any more. A little later, we could not imagine life without hundreds of brand-new laws passed by parliament. Parliament too no longer exists. Now we are pinning our hopes on talks and final documents. At some stage we will remember

that only action is equal to counteraction. Action, not words. If the former republics' transformation into states is really a process, the Novo-Ogarevo process is only a metaphor.

We are apparently faced with a simple truth: Some republics do not want to live in a Union governed by the old center. This knowledge is painful, of course, but a fact is a fact. So the center must change and become what the republics want. But what are we doing? We are pressing them into talks and promising a different kind of independence, a new union, a new relationship. In short, whatever they want, but the center is still the old center. The slightest change can only be wrung from it by force or by terminating finance.

Will the new commonwealth—based solely on talks—last? I remember how three years ago (or perhaps it is longer than that?) parliament discussed a draft law on economic independence for the Baltic republics. Only economic independence! Nevertheless, there were plenty of people opposed to the idea, who said: "You see, they want to live better than the rest of us!"

"We most certainly do!" the Baltics replied. "There is nothing to stop you from doing the same. But you are going nowhere. You are just marking time. You will perish, but we want to live. We do not intend to live in poverty just to keep you company."

This seems to say it all. This is the real reason why the country has fallen apart! I well remember an aphorism suggested by someone from the Baltic republics at a Supreme Soviet session: "Better for everyone to live differently but well, than the same but badly." At that time, however, parliamentarians clearly reflected the mood of the lumpen section of society, for which the possibility of continuing to do nothing was one of the gains of the revolution.

How many other opportunities the Union and the republics had to become more attractive partners and fellow travelers! The "Parity" program was drawn up virtually at the same time as the "500 Days" program—perhaps even a little earlier. It was briefly discussed in the press and then forgotten. But "Parity" began with a conference of heads of state! That is how the authors of the program referred to the leaders of the republics. "Parity" also contained a draft Union Treaty. Moreover, its conditions and rules of the game made expulsion (rather than secession) from the Union a punishment (rather than a dream).

But on one indispensable condition: That the central authorities, republic authorities, and all other authorities would lose a sizable chunk of their power in the course of reform. Citizens would become more independent—particularly in economic respects. So the program was quietly buried.

The "500 Days" program was buried in uproar. Only the center would have lost power, the republics would have

gained it, and citizens would essentially have been left to their own devices. Naturally, the republics were up in arms.

So, I would venture to suggest that the country's disintegration is not only and not even particularly the result of increased national consciousness, the wish to get rid of the dictatorial center, or the historical inevitability of an empire's collapse, so much as the result of the authorities' obvious inability to act. This is caused by their pathological fear of losing even a shred of power.

For this reason alone the plan to save the country with the help of foreign capital was pushed into the far distance. We assured banks and funds that we were prepared to meet their perfectly reasonable terms, but we did not lift a finger. I think this is also the reason why the following appeals were not heard in Russia on 22 August: "Freedom of speech! Freedom of trade! Freedom of enterprise! Land for the peasants! Goods for the producers!"

But there has come to light another circumstance which, in my opinion, has not been properly assessed. Russia only had to announce its intention to free prices—i.e. take not even a step or half a step in the direction of an economy independent of the state—and, before you knew it, the republics were complaining and urgently requesting that we wait for them. One little movement, one little action, and everyone, it seems, is ready to rush after the rest.

It is not hard to see that the Minsk talks are also based on purposeful action, but this too is connected with redistributing central power. The politicians who say it will be easier to haul ourselves out of the abyss if we work together are right. But we must try to get out now, and not just sit on the bottom with panic and helplessness written all over our faces.

Another controversial idea is that there is nothing historically inevitable about the disintegration of our country. The authorities caused its breakup—with their inaction and, as it seemed to them, brilliant maneuvers. Something that does not solve any of our old problems (apart from eliminating the center) and creates a mass of new ones—which are insoluble—cannot be historically inevitable. I am not referring to the problems on everyone's lips: our debts, nuclear weapons, conditional borders, common language, and so forth. But what are we to do about the underlying cause of all our economic problems—the military-industrial complex? After all, you can find a defense enterprise in even the most far-flung region of the country. How will the republics cope with defense conversion on their own?

All right, perhaps a powerful state like Ukraine will cope. If it has time. Because we also have to do something with the Army itself. I do not mean we should use it to strengthen "friendship" between our peoples. Everyone realizes that the Army must simply be reduced in size. But it is simpler and even cheaper to retain an officer than to set him up in civilian life. The withdrawal of troops from East Europe has shown how much this costs.

But almost 5 million armed men will be under no clear authority if the Union breaks up. Whom should such an Army defend? I fear it will defend itself.

The problems suddenly confronting us could be discussed at length. But it would only be more talk. The Army, borders, refugees—all this is important. However, we ourselves are the main problem. We must finally realize that there can be no community of peoples as long as we are poor, hungry, passive, and unhappy. Only prosperous people have unions, associations, clubs, and common interests. The poor have something different—you only have to think of the [Maksim Gorkiy] play "The Lower Depths."

The threat of Ukraine's departure—and any Union is inconceivable without it, of course—certainly should not cause fear, panic, or confusion among us but, on the contrary, the wish to look at ourselves as objectively as possible. To try to establish what exactly it is that everyone—East Europe, the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine—seeks to escape. It is not important what happens to them afterward, whether things turn out well or badly. What is important is the kind of people we are.

We are rather like passengers waiting for a train to depart. We have not yet set off, we have as yet no interest in our fellow travelers, and we have no desire to talk to our neighbors in the compartment. We want to jump down onto the platform to those seeing us off or write meaningless, back-to-front words with our finger on the window. The new acquaintances, heart-to-heart talks, mutual help, and fried chicken divided into four will come later...

Stop! There might not be any chicken. After all, we have been at a standstill for six years! And the train is not standing at the platform but in a siding. The train supervisor will in no way venture to give the green light. And indeed, what sort of supervisor is he en route? Any ordinary engineer could take charge. But, if he does not move soon, he could be left without his passengers, his train, and even his job.

Work Continues at Abolished Union Ministries

924B0103A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Nov 91 p 1

[Report by A. Kosulnikov: "Thirty-Eight Thousand Employees of Abolished Ministries Continue Work—Strangely Enough, in the Same Ministries"]

[Text] Some people perhaps expected that the closing of almost 80 all-Union ministries and departments, set by the State Council for 15 November, would produce an effect comparable to a natural disaster. Some, on the contrary, have been waiting for this day as a national holiday—another holiday of liberated labor.

Neither the former nor the latter got what they had been waiting for.

Yesterday, 15 November 1991, the ministries in the country did not comply with the State Council decision and cease activities.

Your correspondent had an opportunity to verify this by strolling through the downtown of the capital and paying visits to various ministerial entrances.

First, the pass bureaus and security are working full time—in only one organization was I able to get in with the help of the press card.

Second, the telephones are ringing as intensely as before.

Third, people in ties carrying folders under their arms are running around at the same speed as before.

Purely visual observations have been confirmed in conversations with staff members and the leadership. It came out that all of them would be glad to wrap up their work and scatter to cushier places, but there are no special instructions in this regard.

They discussed, passionately and in detail, the segment of the evening information program from the day before yesterday on the topic of dismantling the USSR Ministry of Health, which it is not clear how to conduct. "Any moment," was the general opinion.

At the proper time everybody went for a lunch break, and returned also at the proper time. To be honest, I was somewhat surprised, but there were thick folders full of papers on the tables, and some sort of manipulations were constantly going on with these papers; the process was not entirely clear to me, but it all looked quite solid.

In short, behind every door in the ministry normal work was going on at full speed!

For some reason, however, practically all administrators of affairs in the ministries, that is, the people who, in this correspondent's opinion, should be in charge of the liquidation, asked that their names not be mentioned. Perhaps they did in fact reveal a strict government secret when they said that there is not a single actual document confirming the State Council decision on liquidation?

Then what is there, you may ask. There are Central Television broadcasts and newspaper commentaries. There are telegrams from the Gosbank ((State Bank)) with Gerashchenko's signature about suspending financing—and even those already retracted. There is, according to unofficial sources, a certain text that has indeed come from the State Council, but somehow does

not have a document number or seal. There is, finally, the Code of Labor Laws prescribing that workers be notified of impending dismissal two months in advance. This, by the way, has not been done either.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Issues was perhaps luckier than others—it did receive in advance a document from the government of Russia prescribing that the occupied space be vacated since a republic ministry by the same name is to move in there. Undismissed, uninformed, and quite frightened clerks began to obediently vacate the space, trying to figure out in the process where and how they are supposed to work now. The decision was for now to squeeze in more people per square foot, although it is rather inconvenient to work this way. Nothing to be done about it, however: on Monday, new owners are to be move in on the upper floors. In essence, the ministry is indeed being dismantled in this extravagant way.

That is, no matter where you look you see our sweet, familiar madhouse.

I also stopped by the Department of Labor and Employment of the Moscow government (Moscow Labor Exchange), where by 16 November a department for employment of former ministerial employees had been specially established. Its staff members braced themselves early for the first wave of unemployed. There was no wave, however. Director General Igor Zaslavskiy suggested that it was perhaps the result of ministerial employees' habit of making the rounds of the stores in the morning. He expects that in the next few days—regardless of whether any decision is made or not—about 400 people will resort to his organization's services.

It is worth noting that in the real dismantling of the indicated structures about 38,000 highly skilled bureaucrats should end up on the street. However, by the boldest calculations, no more than one-third will need to register at the labor exchange—mostly what is called "the middle level" of women and those of pre-retirement age. Everybody else, with rare exceptions, has already prepared a "safe landing" for themselves.

As of yesterday 21 ministerial employees showed up at the department.

As We Went to Press

I was able to contact the State Council's press service. It turned out that at the meeting in Novo-Ogarevo on Thursday it was decided to task the Inter-Republic Economic Committee to urgently work out the documentation establishing the procedures for the liquidation of all-Union administrative structures. It is expected that it will be ready by Monday. In the opinion of the press service staff, the ministries should have ceased issuing normative documents yesterday.

Functions of Former Political Consultative Council Detailed*924B0139A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
10 Dec 91 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "The Political Advisers of M. S. Gorbachev"]

[Text] Tell me, please, about the Political Consultative Council under the president of the USSR. What functions it carries out, who its members are, and how it works?

V. Voinova
Odessa Oblast

It is well known that under the president there already existed a Presidential Council and a Security Council. But they never played their role properly. M. S. Gorbachev is placing great hopes precisely on the Political Consultative Council. The following have been confirmed as members of the council: Vadim Bakatin, Yevgeniy Velikhov, Nikolay Petrakov, Gavriil Popov, Yuriy Ryzhov, Anatoliy Sobchak, Eduard Shevardnadze, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Yegor Yakovlev, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. We must speak especially about the boundaries or limits of the powers of the Consultative Council. Already from the name the direction of its work is clear: To give advice to the leader of the state taking into account the developing political situations.

The subjects that are discussed in the Political Consultative Council are the most diverse. As an example one can talk about how the regular session of 30 November went. M. S. Gorbachev informed the Council about the work of the State Council. After an exchange of opinions, the participants of the session unanimously supported the urgent conclusion of the Union Treaty. From their point of view, it is precisely this which answers the basic interests of the peoples, the most acute need for the stabilization of the political and socioeconomic situation in the country.

The participants of the session also did not side-step such a serious question as the absence of a constructive and businesslike dialogue between the democratic movements, the public and political organizations in the sovereign republics and in the country as a whole.

In the opinion of the participants of the Political Consultative Council, the realization of the Agreement on an Economic Association, the most active explanatory work in the interest of the achievement of civic consensus, and the arrangement of a social partnership is the leading direction of contemporary policy, without which it is impossible to preserve the democratic achievements.

Kulikov on Future of Council of Union, Republics*924B0130A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 91
Union Edition p 2*

[USSR Supreme Soviet spokesman B.I. Kulikov interviewed by V. Raskin: "Our Own UN?"]

[Text] Following the referendum held in Ukraine last Sunday, many commentators for foreign publications accredited in the capital have hastened to write commentaries in which they say that the "referendum has struck a fatal blow to Gorbachev's hopes to revive the Soviet Union"

I asked V.I. Kulikov, director of the national parliament's press center, to tell about the outlook for the work of the Council of Republics and the Council of the Union. Here is his point of view:

[Kulikov] I think that the upper chamber will in the near future be reminiscent of a forum along the lines of the United Nations. With the difference that it will be an organization uniting the sovereign states of the former Union. Today the republics' interests are represented by People's Deputies, but in the future this will most likely be done by delegations from the republics or sovereign states. The Council of Republics will become a forum where all the representatives will be able to say whether they are "for" or "against" various decisions being considered and where it will be possible to sort out problems arising among the republics.

[Raskin] How do you view the signing of the Union Treaty?

[Kulikov] After detailed discussion in the republic parliaments, I think that it will undergo significant changes. But it will ultimately be signed. In order that we all survive, we must first establish economic ties that will develop into political cooperation. It's hard to make predictions. But let's return once more to what we all acknowledge: The most important thing in life is the economy. It will help all the parties concerned to come together under one "roof." Let's be realists: Ukrainian-made goods are not needed in Paris today, but they are needed in Moscow. Let's draw conclusions.

It seems that USSR PResident M.S. Gorbachev has drawn his conclusions. In an appeal to the country's parliamentarians, he emphasized that of all the numerous crisis our fatherland is going through, the most dangerous is the crisis of statehood—the very statehood without which there is no great power respected by the entire planet. The President affirmed once more that the idea of self-determination, national-state sovereignty, and independence is important, but that it must be based on union, cooperation, collaboration, and mutual assistance.

The USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union has made some movement forward. On Wednesday, its session approved the draft political treaty.

Much will obviously depend on the meeting of the three leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in Minsk that is slated for Saturday.

Federation of Autonomous National State Formations Proposed

924B0130B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 91
Union Edition p 10

[Article by Doctor of Legal Sciences G. Nikerov: "A Federation for People, Not 'Peoples'"]

[Text] The larger a state, the farther its capital is from the periphery. It is simply impossible for central government bodies to attend to these peripheral areas' needs. And the larger a country's population, the more voters represented by each parliamentary Deputy and by each central government official, and the farther the government from the people. Under such conditions, the creation in a democratic law-governed state of a federation of a union of self-governing parts is inevitable. Such states are more democratic by nature. The federation principle is used to govern not only such giant countries as the United States, Canada, Australia, and Brazil, but also smaller ones like Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, and others. In these countries, federalization provides a democratic structure of state power and a means of administration, though usually not a means of dealing with a nationality question. Moreover, countries organized on a nationality basis, such as Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia, are less stable and often find themselves on the brink of civil war and collapse. As world practice shows, the best way to deal with a nationality question is unlimited national-cultural autonomy.

During the first 20 years of Soviet rule, a Leninist-Stalinist territorial demarcation of the country on a nationality basis—in many cases, on a pseudonationality basis—was carried out. The area of formerly unitary Russia gave way to 15 union republics (including the Baltic republics, which were joined in 1940). The republics were further divided into four "underground levels" of autonomy: several dozen autonomous republics, oblasts, okrugs, and national rayons.

Outwardly, everything looked very progressive. But on closer study, the system failed to withstand criticism. Above all, nations were divided into five grades, as it were: The first grade was to be found in the union republics, the second grade in the autonomous republics, the third grade in the autonomous oblasts, and so forth. There was no trace of equal rights here. More than 50 indigenous and a great number of nonindigenous peoples received no state or autonomous entity at all.

And, finally, the most important point. Some of the union republics and most of the autonomous entities were artificial units: The indigenous nation in them did not constitute a majority of the population. After the establishment of the autonomous units, the proportion of indigenous nations in most of them not only did not increase but, on the contrary, declined. In the Russian Federation, according to the 1979 population census, of 16 autonomous republics, only in four—Chuvashia, Tuva, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Northern Ossetia—did the indigenous peoples constitute a majority.

Mononational autonomous units were created in what were essentially multinational territories. The borders were drawn in areas where the population had long been so intermixed that drawing any boundaries made no sense. In dealing with the nationality issue, ideology called the tune. An effort was made to implement at any cost the Leninist slogan about nations' right to self-determination and to allot each more or less sizable people its own "national corner." There was little common sense in this policy—more precisely, none at all. This is confirmed by recent events: The Union—a Leninist-Stalinist Tower of Babel—is breaking up in the flames of interethnic strife.

Now it's the Russian Federation's turn. In the enormous area of Russia, where, in the course of evolutionary development, a country richer and more powerful than the United States could have formed, we have only destruction and chaos. And we must finally concede that, as in many other areas, we have done "something wrong" in dealing with the nationality issue. And that "something wrong" should not now bind us hand and feed and remain the foundation for constructing a new building.

Drawing new internal borders between nations and strengthening old ones will have the most serious negative consequences for all spheres of life, for both the country and the individual union republics. This practice is also fundamentally at odds with world trends toward the unification of countries and peoples and toward the establishment of united markets and political unions.

In the Russian Federation, the republics, krais, oblasts, and okrugs should be replaced solely by states—several large states formed on an economic and geographic basis. Preserving the autonomous units in their present form would be to continue our dangerous experiments to deal with the explosive the nationality question.

We need only give the republics, krais, oblasts, and okrugs equal rights. Each of these autonomous units or territories would have one or two representatives in a new Federal Council of Russia.

People's Deputy on Need for New Congress, Study of China, Spain Experience

924B0134A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Dec 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Krayko, USSR people's deputy, by V. Litvin, correspondent: "Barriade-Type Thinking Can Lead Us Only to New Barriades: Reality and Predictions"]

[Text] *Judging by the public-opinion polls, people's confidence in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies has fallen almost to zero. To a considerable degree, this was likewise facilitated by the September Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, which was held de facto under the dictates of the republic-level leaders, who did not even*

bother to conceal their attempt to weaken the political structure of the center as much as possible. Nevertheless, the idea of convoking a new Congress of People's Deputies for the purpose of solving the extremely exacerbated political and economic problems is being discussed again in this country's parliamentary and public circles. Our correspondent met with and interviewed one of the advocates of this idea, USSR People's Deputy Aleksandr Nikolayevich Krayko.

[Litvin] Frankly speaking, the proposal to convoke a new Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which, seems to have hopelessly compromised itself as the highest organ of state power and authority, looks like an attempt—if you'll pardon the sharpness of my expression—to bring back to life a political corpse which has already grown cold. Furthermore, the republic-level leaders, who have already tasted all the goodies of de facto independence from a strong center, will not allow such a "corpse" to be resuscitated. This is all the more true inasmuch as the draft of the new political agreement or treaty has already been prepared and registered. Moreover, the country will soon have a new name—The Union of Sovereign States (SSG). In short, doesn't it seem to you that such an idea is nothing more than good intentions flying in the face of the realities which have evolved?

[Krayko] It's precisely on a sober analysis of these realities that I base my proposal for immediately beginning to think about convoking the congress. It has already become a cliché to compare the situation in which this country finds itself to one just before a thunderstorm. Virtually everybody agrees that the thunder, i.e., the social explosion, is inevitable; the only dispute is about the time when it will occur. And nobody, I repeat, nobody, is undertaking any real measures to avert this impending catastrophe. On the contrary, everything is being done to speed it up. Take Moscow, for example. Here matters have come to the point of introducing ration cards for bread; the price of certain varieties of it has shot up to five rubles a loaf. And the universal freeing up of prices which the Russian leadership intends to carry out will place millions of Muscovites literally on the brink of starving to death. Moreover, as past experience has shown, no compensations or indexing will help. Rather it is a case of the ongoing breakdown of the country as a whole already reaching Russia. Here's the way matters stand now: Either there will be a complete abandonment of the present bankrupt political and economic course, or there will be the bloody anarchy of a civil war, that utterly senseless and ruthless Russian rebellion from which everyone will suffer—reformers and conservatives, right-wingers and left-wingers, workers and entrepreneurs.

[Litvin] Entrepreneurs?

[Krayko] In Moscow they recently presented another ultimatum to the mayor's office and the Moscow City Council, demanding that a halt be called to endless skirmishes and harsh words, and that at least elementary stability and order be ensured. What does this tell us?

Merely that the credit of trust and confidence in the new authorities is melting literally before our eyes, that these authorities are now being abandoned even by those social strata and groups which, it would seem, should serve as their firm social bulwark and foundation. This is also attested by the deepening split in the movement known as "Democratic Russia." The gap between the basic mass of the population and the actions of the radicals now manning the levers of state power has begun to show and is rapidly growing wider. Even according to the public-opinion polls being published in the "democratic" press, a significant majority of the population is in favor of calling a halt to the mad race for reforms; they advocate the guarantee of at least some kind of stability, and then proceeding toward a market-type economy.

A noticeable sobering-up has likewise begun to show itself in the programs of several political parties which—quite recently—were calling for a forced march into capitalism. In other words, the soil has been prepared for a major, strategic turning aside from that terrifying chasm toward which we have been pushed by the radicals and the nationalistic leaders. I'm convinced that the society, in its overwhelming majority, will welcome such a turning aside. All the more so in that many people's deputies, having learned by bitter experience, now look at things quite differently than they did, let's say, just six months ago. And the August post-putsch shock has gradually passed away. Taking into account the situation in the republics and in the localities, it would be impossible and, furthermore, hardly feasible, to hold All-Union elections at this time. Under these conditions, the Congress of People's Deputies—more than any other entity—remains the highest organ of state authority and power still existing in this country, no matter how many words we've heard about its "demise" over the radio and television.

[Litvin] I can agree with you that the policy being followed by the republic-level and local leaders is becoming more and more remote from the vital interests of the people. Nevertheless, the real power remains in their hands, as well as the controlling packet of shares in the mass media, which have been conducting an extremely successful "brainwashing" campaign in the national-sovereignty vein. Under such conditions, who could take the initiative for holding another congress? The Supreme Soviet? But it is firmly controlled by the leadership of the republics, half of which, by the way, are not even represented in the new parliament. The President of the USSR? But he has no real power either; furthermore, he is completely dependent on the State Council. Pardon me for saying so, but you wouldn't even have any place to assemble. And even if you went abroad, I doubt very much that you would find a suitable country...

[Krayko] You're being ironic to no avail. Of course, there are quite a few difficulties and obstacles. But they can be overcome. Remember the situation on the eve of

the November holidays. Here in Moscow the "democratic" mayor's office—headed up by Mayor G. Popov—seemed to be doing everything it could to prevent the traditional demonstration from taking place. An appropriate "brainwashing" was conducted, prohibiting orders were issued (on the last day, to be sure, they were repealed), and an alternate demonstration at the Lyubyanka was assisted. And on the very eve of the holiday—on 6 November—the heavy artillery "fired off a shot"—B. Yeltsin's Ukase banning the CPSU. And what was the result? The effect turned out to be just the opposite of what had been expected, i.e., it was counter-productive. Even according to "unfriendly" estimates, there were at least 100,000 persons on Red Square and near it. Moreover, people came there in a very determined and militant mood. And nowadays such dissatisfaction still remains in the country on even a larger scale. To be sure, in the republics it is being channeled into the deliberately false streambed of further "sovereignization," by which is understood the purest water of separatism.

And it's up to us, as Union deputies, by utilizing our own rights and powers, to fearlessly tell people the harsh truth, to explain what a terrible tragedy the complete disintegration of the Union would entail for them. And they will all understand, all the more so in that the events now taking place are opening their eyes to a great many things. According to the latest polls, 80 percent of Moscow's inhabitants have come out in favor of an integrated Union, along with 72 percent from Alma-Ata, and about 60 percent from Kiev, which is notably higher than in the March referendum.

In my opinion, the idea of convoking an extraordinary congress is supported by many parties and public movements, moreover, by those with the most diverse orientations.

[Litvin] You appeal to the common sense of the masses, but it is not they who are manning the levers of power. Instead these levers are controlled by those politicians who are struggling to keep their own armchairs and who, I have no doubts, will greet the idea of a new congress with a very hostile reception.

[Krayko] A few days ago Central Television showed a report from the Croatian city of Vukovar, which—as a result of fierce fighting—has been turned into a heap of ruins. With thousands of dead or maimed, tens of thousands of refugees, this once flourishing region has become a dark hell, a place of death and incredible suffering. Because of the continuing exacerbation of ethnic conflicts, our country could soon have quite a few such Vukovars. And even worse, since the Yugoslavs have no nuclear weapons, and despite all the destruction, they are not threatened by famine. Is it possible that the republic-level leaders, under the pressure of the worsening situation, do not recognize this?

[Litvin] All things considered, you seem to be disturbed by the growing authoritarian tendencies.

[Krayko] Yes, the situation has been made acutely worse by the repressions directed at those who think differently from the group in power, first and foremost, against the communists. The former communist monopoly of the truth has been replaced by a "democratic" monopoly which is even narrower and more mercenary.

There's not enough courage and conscientiousness to admit the erroneousness and adventuristic nature of the course which they chose, nor their own incompetence and helplessness. And so they have to dump all the blame on the nonexistent "enemies of the people," "unsmashed" conservatives, and party bureaucrats who are, supposedly, retarding and hampering everything. It's primitive and unintelligent, but customary, and the main thing is that it influences persons lacking good sense, people who have become dismayed over the day-to-day confusion and disorder. Nor do they want to understand that stirring up base instincts, whipping up hostility and hatred, which—even without this—have reached extreme levels, brings about a further decline and deterioration of responsibility and discipline, elementary order and morality, and finally leads to a complete loss of trust in the institutions of power and state sovereignty. That is, in the final analysis, it turns against the very initiators of the anti-communist hysteria. It is precisely analogous to the well-known saying "Swallow as much sovereignty as you can!" They swallowed to the point of saturation: It's no longer the Union, but Russia itself that has begun to swing back and forth in front of our very eyes! Since we are no longer capable of looking on ahead even a slight distance, of considering the immediate (not to mention the long-range) consequences of our own political actions, then we should at least look somewhat more attentively at the experience of those countries which—in contrast to us—are successfully emerging from crisis-type situations.

[Litvin] What specific countries do you have in mind?

[Krayko] China, for example. There they have not begun to engage in breaking up their political structures nor in "sovereignization." Without any "innovative" noise or pomp, they have proceeded to carry out multilateral, thoroughly thought-out market reforms, which take national specifics into account and which retain a strong state sector, planning, discipline, and responsibility at all levels of social production. The result has been an utterly fantastic leap in the entire people's material and spiritual standard of living, as well as stores filled with diverse goods an ever-increasing portion of which are blazing a path for themselves to the world marketplace.

For some reason, however, we have been attracted by the far-from-rainbow-hued (as it seems to us) experience of Poland, Hungary, and other Eastern European countries, where the enrichment of a narrow stratum has been accompanied by a precipitous decline in the living standards of the vast majority of the people.

Another example is Spain. After the departure of the totalitarian regime from the scene there, political forces

of various tendencies—including the followers of Franco—concluded the so-called Monclova Pact. Its essence was a pledge to cooperate in achieving nationwide goals and not to persecute their political opponents for any past political sins, no matter how harmful they may have been. The result was a political and social stability, a joining in the cause of national revival by the broadest social strata. And this—to no small degree—has facilitated the rapid and extraordinarily effective development of the Spanish economy.

[Litvin] We've obviously departed from the topic of the congress.

[Krayko] On the contrary. What I said above is directly pertinent to the congress. How did preparations for the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies used to be carried out? Alas and regrettably, to a considerable extent, this was done secretly, i.e., in camera; a great deal was decided within the narrow circle of the President and the leaders of the former parliament. As a rule, the sessions of the Supreme Soviet approved the agenda drawn up for the congress without always making—I regret to say—an adequately sharp analysis of the complex problems confronting the country. I am convinced that the preparations for a new congress must be undertaken with a view to responding to the following three fundamental questions, which are fateful for our country: How can the country be saved? How can we extricate ourselves from this extremely acute economic crisis? How can we unite the leading political forces and parties around a program or national revival? Naturally, every deputy being sent to this congress should have a firm position on all these questions, including, of course, his own attitude toward potential candidates for key state posts. In order to solve new problems, we also need new people, although, taking into account the realities which have evolved, the deputies—in my opinion—can also allow certain exceptions.

[Litvin] But what if the congress, as was the case in the past, becomes bogged down in endless disputes and disagreements or cannot reach decisions because of the lack of a necessary quorum?

[Krayko] I'm assuming that the genuine possibilities for convoking the congress will not appear until the only alternative to it are events even more serious than those in Yugoslavia. And, unfortunately, we are steadily approaching that stage. Therefore, the congress, having assembled upon the agreement of the majority of the deputies and, I'm sure, the republic-level leaders, will have to engage not in debates and in looking for scapegoats, but rather in working out measures to avert the impending catastrophe.

[Litvin] In your opinion, what should we begin by doing now?

[Krayko] Concluding, of course, in our own country's variant, something similar to the Monclova Pact mentioned above. By the way, it could subsequently be given a legislative format in the congress. The existing authorities, i.e., those now in power, particularly in Russia

have the following choice: Either continue the confrontation, which—under the present-day conditions—will inevitably result in the most disastrous consequences, or make a decisive turn toward businesslike cooperation among all political and public forces. As a first step, we must repudiate the acts banning the activity of the CPSU. And here it's not a matter of reviving the former Communist Party, which—to my way of thinking—is highly improbable, but of preventing repressions directed against those who think differently. The present authorities must be ready to seriously include a broad spectrum of public forces and movements in the national revival.

We could also give some thought to another matter. As you know, support for the GKCh [State Committee for the State of Emergency, i.e., the leaders of the failed coup of August 1991]—as admitted by members of the investigating committee itself—has been expressed by up to 70 percent of the letters from average people sent to this commission. Obviously, we must take these attitudes into consideration. We must also take into account the increased need to recruit and select persons for state service, the apparatus, i.e., government "machinery," and those around the political leaders solely in accordance with their practical and professional qualities, rather than based on the thoroughly rotten class-Bolshevik principles such as whether or not he was on the barricades near the "White House" during the August coup. Furthermore, if we are to speak seriously about violations of the Constitution and responsibility for the breakdown of our country, we can do no less than place the blame at the door of the present-day leadership.

USSR People's Deputy Andreyeva on Problems of Supreme Soviet

924B0135A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 7 Dec 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Iren Aleksandrovna Andreyeva, USSR people's deputy, conducted by V. Litvin: "It May Be Too Late"]

[Text] *The name of Iren Aleksandrovna Andreyeva, USSR people's deputy, is well known to anyone who followed the work of the former Supreme Soviet. Her speeches were always notable for their well-reasoned style and objectivity, and they contained specific and constructive proposals. Our correspondent talked with Iren Aleksandrovna and asked her to answer a number of questions.*

[Litvin] Once as I looked over the list of members in the new USSR Supreme Soviet I was very surprised to find that you were not on it.

[Andreyeva] Quite frankly, I was disappointed and happy at the same time. Disappointed like anyone who does not get elected. That is simply human nature. And happy because the reason I was not elected was a very clear-cut criterion to which I was supposed to conform unswervingly in the future. I never make that kind of

pledge to myself, much less to anyone else. I will not hang out a sign saying "occupied." So I feel that I succeeded. Now a deputy who is a member of the Supreme Soviet can be recalled not just by the voters (as stipulated by law) but also by a republic Supreme Soviet; that means that each speech must be squared with the guidelines of the republic Supreme Soviets. That was unacceptable to me. I am a nonparty member not only in the sense that I was never a CPSU member; I cannot be a member of any party, for me that would be too great a restriction on my personal freedom. There are enough other conditions and circumstances which one must deal with out of conscience.

The present Supreme Soviet is strictly controlled by the republic groups, which determine how their deputies will behave. So they are not encouraging deputies' independence of action. Deputies from those republics which are not taking part in the Supreme Soviet at all are also in a difficult position. I greatly regret the loss of some of them who took firm positions and were able to produce arguments in defense of those positions. For example, V. S. Advadze, A. F. Nazarenko, N. K. Kozyrev, Ya. Ya. Bezbakh, A. A. Zgerskaya, L. A. Arutyunyan, and others. I am convinced that in the present complex political situation it is very important to make maximum use of our entire intellectual potential and all of our gradually acquired experience with parliamentary procedure. From the legal standpoint as well all this is, to put it mildly, odd. These deputies were elected under a Union law which no one has repealed, just as the mandates of those deputies have not been rescinded. In my opinion, we are once again living and operating like the Bolsheviks. Once again we obviously have a strong desire for there to be no opposition. That means that we are running the risk of "amicably" taking the same path of mistakes, mistakes which decades from now will be euphorically exposed once again.

[Litvin] This reminds one of the time of party leaders' unquestioned dictates...

[Andreyeva] Well, not all leaders are alike, but some new kinds of dictates do perhaps come to mind. In this regard we should not lose sight of the fact that even among the deputies 86 percent were CPSU members. What difference does it make if a majority of them explain away their former membership by citing considerations of expediency? That means that nowadays it is simply expedient for some of them not to be party members. It is quite difficult to imagine genuine adherence to ideological principles there. These transformations are more due to personal and egotistical motives. And, of course, career motives. That is sad. But... this should be repeated over and over: human beings are weak.

Alarm over the possibility of dictatorship is natural. Many of our present leaders and administrators were party leaders until quite recently. Why should one not assume that the interplay of various forces and career motives will not motivate them once again, since they could so suddenly become zealous democrats or staunch

supporters of national sovereignty? It is not the "sovereignty" part which is alarming about this, it is the word "national" in the narrow sense of the word. For 20th century civilization and for people with a modern concept of the world that is too regressive an approach, one which caves in to medieval thinking.

In my opinion sovereignty is a universal concept; it defines both personal self-awareness and state structure to an equal degree. But what does nationality have to do with it? Even religious doctrines do not limit themselves to such a narrow definition. Neither Christianity nor Islam nor Buddhism categorize people by their nationality. Even Russia, strictly speaking, was never multiethnic. Now suddenly we have begun classifying people precisely on the basis of their nationality. Once again a dangerous parallel presents itself. There is no way to escape the correlation between the laws of politics and the laws of economics. The economy is no longer slipping toward the abyss, it is rushing there headlong. Eventually it could drag politics down with it. We will of course continue to curse all the presidents, as is our custom. But we should not forget ourselves, either. For better or for worse the opposition now has a voice—newspapers, television and radio broadcasts and thousands of seats in parliaments from Moscow to the further reaches of the country. Yet our opposition remains somehow one-dimensional. It is all aimed at weakening whoever happens to be the latest leader.

We have condemned the secrecy and anonymity of decisions made by party apparatchiks. Yet now contradictory and often unreliable information, whether rumors or articles in the press, is once again bewildering not only voters but deputies as well. The circle of decision makers is ill-defined. Someone on the State Council has made decisions in the past, and they continue to be made. But it is a mystery who is personally responsible for what. Yet the propaganda continues to hail "openness," "glasnost" and "pluralism." That is the most comfortable way: to require nothing of anyone. The "wisdom" of the apparatus has been learned well, and not just by the old guard, it seems.

[Litvin] Are you not being too harsh? What we are seeing is a search for a qualitatively new type of parliamentary system under conditions of republics' complete sovereignty and independence.

[Andreyeva] What you so delicately describe as a "search" has gone far beyond the bounds of what is understood by a parliamentary system in the civilized world. It is not enough that the present USSR Supreme Soviet has in many ways been stripped of its basic functions, those of legislation and supervision, functions which have now been largely transferred to the republics. Its deputies are now receiving instructions from republic parliaments. In other words, elections which despite all their shortcomings were nonetheless a democratic form of expression of the people's will are being negated by mandatory guidelines—a typical manifestation of the bureaucratic style, which is contradictory to generally

accepted principles for the formation of representative organs of authority. Deputies' hands have been tied in advance... God forbid that they should speak in opposition to some republic. Once again we have stunned the world with the originality of our political culture.

[Litvin] But the politicians who speak out in favor of further reinforcement of national sovereignty really do have the support of a majority of their peoples...

[Andreyeva] Of a majority, you say... But did our present leaders promise disintegration of the Union and creation of separate national armies, currencies and customs services in their campaign platforms? On the contrary, they all affirmed their support for a renewed Union and condemned manifestations of nationalist extremism. So why has all this happened? Did the peoples of what are now the former union republics actually sanction disintegration? For some reason no one seems to be in a hurry to bring these matters to a referendum.

With words one can quite logically reach absurd conclusions. It is like the joke which says that if someone who is half-drunk is the same as someone who is half-sober, then a drunk and a sober person are the same, too. Sovereignty of a region, a people or a nation in no way precludes a union or even integration of certain spheres, for example the economy, culture and policy. Yet in the pledges of some of our sophists sovereignty seems to be equated to isolationism and complete separation. Yet at the same time it is both sad and comical for me to watch as trips are busily made to rich neighbors to win recognition and aid. It is not out of pride that I have that perception, but rather out of sadness and a feeling of offense at the fact that for so many decades we were together in misfortune, yet now that we are free we do not want to combine our efforts in order to live in a new, positive and humane manner. The entire experience of human history proves that peoples moving toward freedom and prosperity unite their efforts ever more firmly and share their natural resources, knowledge and abilities ever more generously. Yet obviously we not only have learned nothing from our own lessons, we are not learning from the experience of others, either.

[Litvin] But the situation is changing rapidly, and this presents the necessity of quickly making necessary corrections in the political course selected.

[Andreyeva] Corrections must be made, I will not dispute that. But in whose interests, those of the overwhelming majority of people, to whom nationalistic games are pointless, or of ambitious leaders who are attempting to keep their positions or expand their powers at any cost? It is no secret that some of them are yielding one position after another and appealing to far from progressive sentiments, saying "vote for me and you will get whatever you want." These "leaders" are always dreaming of gaining complete independence, which unfortunately will also mean virtually unlimited power for them. They will have more honors, more freedom, and a chance to cling to their positions longer.

"Down below," in real, ordinary life, the sentiments and aspirations are completely different. A few days ago Minsk was the scene of a plenum of the Designers' Union, with representatives of 12 republics attending. They all realized that complete isolation from each other would doom them all to backwardness and complete provincialism. Both in the huge RSFSR and in little Turkmenia.

[Litvin] So, to put it simply, disintegration of the Union and its state structures is not beneficial to anyone except those leading that disintegration?

[Andreyeva] No, not at all. It is not that simple, and there are not that few people today who find this advantageous. For example, the new bureaucratic apparatus. The virus of nationalism has infected people who are not only nationalists of long standing, but also those who were internationalists in their previous service. Unfortunate as it may be, some members of the intelligentsia have joined in this dangerous game. To people who are dissatisfied with the previous and current endlessly multiplying day-to-day disorders and tribulations they first said in a whisper and then through megaphones proclaimed: you are first and foremost Lithuanians, Latvians, Armenians, Ukrainians or Russians, and other peoples are only hindering you, holding you back, robbing you and consuming all you own. Nationalism is like a drug: first you try a little bit, then you want more and more. Yet a time comes when those who have tried this drug are horrified when they begin to realize that hatred of other nations is also destroying their own. But it could be too late: by then young turks who hold nothing dear and who are prepared to do anything to cling to power have already unceremoniously elbowed their way to the helm, pushing aside everyone who stands in their way. But the problems, the everyday problems that people have, not only do not get solved, they actually move in the other direction, toward the point of explosion.

[Litvin] Are you referring to economic and social issues?

[Andreyeva] Of course. I am not going to talk about snowballing problems with food and manufactured goods. There is a large number of other problems which are equally ominous. I have been told by competent individuals that there are only a month or six weeks of insulin reserves in our country today. What are diabetics who need it every day going to do? They could be condemned to suffer and eventually die. The compounds required for the operation of dialysis machines are running out. The simplest medicines are disappearing, and there is a shortage of painkillers. People are suffering physically and their lives are even threatened. And doctors despair when they cannot help the sick. How can we get out of this crisis? What should be done? Which resources should be mobilized? Yet in the midst of this epidemic of sovereignty drives and vulgar political machinations these problems are relegated to the back burner. Can we really not comprehend that we are headed for a social explosion which could exceed in force anything that has happened in the past?

How is it that once again we find ourselves in a situation in which paralyzing fear is being instilled in people? How have we been fooled again, first offered a cookie and then seeing it divided up based on ethnic privileges? Who will now unite us in order to bar the way to the latest "bright tomorrow" at the price of our life today?

Stereotypes die hard: everyone sees a coup in the farcical demonstrations of those losers of August, when we could laud the heroism of the resistance. But the most successful coups are quiet palace coups in which people grab the seats out from under each other. We should not forget that, and remember Khrushchev's reign, and Brezhnev's, and those of subsequent leaders, who though doomed continued their embittered struggle behind the stout doors on Staraya Square. And in the Kremlin. Today we already have two presidents in the same palace!

Are all of us who live in this era doomed to be "masses"? Can we really not stand up for ourselves? We will again have to go through the Biblical 40 years until the last person born in slavery dies? With the current life expectancy we would have to wait another 70 years!

We have lost hope in Gorbachev. Now all hopes are pinned on Yeltsin. So does that mean that only the czar can give us relief, while we stand aside and watch?

No, that is not the whole truth, and it does not apply to everyone. The people go on working and living, no matter who makes vows in their name and no matter who usurps the right to speak for them. No matter who uses their name to further purely personal ends. In the end everyone will have to answer to the people. And, as you know, the people long remain silent and then speak loudly. It would be better if things did not come to that.

Future of Supreme Court Questioned

924B0120A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 3-10 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Valery Savitsky, LL.D. Professor: "Supreme Court Awaits Verdict"]

[Text] A short while back a Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court had to decide for the first time in its history the crucial question: to be or not?

No one foisted this question on the Court; there was no insistence that it be discussed. However, evading discussion would have meant trying to put a good face on the matter. Yet the matter of justice is not a game.

The Supreme Court of the USSR was formed in 1924, shortly after the emergence of the Union. Today that model of the Union has virtually disintegrated. I believe that this will be soon legally formalized. Because of their primary "centrism," many Union structures will sink into oblivion—in the wake of the Cabinet of Ministers, the State Planning Committee, the State committee for Material and Technical Supplies, and so on. But what about the Supreme Court?

The destiny of the country's court of the highest instance essentially hinges on two factors: first, whether it will have "work" to do, i.e., whether there will still be a need to settle conflicts, and second, whether the sovereign states situated on the territory of the former Soviet Union, will agree to entrust this delicate mission to some supranational structure endowed with judicial powers.

Our future state setup is still hidden in a dense mist. But a sufficiently clear guidepost—a Treaty on Economic Community—will appear in a few days. The independent states have agreed to form an economic space, which also implies, of course, the creation of a corresponding legal space, i.e., a sum total of the laws in force on the territory of all these states. No economic relations are possible without having common agreements or without bringing economic legislation closer together. Try and use. For example, a gas pipeline passing the territory of several states will not begin to operate unless the states concerned come to terms on the procedures involved in its operation, on maintenance and repairs, on industrial safety rules, etc.—nothing will come about.

As experience has long shown, any established procedure can be upset. I know of no law which prevents this. It can be predicted that the legal norms developed by the members of the Community will, regrettably, also be violated. Hence the problem of determining who the transgressors are, and the application of sanctions arises. Simply put, before punishing there is a need for investigation. Who will do this in the Community? Who, for instance, should rule that a privileged status of economic activity, in defiance of the Treaty, has been established in a particular state for its "own" citizens and organizations? Alternatively who will decide which of the Community's member-states have jurisdiction in a criminal case over non-nationals when a tense situation has arisen due to the accused's national origin? Many such questions will arise, and I see no other body capable of deciding them and being the guardian of civil peace on the Community's territory save the Supreme Court.

This must, of course, be a totally different body, with no resemblance to the existing Supreme Court of the USSR. First and foremost, it will no longer be supreme—over whom will it lord? Nor will it have to sum up the practice of the courts of independent states—they will cope with this brilliantly themselves. Neither should it give any advisory opinions to the courts, or hand down ones which are binding on them (all of which exists today). It is time, at last, to give up the supervision from the Centre over the activities of the courts (the term itself has been fully discredited during the years of the totalitarian regime).

What then will remain for the Union Court to do? Many important things. As I see it, the member-states of the

Community could agree to empower the Union Court with approximately the following functions:

- check (as the last instance of appeal) on how well founded the death sentences passed by the courts are;
- hear cases involving the officers of interstate political and economic bodies (interstate institutions);
- resolve jurisdictional conflicts in civil and criminal cases which affect the interests of several states;
- ensure uniformity in the application of economic agreements on the entire territory of the Community's member-states, and settle economic disputes arising between them;
- promote harmonization of the laws and decrees passed in the member-states with the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Union statutory acts dealing with the defence of individual rights and liberties.

These are no more than the outlines of the would-be Union Court's competence. The need for such a body seems indisputable to me. Having set up such a court, the Community's member-states will be able to use it to champion their interests on the whole of the Community's legal space. Moreover, they will rid themselves of a number of other, existing or planned, judicial bodies (supreme court of arbitration, arbitration of the economic community, patents court, constitutional supervision)—why inflate the system of interstate bodies? And most importantly, by agreeing to the establishment of a single Union Court, we shall reaffirm our resolve to build on the former territory of the USSR—states which, based on the rule of law, use civilized means alone in settling social conflicts.

Shevardnadze Charting 'Path to Leadership'

924B0133A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Dec 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov in the "Opinion" column: "The Return of Shevardnadze as the Symbol of a New Turn in the Domestic Political Life of the Former USSR"]

[Text] The return of Eduard Shevardnadze to a post which he left without sanction, contrary to Gorbachev's wishes, a year ago, which came as a surprise to most people, was perceived, judging by commentaries in the Soviet and foreign press, as a sensation, but of a good kind. In the face of many looming dangers and Western displeasure with the fact that these dangers are not only failing to disappear but are mounting in many spheres, the appointment of Shevardnadze was viewed mainly as a factor eliminating some of these dangers and reinforcing the position of Gorbachev, who continues to contain the acceleration of a chaotic disintegration of the Union.

This analysis is partially correct but exceedingly superficial. Actually, Shevardnadze's return testifies to much more complex and profound processes underway in the domestic political space of the former USSR. The return of Shevardnadze to this position, which is far less

valuable now than it was a year ago when he left it, may be explained only and exclusively by such processes.

Before 19 August

Apparently, Mikhail Gorbachev believed in his good fortune to such a degree that he entirely gave in to the euphoria of the Novo-Ogarevo process, which seemed to be going well. The codification of Gorbachev's role as the legitimate and generally recognized leader and head of a united country, regardless of the territorial bounds within which this united country was to exist and of the measure of independence opted for by individual territories belonging to this country, was supposed to become the culmination of this process, rather than the signing of a new Union Treaty on 20 August (incidentally, I am certain that this treaty still would not have been signed had there been no putsch). So, the president of the USSR, overcome by this euphoria, banished even the thought of someone or something interfering with his achieving the desired goal.

On the eve of leaving for his vacation, Gorbachev had a more than friendly meeting with Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, in the course of which the three leaders discussed too candidly which of the "conservatives" who held key positions at the time would be retired immediately upon the signing of the treaty. The conversation was monitored by the KGB and, possibly, this was precisely what prompted the opposition to Gorbachev to take resolute actions, which resulted in the events of 18 through 21 August.

Gorbachev's decision to leave for the Crimea after all on the eve of signing the treaty may only be attributed to his self-inflicted blindness. However, with or without Gorbachev's knowledge, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze, two of Gorbachev's most prominent comrades in arms, though having resigned prior to this, stayed in Moscow. By this time, they had already formed a legal political alliance with radical opponents of both "the right" (Kryuchkov, Lukyanov, Yanayev, Pugo, and others) and of Gorbachev himself, such as Popov and Sobchak. All of this was affirmed by the creation of the DDR—Movement for Democratic Reforms, which was actually headquartered in the Moscow Soviet. This was a new Center which had ties to radical democrats, and through them to Yeltsin, rather than to Gorbachev.

The presence of Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Volskiy, and Laptev in the DDR leadership essentially made this Center a shadow all-Union cabinet with, for example, this distribution of portfolios: Yakovlev—president, Shevardnadze—vice president and minister of foreign affairs, Laptev—head of parliament, Volskiy—prime minister, who at the same time would control the activities of the CPSU through his party connections and positions, and Popov and Sobchak—mayors of the two capitals and at the same time the connecting link to Russian President Yeltsin. Had Gorbachev agreed to join the DDR, he would have naturally received the

portfolio of "shadow" president which would not have greatly changed the entire picture: Yakovlev would have become vice president, and Shevardnadze—minister of foreign affairs only.

Before taking leave, Gorbachev did not take the decisive step in the direction of the DDR. He counted on forcing his former comrades in arms to return under his wing "from the top," through his alliance with Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, and Kravchuk, and through the Union codified by the signing of the Union Treaty of 20 August. He wanted them, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, TO BE FORCED to return to a strong Gorbachev, but the exact opposite happened: Upon his return from Foros, Gorbachev ended up being a figure which was one order of magnitude weaker. Whether to come to his rescue or not was now up to the former comrades in arms themselves to decide. On top of this, these decisions, as far as appointments to official positions were concerned, now had to be confirmed by Yeltsin.

After 21 August

After the victory in August, Yeltsin had no intention of restoring a strong Gorbachevian Center, even if staffed with new people. All prominent positions around Gorbachev were to be occupied either by Yeltsin's people or those from among the old democratic cadres whose appointments to these positions he would authorize without a threat to himself (to the political strength of the Russian leadership). This is how Bakatin emerged in the post of KGB chief; this is how Shaposhnikov emerged in the post of minister of defense; this is how Laptev was given power over the USSR Supreme Soviet (along with the unpopular and, therefore, unthreatening Nishanov). This is how the post of minister of foreign affairs went to Boris Pankin, a man who not only resolutely dissociated himself from the junta in his ambassador post in Prague but also ensured for Yeltsin a reception worthy of the leader of Russia during his visit to Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1991.

This post was not offered to Eduard Shevardnadze. The clearly vacant positions of USSR vice president, which Aleksandr Yakovlev turned down, and prime minister (until Ivan Silayev moved there) likewise remained vacant.

In this case, a three-way rather than two-way confrontation occurred, not only between the old Union structures (not quite cleansed after the coup) and the new Russian structures, which was noted by all, but also between the old "democratic guard" in the form of the DDR and Yeltsin, who came together in the struggle against the putschists, on one hand, and Gorbachev, on the other hand. Yeltsin was surrounded by a crop of young politicians, to a considerable degree people from the provinces, who were given a chance to completely "conquer" Moscow after the putsch. However, DDR cadres (capital city slickers with Central Committee backgrounds to a man) were rivals for them too. Yet, it seems that Gorbachev himself, whose natural allies were all from the

DDR or the "left" ("men of the 60's") wing of the CPSU Central Committee, did not remain per se an attractive figure in the Center for the DDR. Was it an accident that immediately after the putsch was put down, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Volskiy alike did not agree to become members of the USSR president's Federation Council? I believe it was not. It seems that at the time, prospects for strength and a role for Gorbachev in post-coup development did not appear rosy. They did not want to go and bow to Yeltsin, who in his time had been a "junior" figure in the Politburo and had hardly forgotten the criticism leveled against him by both Yakovlev and Shevardnadze in the fall of 1987, when he was removed from the Politburo. Likewise, it was not worthwhile to hasten to side directly with Gorbachev, who became a "suffering" figure in the episode with the coup in August and the post-coup "humiliations" in Moscow. In addition, an opportunity should have been given to Gorbachev to drink to the bottom the bitter cup of "humiliation" from which Shevardnadze and Yakovlev had gotten a mouthful in their time.

However, the period of hesitation and waiting did not last long. Having gained real power, Yeltsin began to make mistakes. The naturally corporate character of the old "democratic nomenklatura" suggested the direction of movement—toward Gorbachev—all by itself. Shevardnadze held on and waited longer than others. This is why his going over "to the Gorbachev side" was elevated to the status of a symbol.

A King of Trumps Awaits His Hour

The party and communist tradition demanded that Shevardnadze, as well as all others in the entourage of the general secretary, yield credit for all achievements by anybody in the entourage to the leader. However, figures such as Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, who were quite independent as individuals and as politicians, wanted at the very least to be able to count on protection against attacks "from the right," if not gratitude, in return. This protection was afforded neither in the summer of last year, in the case of Aleksandr Yakovlev (the time of the most intensive attacks against him by the "right"), nor in the fall and winter of last year, in the case of Shevardnadze. When Shevardnadze announced his resignation, Gorbachev not only failed to approve of this step but also denounced this act, refuted the words of Shevardnadze about the threat of a coup, and subsequently simply agreed with the critics of the former minister of foreign affairs. Incidentally, it was through his efforts that "new thinking," which brought Gorbachev a Nobel prize, was implemented. I think that Shevardnadze noted that in his Nobel lecture Gorbachev did not see fit to mention him as one of the co-authors and the main creator of an international policy based on "new thinking." It seems to me that, in Shevardnadze's perception, at minimum the prize itself should have been shared by the two politicians.

In recent weeks (until 25 November), Gorbachev definitely began to score points again as a politician primarily because he was deprived of the inevitability of making mistakes, given that he was no longer a holder of the genuine authority of power. Second, because contradictions between the republics (and inside them) were mounting, and for this reason the notion of a stabilizing Center (likewise Gorbachev) became attractive once again. Finally, the West was still betting on him. It was dangerous for Shevardnadze to stay out too long. His authority and popularity made it possible for him to maintain his political image virtually without losses for close to a year. However, this could not last forever. To stand on the sidelines of vigorous political actions for too long would have meant to drop out altogether.

Finally, the ambitious Shevardnadze waited until a time when, out of three real functions still belonging to Gorbachev—arbitrator in relations between republics, commander in chief (owner of the nuclear button), and chief representative of the USSR in the eyes of the West—the first and in particular the last functions began to fizzle before our eyes.

By all signs, Shevardnadze patiently waited for Gorbachev himself to ask for his return, being aware that Gorbachev would do so at the most dangerous time for himself, as is his custom. It happened this way indeed. Gorbachev was preparing the signing of the Union Treaty again. However, hopes for success were slim. In turn, the international standing of the Union leadership was becoming shaky, partly due to the more vigorous "foreign policies" of republics, and partly because of the inexperience of Boris Pankin and the opposition of diplomats who once worked with Shevardnadze to Pankin's actions. A different scenario is also possible: The unpopular role of the "sweeper" of post-coup dirt in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to Pankin from the beginning (with Shevardnadze's consent).

At any rate three months ago, immediately after the coup, Gorbachev needed more than anything Yeltsin's friendship (which official newspapers, or those wishing to appear official, hastened to proclaim "a friendship forever") whereas at present the USSR president needs Shevardnadze's friendship more than anything else. That Pankin was kept in the dark about his future for almost three weeks in the process and in addition prodded to take vigorous actions aimed at reforming the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the usual "sin" of big-time politics which, however, is typical of the traditions of our domestic nomenklatura.

Everybody maintains that the return of Shevardnadze was coordinated with Yeltsin. This appears to have been the case. Even had it not been the case, could Yeltsin have disavowed at this time this decision by Gorbachev—the return of a minister of foreign affairs such as Shevardnadze? Of course, he could not have. In the three months since the coup, Yeltsin's position has weakened considerably, though not substantially, on the whole. I believe that, following the episode with the

cancellation of the of the ukase on the imposition of the state of emergency in Chechno-Ingushetia, Gorbachev could have returned not only Shevardnadze but even Bessmertnykh to the Union post of minister of foreign affairs, all the more so because at present such appointments at the Union level are made by a mere stroke of the president's pen, without all of those Supreme Soviets.

Of course, Shevardnadze was appointed right on the eve of yet another signing of the Union Treaty in Novo-Ogarevo. Clearly, Gorbachev decided to play a strong hand which, however, was of no use. The king of trumps was beaten by the trump ace of caution: Why sign it if it is possible not to?

Was Shevardnadze humiliated by such use of his authority (in the opinion of most realistically thinking commentators, it was virtually doomed to failure)? Not at all. A win would have been shared with Gorbachev. A greater loss (in terms of probability) would have been that of the USSR president in its entirety: Recently, Shevardnadze has not participated in negotiations on the Union Treaty, has not engaged in real politics, and has not even belonged to the official entourage of Gorbachev, as other members of the DDR leadership have.

Shevardnadze as a Politician in His Own Right

The independent value of Shevardnadze as a politician in the confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin is increasing. In essence he is a second political leader on the all-Union scale. It is obvious that he cannot and will not represent the interests of a particular region or republic of the country. From this point of view he is already preferable to Gorbachev who, though to a small degree, is still associated with the Slavic (or Russian) Center. The international prestige of Shevardnadze is colossal. It has never been shaken due to any domestic policy mess. During the period of Shevardnadze's retirement not a single Western politician prominent to any degree failed to pay a personal friendly visit to the former minister of foreign affairs when on an official visit to Moscow.

Of course, Shevardnadze as a politician has weaknesses. For example, he is not a specialist in domestic policy, especially economics. However, it seems that everyone in this country has now come to understand that specific endeavors should be entrusted to specific specialists endowed with the authority required.

The very foreign policy which made Shevardnadze so popular in the West is a second and main weakness. Shevardnadze and Gorbachev are the two main targets for criticism by those who believe that "new thinking" messed up the socialist camp, the CEMA, and the Warsaw Treaty first, and the USSR and its united Armed Forces next, and has now affected Russia as well. Shevardnadze was the one to push the first domino.

Many people agree that Army officers withdrawn from East and Central Europe to their native expanse, which

however is absolutely unprepared for this withdrawal, will become the main social force of a new coup; of course, their anger will also be directed against Shevardnadze personally.

However, the point is that, while sharing "vices" with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze has accomplishments of his own. His two main accomplishments, among others, are his voluntary resignation and public warning about the threat of a dictatorship (no one in Gorbachev's entourage has this to his credit), and his nonparticipation in the ingloriously completed Novo-Ogarevo process on which Gorbachev and others in his entourage placed their bets in the past eight months for the most part. This process not only failed to regenerate the Union but, through the putsch, brought about its ultimate destruction.

In a word, in the struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Shevardnadze definitely holds the most advantageous position, since at present he is the most prominent independent political figure in the country. This is precisely what opens up the path to leadership for him in the Eurasian Confederation (the former USSR). I believe that this is what he had in mind when he agreed to become head of the foreign policy establishment of a country which is ceasing to exist. Time will tell whether this establishment will become a "regional United Nations," with Shevardnadze as general secretary, or merely a stepping stone for moving on to the office of president, or whether some other political combination has been conceived. However, it is ridiculous to believe that a politician who is so ambitious and astute, in an Oriental way, has come back to Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square with a view to restoring the unity and glory of Soviet diplomacy.

Prospects for the Immediate Future

At least two events confirmed the outlined hypothesis immediately after Shevardnadze became minister again. First, the USSR minister of external relations himself stated that, first of all, he would visit the capitals of the sovereign republics of the former USSR rather than Western countries. Second, when information arrived from the circles of the American Administration on the possibility of recognizing the independence of Ukraine if the voters came out in favor of independence at the 1 December referendum, an angry response by the press secretary of the USSR president followed, but the Union Ministry of External Relations remained silent. It appears that Shevardnadze is betting on a policy commensurate with the realities of interrepublic delineation, including the separation of the independent state of Ukraine, the key problem in this instance. I believe that it was precisely his retirement, or rather his incomplete but nonetheless quite substantial "exposure to the people" which followed, that helped Shevardnadze to come close to this perception of reality. In recent months, when Eduard Shevardnadze was "on the sidelines," his Foreign Policy Association attempted very vigorously to work on the issues of interethnic conflicts and relations. Besides, it is, of course, easier for the

Georgian Shevardnadze to accept the reality of independence of all republics than it is for the "internationalist" Gorbachev. In a word, in the immediate future we may expect Shevardnadze to pursue an independent domestic policy of his own to which Gorbachev will have to adapt. If Gorbachev does not do so with enough dispatch, yet another conflict couple, Gorbachev-Shevardnadze, may be added to the Gorbachev-Yeltsin couple. Of course, diplomatic decorum will be observed in the process.

A New Array of Political Forces

Therefore, the official return of Shevardnadze to the political arena ultimately affirmed a new array of individual political forces in a space gravitating toward the former USSR (incidentally, Shevardnadze made Vladislavlev, a prominent DDR figure and Volski's deputy in the Union of Science and Industry, his first deputy).

The first force. The Russian leadership headed by Yeltsin, who is surrounded by people who are ambitious and young either in age or in the duration of their political careers, and are prepared for Russia's life "on its own." Despite the fact that many party functionaries from the old apparatus have found their way into this leadership, none of these people was privy to the high society of the party previously. Therefore, they are in opposition to Gorbachev.

The second force. Gorbachev and his entourage, which mainly consists of the former leftist party opposition at the Union level. They view Yeltsin's entourage as either provincial or unprofessional parvenus and upstarts who are incapable of developing a perception of values on the all-Union or international scale.

The third force. Leaders of republics which still gravitate toward the Union and closely monitor the array of political forces in Moscow and the struggle between them. In the future, they may easily switch their position from "unionist" to "independent."

The fourth force. The new supreme leadership of the Army. The Army is virtually the only surviving all-Union social institution which is, on top of this, armed. Nobody can ignore its presence. Passive waiting by ranking Army officers who at present are not included in specific political groups cannot last forever. The Army will have to make a choice sooner or later.

The fifth force. I would call this force, for now as a matter of convention, the "Shevardnadze party." Those who for various reasons did not join the entourage of either Yeltsin or Gorbachev (or at least are not tied to either of the presidents through official positions) and "defectors" from the two presidents may become its members. The composition of this party may end up being quite varied: from genuine democrats to former party functionaries. Perhaps, some "multinational" representation will exist within this initially Moscow-based party. It is absolutely obvious that this concerns the emergence of a new "Union" party which will try to gradually intercept

the initiative from Gorbachev and his entourage as Gorbachev's position is objectively weakened further. The DDR, which has already played the role of a bridge for passage "to democracy" by the former party nomenklatura, will now become such a bridge for the movement of the functionaries of the old Center to the new, Shevardnadze center.

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The political struggle in Moscow will inevitably intensify, especially after the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine. Nazarbayev's promise to begin "playing the white," made after his triumphant victory in elections in Kazakhstan, in combination with his clearly expressed aspiration—as a counterbalance to Kravchuk—to maintain a union with Russia, amplifies the Oriental accent of political life in Moscow. I think that the "Shevardnadze party" will show itself as very active in this struggle; its chances of success are great.

Shevardnadze Assesses Political Career

92US01414 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze by Andrey Karaulov in Moscow on 15 October 1991: "'It's Me, Eddie...' Eduard Shevardnadze in Conversation With Andrey Karaulov"]

[Text] [Karaulov] It seems to me there is no point in talking about the putsch, Eduard Amvrosiyevich—we will wait for the trial, it will not be long. But there was one episode when Lukyanov—do you remember?—at the Supreme Soviet suddenly raised the question of Germany... Why was all this behind your back, what do you think?

[Shevardnadze] I do not know. I cannot explain it. When I was not there they called in two deputies and said: The Supreme Soviet is now considering the question of a treaty. Neither one of them was prepared... And in general that is the way it is in parliament, even in countries where the parliament functions only nominally I got the impression that the opponents were prepared ahead of time. The questions they asked do not arise spontaneously. When I arrived... from New York, I think... they told me and I was upset, disenchanted... what was happening? I did not understand.

[Karaulov] During his farewell to Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Matlock said in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that he was horrified to learn of your resignation, that it was the worst day of his life

[Shevardnadze] I read that.

[Karaulov] Was it difficult to work and live in such a situation?

[Shevardnadze] I still remained true to myself. I also tried somehow to adapt, well... I proceeded above all from the fact that our parliament is young, it has no

experience, it has not developed the art of discussion, and so forth. Many questions arose later, after the "Soyuz" group had been created; it appeared as a kind of counterbalance to the Interregional Deputy Group. Who formed "Soyuz"? Who encouraged it? Who stimulated it? I do not know. After this group appeared, there began to be directed attacks on our foreign policy.

[Karaulov] Did you try to fight?

[Shevardnadze] In the Supreme Soviet?

[Karaulov] Did you fight...for yourself, for your right—if you are minister—to do your work the way you think it should be done?

[Shevardnadze] No.

[Karaulov] Why, Eduard Amvrosiyevich?

[Shevardnadze] I defended the foreign policy and the treaties we had signed. I argued our position in negotiations in the United Nations in connection with the events in the Persian Gulf—I literally fought for every word, but that was a fight for positions, not against those people who like certain intrigues, maneuvers, and insinuations...

[Karaulov] Were it not for the congress would you have left anyway?

[Shevardnadze] Yes, I would have resigned. After the January events in Vilnius and Riga.

[Karaulov] Did you see them coming?

[Shevardnadze] Yes.

[Karaulov] Tell us the secret: Was it intuition, your work experience, or did you have some concrete information?

[Shevardnadze] You know, every person has his own experience in analysis, his own approach, and on the basis of this methodology they draw conclusions. When there is analysis there are conclusions. I did not know... but I felt that after the end of September of last year... October, November... something would happen. There would be events which would be incompatible with my convictions and hopes, that they, these events, would compromise everything we had done in the area of foreign policy. And that is what happened... What happened in January in the Baltics was a serious crime against the state.

[Karaulov] Nonetheless you said at the congress that Gorbachev is your friend.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, that is what I said. For some reason it seemed to me that by my resignation I would help Gorbachev a great deal. It is another matter whether we coordinated it... or not. But what is the difference now? I did not coordinate it with him because I knew Gorbachev would not agree. Timur Georgiyevich Stepanov, my friend and assistant, knows: Early in the morning, before my speech, we sat in my office and I was thinking

out loud. I said that if I were to pick up the phone right then and warn Gorbachev of my resignation, my statement, of course, would not have occurred, we would not have received his consent, we would not have received his sanction, as it were. But I was deeply convinced that I was taking a step in support of perestroika. And if he was the initiator of perestroika, a real democrat, and a real reformer (and he began as a reformer), then... But it seems to me that he took my resignation badly...

[Karaulov] Did he regard it as betrayal?

[Shevardnadze] Well, I do not think he ever really said that... You know, he had to overcome that internal conflict

[Karaulov] Offended?

[Shevardnadze] Well, I do not know, on the one hand, in general, he was offended but on the other... I had to make a choice in favor of reason, you know. Ultimately even then he could have said: Yes, there is the threat of a dictatorship. But he said: I do not know of any putschists; what dictatorship—where, who? True, in Minsk (a month later) he said that the country was teetering on the edge of chaos, anarchy, and that it is from anarchy that the most terrible dictatorship grows—that is, he spoke of the threat of a dictatorship even more persuasively than I did...

[Karaulov] Did you consider the possibility that he might not understand you?

[Shevardnadze] Yes. Yes, yes. But I... still believed that Gorbachev would deal a serious blow to the reactionaries, to all those... rightists, ultra-conservatives, and so forth. Look at what Likhachev and the other deputies did later—against this background it would indeed have been possible to consolidate and show the whole country what consolidation is—now...

[Karaulov] And was there no other way? Only your resignation?

[Shevardnadze] You know, when the foreign policy became the object of constant attacks but nobody—neither the president, nor the Supreme Soviet, nor Lukyanov, not to mention Ryzhkov, that is, the people who should have been defending the foreign policy—none of them said a word, literally not one...

[Karaulov] Why? The entire world was happy...

[Shevardnadze] The entire world was happy, the Nobel Prize and everything else, but then some Leningrad newspaper—I do not even remember what it was called—thinks that Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, they are the ones who destroyed this great Union... There were also other statements, more authoritative ones, you might say—here we had lost the battle for socialism, especially in the area of foreign policy, as it were, and again Shevardnadze, again Yakovlev... I, for example, am grateful to my opponents. How else could I feel...

when everything in which we take pride is ascribed to us two alone—if that is true, well, I am proud.

[Karaulov] A former member of the Politburo and a confirmed communist is proud of the fact that we have lost the battle for socialism? Is that a paradox, Eduard Amvrosiyevich? What has happened to you? Is this a...revolution of the spirit or evolution of consciousness, what do you think?

[Shevardnadze] (After a pause.) I tried to give some kind of explanation for everything that has happened to me in a small book which was published recently. I tried to show everything... the stages, as it were. I will tell you: I was sincere when I believed in Stalin and Khrushchev and then—in a certain stage—in Brezhnev. And all of us (in any case the absolute majority of members of society) somehow believed—we were probably naive. But as I advanced along this ladder, through the hierarchy, as it were, as the scale of my own activity and all attempts to change and improve anything grew, I understood, I was faced with the fact that there are certain boundaries that cannot be crossed over.

[Karaulov] Did you really believe in Brezhnev?

[Shevardnadze] During the first years after he assumed power, I... believed in him.

[Karaulov] And then?

[Shevardnadze] I believed in him... You know, at least Brezhnev did not stand in the way of Georgia. And sometimes—rarely, to be sure—he supported us. I think Brezhnev still remembered well the tragedy of 1936 when blood flowed in Tbilisi. He understood that this was Stalin's homeland and much here was linked to the name of Beria... a small republic with three autonomous entities and very complicated internal relations—and Brezhnev somehow tried to take into account all these peculiarities, and it would be dishonest and unfair of me not to say that.

I came to deep and fundamental conclusions. The socialism we built became an impediment to life. Let me tell you: Mikhail Sergeyevich and I visited the Arab region repeatedly. The famous Arab experiment... How many years have passed—15 probably, but we were the ones who started that. Now everyone is talking about the farmers. But I have known a person for a long time: He is disabled, in the first category, a veteran... he keeps 15 cows. And others each have 15 as well—a real farmer-run business. And we asked then secretary Abuladze to show all this to Brezhnev. We were returning and thinking out loud: What is this? Socialism, or is he a kulak, is this the beginning of capitalism?

[Karaulov] What did you decide?

[Shevardnadze] What? (Laughs.) We decided that if we showed this to representatives of the Center they would say: That is capitalism—and de-kulak-ize them.

[Karaulov] On two counts...

[Shevardnadze] Yes. And then, you know, Gorbachev said: All right, what do we do next? What? And I asked that same question. Let us say that we managed to get something done in one region. All right, we did something in one region and we will do it in 10 more, and then what? We cannot change production relations in one separate region. And Gorbachev said: Everything is rotten from top to bottom, it must be broken down... That is the way, as we moved up the ladder, as it were, right up to when I became secretary of the Central Committee and became convinced for myself that, in spite of such a high position (candidate for membership in the Politburo), I still could not break down any barriers... that is when you really come to the conclusion that everything has to be changed. This... is a torturous process.

[Karaulov] Did people from the Politburo, Aliyev, for example, who was virtually the only representative of the Transcaucasus in the Kremlin, begrudge your closeness to Gorbachev?

[Shevardnadze] Perhaps, I do not know, but I did not give them reason to. I worked with Aliyev in the Transcaucasus and we did not have any special problems, although we are different kinds of people. To be honest, I did not see...

[Karaulov] The Soliko Khabeishvili affair—does it seem to you that that was a conspiracy against you?

[Shevardnadze] (Pause.) When he was first arrested I did not assume that he had in mind any kind of action against me. But still I wanted to figure out what had happened. I was convinced that he was a pure and honest person. I knew how modestly he lived and that he had a good and decent family... I recall that very conversation. Late at night he came up to see me on the 11th floor. We sat and talked for about three hours and I asked him just one question. Soliko, all kinds of things happen in life, tell me just between the two of us, there is nobody else here and I am not recording anything, simply explain. Soliko cried like a baby...—we ended up spending three hours examining episode after episode. I knew some of the things already, but he gave arguments as to why this could not have happened, and it was then that he convinced me that... simply in human terms, he was not guilty. But I could not close the case. Now there are various rumors in Georgia: Shevardnadze executed him, this guy...—one might ask, if I could have commanded such a thing, why did I not save Soliko Khabeishvili? He was a friend and a like-thinker in the full sense of the words. And indeed I could have said: Close this case—and that would have been it, they would have closed it. But I could not allow myself to do that, no. One very high official came to me making suggestions (in principle a great deal depended on him): Find a good job for Khabeishvili... a salary and all the rest, but get him out of the Central Committee—and everything will be all right. And I answered: You know, I cannot do that. In the first place, I believe Khabeishvili. But if you have evidence that Soliko is a bribe taker, how can I recommend him

for an important position? And if he is an honest person, then why, on what grounds, should I contribute to the establishment of his reputation as a bribe taker? And Soliko, incidentally, agreed with that. And then, after I had left for Moscow, it all happened. And the rumors reached me...—you know, people are people, and it had leaked out that even during the process of investigation and—even—during the trial itself attempts were made somehow to link this affair to Shevardnadze.

[Karaulov] I asked Primakov, and he said you had taken certain steps to prevent Soliko from being executed. But can it be that after a year, two years, or five years, it was still impossible to get him out of prison?

[Shevardnadze] No, I did not take any steps to prevent Khabeishvili from being executed. How could I have intervened? What right did I have to do that? You know Gyuli, his wife, came and wanted to get in to see me at the office. But I conveyed to her through mutual acquaintances that I did not advise that. Of course, I could have met with her, but that would have complicated things, people would have said that a member of the Politburo was protecting him, and so forth; it was better not to do it. For some reason I believed that the court would come to objective conclusions. And indeed many of the episodes were dismissed during the trial; it turned out that there was much that was trumped up, there had been a certain amount of false information.

[Karaulov] Did you sympathize with him?

[Shevardnadze] It was a great drama. Very much. I sympathized because a member of the Politburo, the minister of foreign affairs... sometimes, you know, all it takes is one phone call—but I never got in touch with anyone on his behalf. And it probably could not have been any other way...

[Karaulov] Why?

[Shevardnadze] Well, who could I have called and what could I have asked for? That Soliko was honest and fair?

[Karaulov] But if you understood in your soul.

[Shevardnadze] At that time, before the court had handed down the ultimate verdict, I relaxed somewhat. There was the prospect of helping this person somehow... and legally. And Mikhail Sergeyevich, incidentally, did intervene; his resolution concerning the suit brought by certain figures in literature and art against Soliko was very sharp: Straighten it out. Here I really did show concern. I did not want Soliko to get the short end of the stick. I received information and my friends told me that they could simply physically destroy him in jail.

[Karaulov] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, I understand that the law is the law, but still I cannot believe that if—God forbid—your father or your brother were to end up in that situation... knowing that they were not guilty of anything, could you really leave things as they were?

[Shevardnadze] (Thoughtfully.) Yes. I held a very high position. If I had intervened, the people who stood to gain from concocting this case... they would have taken advantage of it. Therefore it pains me when people now say that Shevardnadze contributed to the executions in Georgia... and so forth. That is not true.

[Karaulov] Does that have to do with... Kabakhadze?

[Shevardnadze] Kabakhadze. Secretary of the party raykom. He was executed for bribery.

[Karaulov] Were you friends?

[Shevardnadze] No. I cannot say that we were friends, he was younger, but I was the one who contributed to his advancement in the service and I knew his family and children...—well then there was that affair. At first I did not even believe that he had taken bribes. But it turns out that there was a large case there. Of course, everyone who worked with me... there was—first—a desire to help somehow... But how can you help if everything has been proved and he has confessed?

[Karaulov] But you had a great deal of authority in Georgia and frequently went around with various circles of the intelligentsia—and nonetheless in Georgia today there is not a single voice in your defense. Why? Is everyone really that afraid of Zviad Gamsakhurdia? What is happening?

[Shevardnadze] (Pause.) You know, I have thought a lot about that problem. I cannot say that... they hate me in Georgia, that nobody respects me. On the other hand—yes, you are right, articles are always being written, literally every day...

How do you react, what do you do? In principle it is difficult to react because most frequently they make absurd accusations... But it is also very difficult to react, you know... when public opinion is being manipulated, and constantly, from one newspaper to the next. I also had this idea: To go to Georgia and ask for some kind of dialogue in front of an audience. If someone wants to make a complaint or accusation against me, let them do it and I will respond. Thus during those tragic days after 9 April: There were disputes and accusations, but I did not back down and I answered all the questions. And I would certainly answer them now.

You know, at one time I had this phrase: For Georgia the sun rises in the north. Now this is one of the main accusations. They cannot forgive me for that! But, actually, listen...—were it not for the Georgiyevsk Treaty where would Georgia be? They got down on their knees and begged to become a part of the empire and receive protection from the Russia tsar. Because Georgia was dying. The nation was simply on the verge of physical degeneration; what kind of unity could there be if Kakhetiya was separate, Kartaliniya... Mengreliya—individually, they all would have been destroyed. Therefore I sincerely said, and I say now: Georgia will perish without Russia.

Self-determination is another matter. Any nation, any republic (Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, or Ukraine...—all of them!) has the right to self-determination. But I am a realist. How will we exit, what will be our relations—we will sit down at the negotiating table and resolve this issue.

[Karaulov] When you and Gorbachev were contemplating (in Pitsunda) perestroika, did you understand that all we are faced with now would happen?

[Shevardnadze] No. We had no idea of what would happen. Gorbachev did not aim for (or at least he did not say so) the post of general secretary—we simply came to the conclusion that we could not live that way any longer! That everything had to be broken down! But how it would turn out, what problems the people who would begin this work would encounter—we did not discuss that at that time...

Our main mistake, in my opinion, was that in some stage our executive power became extremely weak. I do not wish to say that I was always right, but I along with a couple of other comrades, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev in particular, insisted on presidential rule from the very first day. Mikhail Sergeyevich probably thought that the combination of his two posts—general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Supreme Soviet—would give him sufficient power to take over the helm. But what happened? The old mechanism is almost destroyed and the new one is working inefficiently—the power turned out to be amorphous.

[Karaulov] I wonder if Mikhail Sergeyevich did not begin to envy you your popularity and growing respect in the world.

[Shevardnadze] I... am not sure, in any case there was no cause for envy when I rejoiced in his every success and helped him when I could. I will not say that I was in seventh heaven when Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Prize, but I was no less happy than the others because this is high recognition of our foreign policy and everything that has taken place in the Soviet Union.

I never regarded our real victories in diplomacy as my own personal success. And I expected the same sincere and active support from him. Of course, in the meetings of the Politburo, the plenums of the Central Committee, and the decisions of the Presidential Council... without that support the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not have been able to do anything. But when it became difficult, and... very difficult, when Gorbachev should have spoken out, he remained silent. This was probably a mistake on the part of Mikhail Sergeyevich.

[Karaulov] What kind of a person is Gorbachev?

[Shevardnadze] You know, regardless of how things are there (and Gorbachev is experiencing hard times now), regardless of all his mistakes and unnecessary wavering, the step taken in 1985 turned the world around. And it seems to me that we must start with that.

[Karaulov] Do you meet with Gorbachev now?

[Shevardnadze] We have had meetings, but they were not significant. I cannot tell him anything new. Except that I am now living with the problems of the Movement—that is my main mission. I told Gorbachev long ago that the Movement for Democratic Reforms was in his interests and in the interests of democracy.

[Karaulov] But in 1985 you and Yakovlev were communists, and socialism...

[Shevardnadze] No, I am talking about democracy. But socialism or capitalism... is there any need to argue about which would have been better? I think the time for arguments has passed. We are faced with a difficult transitional stage which will last, according to my predictions, about five or six years. And then we can determine what our social system will be.

[Karaulov] You have repeatedly stated—publicly—that the Communist Party of Georgia is one of the most powerful. And suddenly—such a great defeat in the elections.

[Shevardnadze] Because that is the fate of communist parties in general...

[Karaulov] Will the CPSU be restored? What is your point of view?

[Shevardnadze] That which was will no longer be. Never.

[Karaulov] Is that good?

[Shevardnadze] Life itself has made that decision.

[Karaulov] Do you still think as you did before that Vladimir Ilich is "our greatest friend"?

[Shevardnadze] You know, as a thinker... from the standpoint of intellectual potential, well, Lenin was an extremely rare phenomenon in history. But if one is to speak about socialism, about the mistakes we made, then, of course, Lenin is no saint, and to heap all the blame on others is the deepest delusion. I do not recall who it was (of those near me) who called Lenin "Vladimir Robespierre"—it seems it was Bukharin, although Bukharin had a very respectful attitude toward Lenin. Judging from everything, Lenin was a cruel person. The situation cannot justify cruelty. If that were the case, Stalin could be justified as well.

[Karaulov] I do not believe that you are just coming to understand all this now that you have left the CPSU.

[Shevardnadze] Doubts... occurred to me at the end of the seventies. But still I did not, as it were, respond very quickly, the process of contemplation for me... is long, and only when I am finally convinced do I come to a decision. And as concerns what our society will be like—while speaking in the United States I recently said that it would be a synthesis of all the positive that has been accumulated by civilization. Call this whatever you wish: capitalism... socialism—it makes no difference.

[Karaulov] But still the country is not prepared for the market, and, moreover, in this extremely difficult economic (and political) situation the market is simply impossible.

[Shevardnadze] No, it is possible, but most likely we are being awaited by completely unpredictable events. I do not believe that positive changes will come about in the next few months. And against this background there can be a very large amount of trouble, very. Of course, we should have more boldly—from the very beginning—created conditions to encourage foreign capital investments. Internationalization of economic life is one of the achievements of the 20th century. And if three or four months ago we had opened up the road to foreign investments, in the first place we would already have experience in market relations and in the second place we would have a direct advantage. And this process is being held up as before. And the prospects are the most uncertain—this, incidentally is one of the reasons for the depressing predictions and the thoughts which sooner or later force democrats to agree on a unified platform.

The most diverse situations have arisen. But still if one is to speak of a breakthrough, people began to trust us after we removed our troops from Afghanistan. That is when the Cold War ended.

[Karaulov] Would it have been possible to make a decision about Afghanistan any sooner? Even a year.

[Shevardnadze] No, it would not.

[Karaulov] Why?

[Shevardnadze] Impossible. Society was not ready. And how? For many years the opinion had been developing that it was the international duty of our people, and the people believed that... in any case many of them did, although I, for example, had no doubt that it was an unfair war. There were also what one might call strategic arguments. Here was this "special region," an important section of the border, we had to take into account a confrontation with China, with America, poor relations with Japan.

[Karaulov] In addition to Gorbachev and yourself, were there other people in the Politburo who understood that Afghanistan was stupid?

[Shevardnadze] About stupidity... I do not know; many people thought that we would get things straightened out there almost immediately, but then Ligachev, for example—I cannot but say that he was one of the active proponents of withdrawing Soviet troops.

[Karaulov] I hear you. And incidentally, why did Gorbachev need Ligachev? Tell us the secret, Eduard Amvrosyevich.

[Shevardnadze] A person always risks a little when he promotes people to the most important posts in the state.

Now they say that Ligachev should not have had anything to do with ideology—but why should Shevardnadze engage in diplomacy?

[Karaulov] Well, anyway...

[Shevardnadze] We had a different view of the person; we knew that he worked very energetically, that he stubbornly followed the course he thought to be correct. Regarding Afghanistan, for example, he held reasonable positions. But that was not always true. Yegor Kuzmich caused real harm; his anti-alcohol campaign alone cost I do not know how much—perhaps we would now be living under quite different conditions...

[Karaulov] Did you tell Gorbachev that he should have mercy on the fruit of the vine?

[Shevardnadze] In my heart I was always against it. But I did not vote, I did not raise my hand, I will tell you honestly—I simply did not believe that my vote would change anything or make anything happen.

[Karaulov] When withdrawing the troops from Eastern Europe did you understand that Zhivkov would soon end up in jail, that Ceausescu would be shot, and that Honecker would be wandering through Europe like a phantom in search of refuge.

[Shevardnadze] We did not expect such dramatic consequences. We were simply trying—especially Gorbachev—not to allow any more influence of any kind, not to impose our way of life on these countries. And we encountered... simply degeneration; I would put it that way.

[Karaulov] Did you become friends with any of them?

[Shevardnadze] You know, on the human plane I had normal relations with all of them. Jaruzelski made a strong impression on me, it was only because of his flexibility that we managed to avoid the most terrible consequences here. I thought Husak and Kadar turned out to be interesting people—they also began perestroika but still, you know, they conducted perestroika "within the framework," as it were, and everyone was looking here, to the Union, to Gorbachev... I would not want to characterize each of them in detail now... each of them probably made his own mistakes, but, after all, we forced the "socialist camp" to copy us, and our system turned out to be quite alien to these countries.

[Karaulov] In my opinion, it turned out to be alien to us too. Is what is happening in Georgia now really not the same thing as happened in Eastern Europe?

[Shevardnadze] It takes time. A rational and orderly process is going on: The people are achieving sovereignty and independence. But how to build relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the future Union—that is another sphere. Believe me... I am not ruled by a sense of indignation now because they criticize me and there is a lot of slander—I am capable of forgiving and not being hasty with conclusions. All around there are new people

who are young and inexperienced, perhaps there is a process of assimilation going on—I do not know. I am very much afraid of famine, very. And I want you to write that. This is a very real threat. If Georgia does not find ways of cooperating with the other republics, with Russia and the Center, this could end very badly. The threat is quite real!

The second thing is the national question. Georgia is not just Tbilisi. And the government of Georgia is the government of all people living in the republic. We know that this concept has now been compromised to a certain degree—but I am not embarrassed to say that I was and still am a confirmed internationalist. We have a poor idea of history—but when David the builder won the Battle of Gidgory (there is a tiny place called Gidgory, it is in Svansky Rayon, near Tbilisi), he immediately built a large mosque—as a tribute of respect to the other nation and the other religion. In those times that was probably difficult to explain, but he... was a great, very great person.

[Karaulov] How do you regard the position of President Gamsakhurdia?

[Shevardnadze] It is not easy for me to say, I am not familiar enough with his statements. Life will show us.

[Karaulov] Have you had no contacts?

[Shevardnadze] Previously we did, but they were episodic.

[Karaulov] Do you believe that the conflict in South Ossetia is a matter for the KGB?

[Shevardnadze] I do not believe so. I rule that out. The Center is not interested in having the Georgians and Ossetians live with such strained relations. They said about Nagorno Karabakh as well that everything was being run by the Center, but I sat in that Politburo, reports were made regularly, and information came in—perhaps we were indecisive, but to say that the Kremlin encouraged interethnic conflicts—that I do not accept.

[Karaulov] Concerning 9 April, you personally had some questions which remained unanswered.

[Shevardnadze] I did. They have probably not yet become, as it were, public property—for I was deceived, the military denied that they had used chemical means and gas, they lied to my face...

[Karaulov] But who actually did give the order, which colonel?

[Shevardnadze] In my opinion, this is not a matter of colonels. I know from my own practice what the Central Committee Bureau can and cannot do. I recall that we asked the military for help in harvesting the crops—grapes, for instance—in that case they even appealed to the Ministry of Defense. The district commander was

not authorized to make a decision about that. Rodionov could not take responsibility without making phone calls and consulting.

[Karaulov] Now you are the head of the Movement for Democratic Reforms. Do you think it has a future?

[Shevardnadze] Yes. That is my view. This is a movement for the transition period. Its goal is a smooth transition to the new condition of society—without civil war, without bloody conflicts, without complications, and so forth. If we unite, that is the way it will be.

[Karaulov] Now it is already clear that when you resigned you did not intend to get out of politics.

[Shevardnadze] If we managed to achieve everything we have thought about it would be no less than the post of president. The problem of stability in the country and a smooth transition to the new society depends on each of us, that is, it depends more on the movement than it does on any one official (even a very high one).

[Karaulov] Do you have a sense of humor, Eduard Amvrosiyevich? If I were to title our conversation as Limonov—at one time—titled his novel: "It is I, Eddie..." God, I really would like to, Eduard Amvrosiyevich. Will you not be offended?

[Shevardnadze] You know, there are always certain "nicknames" for politicians.

[Karaulov] The "silver fox"—who said that?

[Shevardnadze] The "silver fox"—comes from foreign journalists. They say that among Georgians (in ancient times) one of the military leaders was called that.

[Karaulov] And how do you feel about this?

[Shevardnadze] I not only like humor, I adore it. And everything that is done with a pure heart—that is wonderful. I think that only people with high intellect are capable of humor.

[Shevardnadze] Thank you, Eduard Amvrosiyevich. I have taken three hours of your time.

Democratic Reform Official on Movement's Leadership

924B0122A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 49, Dec 91 p 2

[Interview with Professor A. Braginskiy, chairman of the Moscow Regional Center of the Movement for Democratic Reforms, place and date unknown: "Parties and Leaders"]

[Text] And so, finally the democrats have reached an agreement by signing a document of support of the reforms promoted by the president of Russia.

[Braginskiy] For the time being, this support is largely symbolic. The reason is that the multiparty system,

which is defined not by the number of parties but the willingness of the social strata to safeguard their own interests as part of the authorities, through the parties, has still not been established.

[Correspondent] In your view, what does the establishment of a multiparty system require?

[Braginskiy] It is difficult at this point to enumerate all the necessary conditions. Let me mention the positive example, in my view, of interaction among parties within the framework of the Movement for Democratic Reforms. For the time being, the movement consists of a few small parties and a substantially larger number of regional centers which rally nonparty supporters of the movement, on the basis of their professional and political interests. The parties are competing with each other in an effort to become centers of attraction for the nonparty groups. Rules of interaction among parties are being drafted in the course of their development, and coordinated decisions are being made. The binding link in ensuring the stable and civilized nature of this process is leaders with proper authority and who do not need to resort to populism.

[Correspondent] Let us talk about the leaders of the Movement for Democratic Reforms. Even before perestroika Shevardnadze, Popov, and Yakovlev lived well. They have retained, to this day, all their privileges: dachas, cars, etc. Are they able to understand the needs of someone who, shall we say, is standing in line?

[Braginskiy] The fact that these people were in the leadership and lived well within the old system as well is not a case in point. They could have retained their privilege of leading a peaceful carefree life, write books, deliver lectures abroad, and earn high honoraria. However, they assumed the difficult task of leading the country out of the precipice. I consider this to be a courageous act, a manifestation of a feeling of duty toward those you describe as standing in the line.

[Correspondent] Why are there no new leaders? Is it that the country is short of people, the way it is of sausage?

[Braginskiy] It is rather a question that the younger people were not given the opportunity to acquire a reputation. In the majority of cases, the people are supporting political personalities they have known for a long time.

[Correspondent] Is this psychological?

[Braginskiy] Generally speaking, in our country people rely more not on ideas and laws but on personalities.

Shevardnadze, Popov, and Yakovlev proved themselves as political leaders in both normal and critical situations. Something infrequent in our case during periods of radical political changes occurred: the efforts of the previous leadership were not rejected. This should contribute to the developing of young politicians and to setting new political standards, something which is so urgent in implementing the reforms.

Legal Expert Hits Yeltsin CP Ban

PM1811160991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Nov 91 p 2

[Report on interview with Doctor of Legal Sciences Boris Bayliyevich Khangeldyyev conducted by Correspondent V. Nikiforova under: "Interview With a Lawyer" rubric; time and place not indicated; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "The President Can, of Course, Do Anything, but What Is To Be Done About the Constitution?"]

[Text] On first reading the Russian President's Decree: "On the Activity of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party" it seems so unconvincing that you start wondering whether this is a legal document or a political document in the spirit of the old traditions of party rule. But what do specialists think on this score? Correspondent V. Nikiforova asked Professor Boris Bayliyevich Khangeldyyev, doctor of legal sciences, to comment on certain provisions of the decree.

[Khangeldyyev] Almost every article of the decree requires proof, but either there is none at all or it still needs to be sought. What you get are suspicion and hints instead of argument. Take the start of the document: "The events of 19-21 August highlighted for all to see the fact that the CPSU was never a party. It was a special mechanism for shaping and exercising political power..." What is the basis for this claim? Party documents—the Program, the Statutes? Certainly not! And what about the millions of Communists involved here? The decree patently confuses the officials belonging to the leading structures of the CPSU with the party itself, which is clearly dictated by as yet uneradicated partycratic thinking on the part of the drafters of the document.

In former years the Communist Party exercised its leading role in accordance with Article Six of the USSR Constitution. And the president of Russia today, the former first secretary of Sverdlovsk Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] and then of the capital's gorkom [city party committee], and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, did not take exception to this at the time, but took, particularly in Moscow, a pretty tough party line.

However, one must not approach past practice with today's yardsticks. And yet a perplexing question does arise: Why are these charges being leveled now when the former Article Six has been removed from the Constitution and the party itself has effectively withdrawn from the exercise of the functions of power?

I will cite the decree further: "This was confirmed during open hearings in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the CPSU's role in the coup d'état of 19-21 August." From the standpoint of legal experts, this is nonsense. The hearings have not yet terminated and no resolution has been adopted. But the head of state's decree has already in effect brought in a verdict

Let us take the following charge: "Responsibility for the historical dead end into which the Soviet Union has been driven and the shambles to which we have been brought lies with the leading structures of the CPSU, which effectively swallowed up the state and used it as its own instrument." For a lawyer there is no subject for discussion here at all, unless, of course, you think back to A. Vishinskiy's shameful speeches at the political trials where the law was brazenly flouted by the slaves of the "leader of the peoples," J. Stalin. But as a citizen I am bound to observe that the charges concerning the "shambles" should be leveled at the actual guilty parties rather than at all CPSU members indiscriminately. And at each one of them individually, according to their "personal contribution."

Of course, the dead cannot be held to account, but there are hale and hearty functionaries from those leading CPSU structures who are responsible for what has happened, at least in the last six-seven years.

Another provision of the decree reads: "Despite the measures taken against those structures, they have not halted their illegal activity aimed at exacerbating the crisis still further and creating the conditions for a new antipeople coup." The reasons for this thesis are clear, but for such charges you need facts and meticulously accurate documentation: What kind of illegal activity is being carried out, by whom, and where? And why again are the "structures" and the entire political party being punished rather than specific officials?

It should be remembered that last year saw the adoption of the Law "On Public Associations," to which Yeltsin as a USSR people's deputy and member of the country's Supreme Soviet did not apparently object. And it is strange that his apparatus has forgotten the articles of this current law.

Yet another provision of the decree needs explanation: "Given that the RSFSR Communist Party was not registered in accordance with set procedure..." I would inform the president and delegate of the 28th CPSU Congress that the CPSU did undergo registration, while the RSFSR Communist Party—the republic organization—did not have to be registered under existing legislation. Moreover, the registration period set by the law extends until 31 December and consequently the time has not yet expired. That is de jure. While de facto the Russian Communist Party has been recognized by Yeltsin himself in several documents and acts and, in particular, by the recent ordinances of the presidents of the country and Russia: "On the Utilization of the Complex of CPSU Central Committee and Russian Communist Party Central Committee Buildings Located in the Moscow City."

Of course, where the property and resources of the CPSU and Russian Communist Party are involved, some legal formalities can indeed be overlooked. Some people very badly want to get their hands on the "complex of buildings" and so forth belonging to the party as a whole

and all Communists. But according to the law this can only be done by a court ruling. However, do you really need to get so angry about waiting? The Russian president is now in a hurry. But to no avail. You do not advance a just cause—if just it really be—by unlawful means.

Alksnis Comments on Ongoing Events

LD0812185291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0545 GMT 6 Dec 81

[Studio interview with Viktor Alksnis, live or recorded—from the "Utro" (Morning) program]

[Text] [Reporter] It seems that we could be accused of bias inasmuch our program's guest has appeared—we have just counted it—on the screens of Central Television at least four or five times. And this is the first question which I want to ask our guest Viktor Alksnis: Viktor, tell us please, how do you explain this great popularity of yours this week?

[Alksnis] Well, as it seems to me, simply, people have at last become conscious of the tragedy which our state is experiencing and now a change of course is being urgently carried out. From propaganda, so to speak, for ideas of sovereignty and isolation, today the formation of public opinion about the need for unification is beginning.

[Reporter] Taking into account this great popularity of yours, could you briefly give your assessment of what is happening in the country.

[Alksnis] I think that this is our common tragedy. And of course this will have a most serious effect on the lives of each of us. And when I drove here to the TV center, already at 0700 in the morning there are queues in front of the shops—after all this is a direct consequence of the processes launched in January when the Muscovites themselves went to Manezh Square and chanted "Freedom for Lithuania!", "Freedom for the Baltic republics!" Now they are lining up for two-three hours. Now that Ukraine has declared its independence they will have to line up for five hours, not only in Moscow—in Kiev, too, they will stand in lines, in Khabarovsk and in Tashkent, as we are a single organism. We are Siamese twins who have all organs in common. Yes, one can attempt to carry out a surgical operation to separate them, but we will die together.

[Reporter] What is your attitude to the fact that you are frequently called a hawk, a right-winger?

[Alksnis] Well, I will not retract my convictions and I want to say that what I said two years ago I will continue to say today. But what is interesting is that those who two years ago were saying completely opposite things as regards the state have today, today to all intents and purposes, espoused my views and I see how the press is changing abruptly; for instance KOMSOMOLSKAYA

PRAVDA, which was constantly propagating sovereignty, is today coming out in favor of the state. To all intents and purposes the mass media are espousing the views of the Soyuz group.

[Reporter] Perhaps, let us say, they are taking the position of common sense?

[Alksnis] Yes, yes.

[Reporter] I have the following question. Literally the other day I learned—I won't mention their names even though I know the specific people—about the fact that, for instance, in Latvia they have begun dismissing representatives, let's put it like that, of the Russian-speaking population, without any reasons. And I know one case where a person was dismissed literally three months before receiving his pension. How will you comment on this?

[Alksnis] But the whole point is that the national democrats have, to put it mildly, twisted the Moscow democrats round their little finger. That is to say, yes, under the cover of [changes thought] having donned the clothing, so to speak, of the democratic movement—concealed under this clothing was an ordinary, well, cave-dweller's nationalism and this aim is being implemented in practice. And what is happening in Latvia of course is very, very sad. Yesterday Boris Nikolayevich signed an agreement on economic cooperation with Latvia. But, after all, why did he not set the condition that we would not sign the economic agreement as long as the concept of citizenship in the Latvian republic is not changed? After all, this is the way the Western countries are acting. For instance, the chairman of the Helsinki Supervisory Committee sent Gorbunovs a letter in which he sharply protests against this, against this concept. Under this concept about 1 million citizens of Latvia, more correctly, inhabitants of Latvia, will not receive citizenship, and the majority of them are Russians. Well never mind about citizenship, there are restrictions in political rights. But, after all, under the existing legislation, under the law that has already been adopted, people will not have the right to have land, there will be limitations on entrepreneurial activity, shareholder's activity, on holding jobs in the state service; many restrictions.

Yet Russia is keeping silent. This is somehow incomprehensible. Since Russia is keeping silent the authorities of the Latvian Republic are undertaking steps aimed at further restriction of these rights. After all, the aim is clear now, I think: Indeed in Latvia today [the population ratio] is 50:50. And the most radical national democrats are already putting forward the aim of creating conditions for the voluntary return of Russians to their historic homeland. Yes, evidently people will not be driven out by tanks, submachineguns, but such conditions will be created that people are forced to leave Latvia's territory, to create a population ratio of at least 75:25. And to this end some 700,000 people need to be

forced to leave Latvia. Indeed, conditions are being created in order to compel people to leave.

[Reporter] Quite. I see that Larissa has a question.

[Reporter Larissa] The saying is well known: "It's a bad soldier who does not dream of becoming a general." Would you like to become a general, even though Colonel Alksnis is better known than any marshal?

[Alksnis] No! I, you know, I believe that colonel is the highest military rank. And nevertheless—well then, colonel sounds somehow better.

[Reporter] I have one more question for you. At the present moment it is not enough to engage in establishing facts. Have you some program for getting out of the crisis that has arisen?

[Alksnis] Regrettably, today the situation is such that the disease has taken such deep roots that we need treatment and treatment by shock therapy. But this shock therapy should not be within the context of a transition to the market. Evidently, we will need to realize the truth uttered at the time by the great Russian philosopher Berdyayev, that the state is given not in order to insure heaven on earth but not to permit hell on earth. When we reach the condition of hell on earth—unfortunately this is already inevitable—this will be the bitter pill to make us realize, well, the abiding value of the state.

[Reporter] I have a last question to you. Are you a supporter of the use of force?

[Alksnis] When it concerns protecting the lives of people, yes.

[Reporter] I thank you. I remind our viewers that Viktor Alksnis was the guest of the program and I want to add that the views of the guests of our program do not necessarily coincide with the view of the "Utro" program. Thank you.

Commentary on Gorbachev Post-Coup Struggle To Regain Power

924B0121A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA commentator A. Aleynikov: "The Putsch Toward Communism: One Hundred Days After Foros"]

[Text] Gorbachev has reached the end of his real political road—this verdict has been handed in by the majority of politicians and ordinary citizens. But let everyone have the right to make his own appraisal. Alas, after August 1991 the entire bottomless pit of the moral abyss we had fallen into became evident. During those days we displayed again that genetic willingness to inform, to conduct a public self-informing justification in the name of retaining power.

It is good if, in trying to find out Gorbachev's role in the "putsch," some people are driven by the desire to discover the truth. But there is also something else: the lust to humiliate a politician who has made a mistake. All of this, by the way, comes from the same source—the revolutionary conscience.

Yes, the cart of Gorbachev's power has overturned. So all the attempts in August-September to regain this power were fruitless before they started, since one cannot enter the same river of "centrist politics" twice.

The question is, however, whether Gorbachev is needed at all in this environment of psychological hype, fear of total collapse of the last vestiges of well-being, and imbalance of both politicians and citizens? I would not be in a hurry to say "no." It is clear that Gorbachev is from the pre-August world. But it was Klyuchevskiy who once remarked that not only do reforms change the old, but the old changes the reforms. The self-deception in regard to the mythical representative function of the president is not so much naive as it is dangerous in the reality of political life. Gorbachev's bankruptcy (at least, on the surface) in many reforms, capable of wiping out six years in just 100 days, is another phenomenon of our history.

In April 1985, the then general secretary understood one very simple truth: The power egotism of the class that had nurtured him not only was cynical—it even put a brake on the mildest transformations objectively needed to maintain the balance of any political regime. Having started the reforms, the upper echelon of liberal communists did not expect the emergence of a more dangerous adversary than the orthodox comrades in the Politburo—the emergence of radical democracy which propped up the seemingly defeated Yeltsin.

Yes, any radical reforms could have led to his being replaced through the Khrushchev option. Let us be objective, though: It still would have been better to take a risk than to sweep many problems under the carpet. Gorbachev, however, saw what he wanted to see, supported in his righteousness by Western Gorbomania. Still, it was he who awakened the practically sleeping intelligentsia, whispering in the kitchens

Gorbachev's power, having traveled its glorious road until the beginning of 1990, started then to be wary of drastic changes and unpredictable results. Many were pleased with his centrist policy that was considered his main advantage. But it was exactly the "centrism" that led us to August 1991. The president's brilliant ability to maneuver, so advantageous on the diplomatic stage, in the end started to irritate everyone and everybody, who saw in this weather vane type behavior the weakness, not only of a man, but of his power.

My God, what kind of government and president are they, complaining relentlessly that someone "keeps them from working?" So, if we tally up the bill to be handed to the democrats who "suffered a victory" in August, Gorbachev and the CPSU should start with themselves

Painful as it is to admit, Gorbachev had frustrated the expectations of all political forces. So 19 August was inevitable, since even those who wanted to keep the country within the old, albeit repaired, framework, sincerely believing in the "socialist nature of perestroika," reached a point of desperation. However, had there not been an attempt at a "coup of the government," there would have been a "coup from below." I am convinced that Gorbachev's vacillations and contradictions would have pushed Yeltsin to catalyze the popular-rallying mass and would have led to the president's inevitable voluntary resignation. Remember Milyukov's question that so clearly defined the political alternative of 1917: "Kornilov or Lenin?" The 1991 dilemma was "The State Committee on the State of Emergency or Yeltsin?" It is the collapse, the failure of the attempt to change direction that led to the August coup. Yanayev did "his friend" an invaluable favor: He pushed him again onto the political scene. In a different role, though...

Only after the August did Gorbachev start becoming a politician. Having lost face for a while; having been shaken by the unfamiliar and never before encountered humiliation of reading someone else's text from the podium, he is beginning to find himself. It seems that the entire 100 days he concentrated on the main agenda: to regain power in order to regain respect. It is clear that as a president Gorbachev will not spread a magic tablecloth in front of the population that has lost hope of redeeming its food ration coupons; he will not cure the dystrophy of the ruble, and will not bring clarity into the whimsical picture of the interrelationships of the power structures. Today he is already (so far?) not a president in a real sense. However, watching the political flip-flops and contractions of the new power, Gorbachev is desperately trying to restore his image. Thus, attracting many popular political activists onto his team, the decisive demolition of the CPSU and the Congress of People's Deputies, and the intensification of foreign policy. The new Union treaty could have become the main result of the 100 days after the "Foros sit-in." It did not; to a large degree, it is even more remote now—and not through the president's fault. Unfortunately, he now has distinguished disciples in the republics, who change their position in regard to the Union in the time it takes to shout a slogan at a rally. Try to analyze Kravchuk's statements in this respect: Even Yeltsin did not have a swifter evolution of viewpoints; as for the position on the Union, at least in this the latter has been consistent and firm. Perhaps this is why Gorbachev continuously underlines the role of Russia, now unfailingly expressing his respectful attitude toward its president. Another point that is clear: Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Popov, Sobchak, and Yavlinskiy—all of them clever people who value their prestige and independence—would not have returned to Gorbachev's team unless they wanted to stop the all-out slide toward chaos. Nobel Prize Winner E. Canetti said: "The central phenomenon of power is the triumph of the survivor. The moment of survival is the moment of power." In order to survive, the president is persistently trying to build a new state. He is barely being

heard yet, and nobody wants to understand, because nobody has lived yet outside the Union, outside the common statehood and economy. If Russia does decide to go this road, already swept of mines, it will drag all other republic-states with it. This road cannot be traveled without conflicts, and the need for compromise may again propel Gorbachev to the political front stage. Strictly speaking, it is Gorbachev who is now in opposition (normal, routine, sensible, and necessary), although it is not yet clearly defined. There is perhaps Pushkin's vexed thought that is on Mikhail Sergeyevich's mind, though: "As the devil would have it, why did I have to be born in Russia with a soul and a talent."

Gorbachev's Foros Guard Units Detail August Events

924B0136A Moscow VETERAN in Russian
No 49, Nov 91 p 4

[Article and interviews by Yu. Lenchevskiy: "Did Border Guards Blockade Foros?"]

[Text] Over the past 20 years I have had occasion to visit Foros at least 15 times. I have known six commanders of its guards unit. Therefore it is only natural that I would be interested in this heavenly spot on the southern coast of the Crimea, particularly now. After an army of my fellow journalists had rushed off to the Foros unit I came here myself. By that time so much had been written and said about Foros that it seemed that there was nothing new that I could learn about those days in August.

By analyzing many articles, accounts and recollections I had gotten a picture of what happened. But I wanted to meet personally with the people who took part in those events, the people whom I have known for many years.

Unfortunately, in their search for sensation and efforts to draw attention to their articles some in the media are willing to ignore the elementary standards of journalistic ethics. They operate in the realm of pure fantasy. They err by making certain inaccurate statements and even false statements; often they present only negative information. Whatever the case, there are plenty of various "inaccuracies" in articles about the events of August. And sometimes they are not so innocuous.

In his diary "Foros, August 1991," which was published in IZVESTIYA, presidential aide Anatoliy Chernyayev relates how M. S. Gorbachev spent his time under siege.

The reader can easily get the idea that Zarya [Dawn], the President's dacha, was besieged by border guards. Allow me to quote several passages:

"I asked Olga (Olga Vasilyevna Lanina, a consultant and secretary to the President): you went out—what is happening on the road? The road is closed. There are border guards everywhere."

"There was a border guard tower to the right. Two soldiers pointed their gun barrels and binoculars at us."

It goes on. Chernyayev went swimming. "But this time there was a border guard with a dog up above, at the top of the path."

"He (M. S. Gorbachev—Yu. L.) and I went over to the other balcony, stood by the railing and immediately noticed the way the gun barrels in the tower turned in our direction and a border guard patrol on a nearby cliff zeroed in with their binoculars..."

So, was Foros blockaded by border guards? Did they take part in any anti-constitutional acts?

Whenever the President vacations in the Crimea the approaches to the dacha are blocked by border guard patrol ships at sea and border guard units on land. Six militia posts are located on commanding heights near the highway. The Crimean ASSR KGB Administration provides protection for movement from the airport to the dacha, and also assigns six men to patrol the main entrance gates. The unit commanded by V. F. Khomutov has guarded M. S. Gorbachev on vacation since 1985. Winter in Pitsunda, summer in Livadiya. And since 1988 in Foros. The perimeter of the dacha grounds stretches for three kilometers. Border guards patrol beyond the first set of gates, and KGB troops from the "Ninth" beyond the second.

When M. S. Gorbachev and his family arrived on vacation this year the following were activated to protect him: a personal guard unit under the command of KGB Gen. Yu. S. Plekhanov, a subunit of USSR Presidential Dacha house security, subunits of the Crimean Border Guard Unit under the command of Lt. Col. V. L. Lysak, vessels from the Balaklava Brigade of the border guard maritime patrol, and Crimean MVD units.

From an interview with Capt. 1st Class Igor Viktorovich Alferev, commander of the border guard patrol ship unit:

[Alferev] The seaborne border guards ensured reliable protection of the President from the sea.

[Lenchevskiy] How?

[Alferev] On 3 August 1991 a group of four patrol ships and a subunit of small cutters assumed their assignment of protecting the USSR State Border in the vicinity of the President's residence. Use of that number of men and equipment was introduced four years ago, when the President's official residence was established at Foros. We patrolled normally from 3 August through 23 August.

As everyone knows, on Sunday 18 August Boldin, Baklanov, Shenin and Varennikov drove up to the President's dacha. After speaking with M. S. Gorbachev they left. With them went Yu. S. Plekhanov and personal adjutant V. T. Medvedev. KGB Maj. Gen. V. V. Generalov, Plekhanov's deputy, remained at the dacha. He ordered tighter security measures around the dacha. At 5:00 pm he doubled the watch at the checkpoint, something that had never been done in years past. From that point on Generalov attempted to feign an external

blockade of the dacha and made serious efforts to have a negative effect on the morale of the house security unit.

How did events unfold in the Crimean Border Guard Unit?

From an interview with Maj. Yuriy Ivanovich Cherkosov, watch officer of the border guard unit:

[Cherkosov] On 18 August at 4:00 pm we lost contact with Foros. Then the electricity there was shut off. At 6:00 am on 19 August we heard the first information about the State Committee for the State of Emergency. On that day the unit commander, Col. P. P. Kharlanov, announced to the men that the unit's border guards would not take part in any anticonstitutional acts. "We will not turn our weapons inward," said Kharlanov.

From an interview with unit commander I. V. Alferev:

[Alferev] On the evening of 18 August I received a report from the post guarding the site from the sea that all communications had been lost. The post was in the immediate vicinity of the President's dacha. Nor did a telephone link to the internal switchboard of the site under guard function. There were power outages.

On the morning of 19 August, when we got word of the coup, I received instructions to switch to an intensified plan for protection of the state border, which I did: observation was stepped up, watch units were put on alert and certain sectors were reinforced.

At 10:35 am on 19 August Capt. 3rd Class M. V. Krikunov reported by radio from a patrol ship that M. S. Gorbachev had gone down to the beach.

From an interview with Mikhail Vasilyevich Krikunov, unit veteran and ship commander:

[Krikunov] "The President is alive! I can see him strolling on the beach with his family!", I reported to the brigade commander.

Alferev decided to move the President's personal ship, the "Crimea," from Yalta to Balaklava. It was necessary to attempt to make contact with M. S. Gorbachev, get him out of Foros and save him. But how?

From an interview with I. V. Alferev:

[Alferev] A subunit of small cutters was the only means of contact between the President's security guards and the mainland, and it was used on the basis of weather conditions and its own capacity to operate at sea. It was by means of a cutter of this type that I was sent a small package of a cylindrical shape. It was handed over by Boris Golentsov, the deputy chief of the President's personal guard. Our representative asked that Golentsov communicate to the President our readiness to assist him if necessary. Golentsov gave us an address and a description of the person to whom we were supposed to turn over the cylindrical object. This was probably one of the channels for dissemination of a videotape containing a

speech by the President. We took measures to step up our antidiversionary defense. We were particularly vigilant while the President and his family were on the beach. According to regulations all guns were aimed out to sea. It was forbidden to set course in the direction of the facility under guard. In the period of 19-21 August there was no massing of Black Sea Fleet ships. During the first half of the day on 21 August we observed a crossing by six hovercraft. Two of them hove to at a distance of eight nautical miles from the shore on a traverse heading from the residence. Because of mechanical difficulties, as it later turned out. The ships' crossing was planned, and the sailors had informed us in advance. There was no sea blockade. All ships passing at an appropriate distance followed the recommended course.

On 20 August M. S. Gorbachev also came out on the beach, looking calm. Border guards continued to patrol the beach area at night, as before.

From an interview with Petr Petrovich Kharlanov, chief of the Crimean Border Guard Unit:

[Kharlanov] I submit that President Gorbachev was intentionally misinformed and put in a nervous state in order to make him afraid to communicate with us or to undertake any other actions. Simultaneously disinformation was communicated to the Soviet and world public.

At the time we were working out a plan to liberate the President. Essentially it was as follows: to enter into direct communications with Gorbachev and his personal guard; to propose concealing Gorbachev and his family in one of the underground rooms; to land approximately 700 soldiers and officers from the Sevastopol and Yalta border guard units on Foros; to inform the house security that border guards intended to liberate Gorbachev; to enter the dacha grounds and, in the event that Generalov's people offered armed resistance, to engage them in combat.

According to our calculations we could have neutralized the dacha's real "besiegers" within 15-20 minutes and transferred Gorbachev and his family to a safe location. However, after we found out about the Russian leadership's intention to fly to Foros we decided that the plan was not necessary.

From an interview with Senior Warrant Officer Viktor Aleksandrovich Ternovskiy, a unit veteran:

[Ternovskiy] We saw M. S. Gorbachev on the shore. It would have been possible to get the President out of the dacha. We could have thrown up a smoke screen and brought him on board the ship under its cover, and then transferred him to the "Crimea." That ship has full communications equipment.

The article "Will Warrant Officer S. Lavrikov Be An Admiral?" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 15 October 1991) states that he was the only one of the seaborne border guards who was known to the President's personal guard: every summer Sergey took the Gorbachev family out sailing on a small pleasure cruiser.

It was through him that Gorbachev's personal guard handed over the package, asking that it be taken to a certain address. I have known Sergey Nikolayevich Lavrikov for 15 years, but he did not even want to talk about that. He just waved his hand: "That did not happen. The newspaper is writing things that are not true! Generally speaking my job is as a driver..."

Warrant Officer Nikolay Khvorov, who was mentioned in the same article, is a technician in the Unit imeni Terlitskiy in Foros, was the one who discovered individuals cutting off communications, and he was not inclined to confirm the account in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, either. The men were clearly fed up with correspondents. And there was the danger of saying too much. They had decided that giving information, even information about the events of August, was not part of their duties. An investigation into the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency is underway. The border guards have been questioned by investigators from the procuracies of the USSR, Russia and the Ukraine and the USSR Chief Military Procuracy. People are convinced that the investigators are acting on the basis of official instructions from the Kremlin.

From an interview with Col. P. P. Kharlanov:

[Kharlanov] The investigators come to us with a plan based on the official version, but they go away convinced that the border guards are completely innocent.

While I was with unit commander Alferev I ran into an investigator. To all appearances a nice young man. I liked him. It was interesting to hear him talk about how he questioned Irina Gorbacheva. As a witness, of course. Border guards P. P. Kharlanov, I. V. Alferev and others are also witnesses in the case of the USSR State Committee for the State of Emergency. But they are witnesses today. Tomorrow...

From an interview with unit commander I. V. Alferev:

[Alferev] It seems that the investigation is being supervised by someone in some way. But the investigators did not uncover any instances of criminal acts among us.

From an interview with Maj. Yu. I. Cherkasov, watch officer of the Crimean Border Guards Unit on 18-19 August:

[Cherkasov] The border guards served conscientiously, yet some of the mass media have been making outright accusations against us. Someone wants to make scapegoats of us.

Yes, there has been much fantasy surrounding events at the dacha in Foros. For example, there has been talk of the Sevastopol KGB Regiment... There is no such regiment. The 16 ships off Foros were also made up. As for the question asked in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, whether Warrant Officer Sergey Lavrikov will be an admiral, I can tell you: no, he will not. Not everyone can

become an admiral. Nor does Lavrikov have any particular dreams of becoming one. He simply serves honestly and conscientiously. I asked the brigade commander:

[Lenchevskiy] So did Sergey Lavrikov hand over a videotape containing a speech by M. S. Gorbachev or not?

[Kharlanov] He did.

[Lenchevskiy] So he could be made Hero of the Soviet Union for that!

[Kharlanov] There will be the trial, and then we can come back to that matter.

...I had an opportunity to meet many people in the Crimea, in Simferopol, Foros, Livadiya, Balaklava, Sevastopol... Border guards are courageous and responsible individuals, and during those days in August they performed their task of defending the USSR State Border as always; they did not take part in anti-constitutional acts. Nor was there any blockade of Foros by border guards.

(P.S. By the way, I also visited the former dacha of Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev at Livadiya. Everything there is a delight to look at. A splendid building, a grotto, a swimming pool and separate buildings for service personnel. Wonderful grounds, 37 hectares in all. Was it necessary to build a new official residence at Foros?)

Ligachev Views 'Betrayal' of Cause

LD0812181691 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 7 Dec 91

[Studio interview with Yegor Ligachev by journalists Vladimir Vedrashko and Andrey Shipilov; first paragraph is announcer's introduction; live or recorded—from the "Top Secret" program]

[Text] [Announcer] You must remember that Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, an aide to the USSR president, took part in the first "Top Secret" program. We promised at the time that his opponents would also have the chance to appear on our program. Today, Yegor Ligachev, a traditional opponent of Aleksandr Yakovlev, is taking part in the "Top Secret" program. He recently returned from the United States, where he gave lectures and discussed details of the publication of his book of memoirs. Immediately afterwards, he visited the editorial office of the "Top Secret" newspaper, and although he did not tell us anything that was top secret, we nonetheless have a feeling that he knows significantly more than he is saying.

[Vedrashko] The communist party and the whole system which we used to have did not stop the rise to the top of those politicians and careerists who ultimately directed their politics against the people. This means that the party itself was an unhealthy organism and that society itself was constantly in a sick condition. Did you understand that? Did you see it?

[Ligachev] I don't think we should equate the party with individual leading figures. The party is the very same party which lifted our country to a high level of development in the economy, culture, and education, the party which, ultimately, took our country into the league of world powers. It is the party which, after all, together with the people and the peoples of other countries, managed to break the back of fascist tyranny and save human civilization. It is the party which, together with the people and the peoples of other countries, has managed to guarantee peace in Europe for almost 50 years now. It is the party which, together with its people, shot into space. Our party can boast a great deal that is glorious and heroic. I don't think we ought to forget that side, either.

At the same time it has a history of numerous mistakes. But you have to agree that as a rule the rectification of these mistakes including the issues connected with perestroika and renewal was not started by someone else but by the party. We, the communists, began perestroika. We opened the broad scope for democracy and progress. At the same time the communist party now finds itself banned. What are the reasons for this? What kind of democracy is this? I would like to tell you that those who are doing such a thing are digging a grave for themselves.

(Shipilov) Do you have the feeling that Gorbachev and other comrades in arms with whom you had worked have betrayed you?

[Ligachev] I think I have the feeling that they have betrayed the cause which we began together. The fact is that we began perestroika not to change the soviet system but to reform it. This is a fundamental point. We began this not to change the economic and sociopolitical basis of the existing system but to reform it. We undertook reforms. Reforms are transformations which improve the system without changing the basis of the system, which radically improve the system.

Well, the point is that this cause has been betrayed. This is a thing of the past. I wish I was wrong. I wish that we would return to the socialist choice in reality not in words. I am fully convinced that, in the end, we will return to this after going through all torments and a million hardships because socialism, after all—I mean true socialism—is a just cause.

I can already feel that there are people in society now, the working class and the peasantry, gaining strength, who are not indulging in nostalgia for Stalinism, as some accuse them of doing. Only lunatics indulge in nostalgia for Stalinism, because Stalinism is our enemy, the enemy of socialism, you understand. It is very good that perestroika has inflicted a blow at Stalinism. But the nostalgia is for other things, for those things that were not so bad in the thirties, the forties, the fifties, the sixties, and the seventies.

[Vedrashko] A year ago, in an American magazine interview, you said that talk of a conservative conspiracy in

the USSR was utter nonsense. What is your view today, after the events of August, of that judgement of yours?

[Ligachev] I am profoundly certain that I have no need to correct that judgement. For example, I do not consider them traitors to the motherland, not at all. I do not believe that they were seeking to seize power; they had plenty of power already. I believe they are people who, like all of us, were trying to find ways to get our country out of the impasse. The fundamentally important point is to what extent they were taking the right path. From my point of view, it was not the right path, it was a mistaken path, a ruinous path, for it is impossible to extricate the country from the crisis by military means, by unconstitutional, undemocratic means.

[Shipilov] Do you regard Nina Andreyeva as a possible, potential political ally of yours?

[Ligachev] If I have not yet lost any of your trust, I want to say most frankly that, to this day, I have not met Nina Andreyeva face to face, and I have not once spoken to

her on the telephone, although I tell you bluntly that I also respect people who are committed to clear, precise, definite views.

[Shipilov] You, along with a whole series of well-known leaders, began perestroyka, but in general, all the glory has now gone to others. Does that hurt you, as a politician and as a man?

[Ligachev] I don't even think of glory. I can tell you honestly and frankly. What I think of is how to make things better for our people, our society.

[Vedrashko] What do you think of the assertion that your generation is going out vanquished? How do you perceive that assessment?

[Ligachev] I think that there are neither victors nor vanquished in this sense. For example, that question was put to me recently abroad, when I was in America, and I answered very clearly that I consider that I have not lived my life in vain.

Latest Kazakhstan Demographic Data Analyzed

92US00974 Alma-Ata LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh
26 Jul 91, pp 2-3

[Article by demographer Maqash Tatimov: "Think About It, Kazakhs!"]

[Text] On the first of March last year I read with interest the essay on current problems by Torekhan Daniyarov, chief of the LENINSHIL ZHAS Ideological Division, entitled: "We Are 10 Million Kazakhs." Very difficult questions of our people's demography, society and migration are raised well in it. At the same time, I have also become acquainted with the basic kinds of letters which the author has received from all over. I have felt it suitable to offer to the attention of readers my own article in order to exchange views with letter writers, and to support the position of the Daniyarov. If this article becomes, in one respect, spiritual sustenance for every Kazakh citizen, to help them measure our past, investigate our present and speculate about our future on the eve of the great celebration of the Kazakh peoples attaining 10 million, to be noted and celebrated at the end of the international music festival, "Voice of Asia," which begins soon in Alma-Ata on 26 July, it is all the better.

The Author

According to scientific projections the numbers of our people reached the round figure of 10 million on 30 June 1990. Kazakh numbers have now been raised to expansive, unheard of levels. On that day of decision, one of nearly one thousand "tender" babies born into Kazakh families, in the west, the east, or perhaps the north or the south of our broad Kazakhstan, or even perhaps altogether unknown to us in a corner of some neighboring union republic or, it is quite possible, in a foreign country, raised our numbers to that figure. It is for the sake of Kazakhs that I pick that single happy baby out from among all those born last year, now on the eve of our joyful celebration of ten million Kazakhs.

We are perfectly justified in saying, "By Allah, we are now not a few. We are 10 million Kazakhs." Our Kazakhs may now, in numbers, be in seventieth place among the two and a half thousand peoples and nationalities in the world. Among the Turkic-speaking peoples numbering 130,000,000, we are in fourth place behind the Turks, the Uzbeks and Azeris. Following after us in numbers are Tatars and Uighurs, and after them our fraternal Turkmen and Kirghiz.

And in the Soviet Union alone we are the fifth most numerous people, after Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks and Belorussians. If our people had not been subject to difficult demographic fates like some last judgment on three occasions, it would rank second, by virtue of history, and third, by heritage.

Thus, the logical question arises that if the Kazakh people had not been annihilated and destroyed during its difficult history of disaster, "how many Kazakhs would

there be today?" This is indeed a key question for us, one we have thought about a great deal. In truth, if the Kazakh people had not been made to suffer various disasters starting with the Dzungarian invasions, and going down to yesterday's extremist red massacre, our numbers would not be the almost 10.3 million that they are, but perhaps far more than 25 million, even as many as 30 million. In terms of the moderate projection, which takes into account laws of growth peculiar to the Kazakh people, we are found to have preserved 40 percent of our historical demographic growth potential in the twentieth century to date. We must also remember that the Kazakhstan today has been left with a population reaching seven million only in the middle of 1991 due to gradual migration to foreign areas (each in its time, the trek to escape the Dzungars, the dislocations caused by colonialism, the destruction due to red extremism and dispersal due to environmental disaster), and that this means that we have retained one-third of our demographic growth potential in Kazakhstan.

There was another happy event for us in the middle of 1991. The numbers seven and 40 have always been honored by the Kazakhs. It is clear to us all that many Kazakh words, including the words for "capable," "attainment," and "sufficiency" are derived from the lucky number seven. Human beings making gifts of seven or 40 things, or their offering seven cakes, or grouping children in forties, are superstitious outgrowths of our esteem for these numbers. According to our own estimates, taking into consideration migration, the number of native Kazakhs in Kazakhstan these days has reached a watershed number of seven decimals. We number seven million or 7,000,000 and the proportion of Kazakhs within the republic's population as a whole has reached 41.5 percent. The time has now come to substitute quality for quantity. Do you not realize, Kazakhs, that we have grown up? I wish to say to the people that the time has now come to think.

I have utilized the full returns of the Soviet All-Union Census which took place two and a half years ago, data from the census carried out in China in the summer of 1982, the results of the 1989 Mongolian Census, and other foreign data in estimating that the numbers of our people are 10 million. Results from Soviet censuses, and likewise systematic work on Kazakh birth and death figures by year, and investigations of natural growth rates of our people on the spot have in particular made possible great reliability in my estimates. For example, data on the rate of natural increase of Kazakhs, as one of five main Soviet peoples, are collected throughout the Soviet Union. A Kazakh on vacation in the Crimea, or in a medical facility, or a Kazakh living in Kamchatka with his wife who recently gave birth to a child, or a Kazakh who has died suddenly, are reflected in the central statistical system.

I think it of interest to answer the question of how our national growth, which raised our numbers of 10 million during that year, the 12 months in question, took shape. During one calendar year, that is during those 12 months

constituted by the second half of 1989 and the first half of 1990, some 320,000 Kazakh children were born and some 70,000 members of the Kazakh nationality died, yielding an increase of some 250,000, or 24.5 per thousand (nearly 2.5 percent). During the month of most numerous births, that is, during June of last year, some 25,000 babies were born and began life. Some 6,000 departed life. Even on our watershed days, the two 24-hour periods between 30 June and 1 July of last year, an average of 1,700 children was born and 200 persons died. As we have already mentioned, one of those 1,700 happy children whose stars shown for the first time on these days was the one who raised our numbers to 10 million. I have suggested that we make it a habit to name children born in the two watershed years following that time auspiciously as Ongdybay and Ongalgul in memory of the event. I think it would be good also if we made them happy by giving them the names of Kazakh heroes or of distinguished persons. (For example, last summer I was among Kazakhs of Kolkhozabad and Wakhsh Ravons of Qorghantobe Oblast in Tazhikistan on the business of the Kazakh President's Council. At the direct request of the parents, I gave the name Ongalgul to the just born first daughter of the young couple of the house. I forget their names, setting a good example and fulfilling the function of the honored guest.)

Thereby, as our numbers increase, now quality is being created as the time goes on. This is a fundamental law of all human development, a fundamental dialectical principle. Similarly, is it not true that as numbers grow in this way in the life of a society a shift towards quality takes place, and that as quality develops quantity contracts?

That quantity gives rise to quality in all developmental dialectic is something which our people has observed since times of old, a fact which it knows how to express. For example, the proverb, "a runner from a hundred, a champion from a thousand," is expressive of this. In addition, I say in logical development of this idea: each million should hit the mark by producing one individual as a pure genius for today. History today is difficult. At a complex, socially difficult, economically severe and politically critical time, our age requires just the right pure genius who will draw together our 10 million scattered here and there, and who will bring them into concord. At a time when 10 million people are a great many in each sector of life, is not the advancement and furthering of such wisdom what life needs today? The time for the wise to step forward brilliantly is now. We are not without such sages. If we become a whole people life itself will bring them forward. There was a time when we produced many runners from a hundred, and champions from a thousand. However, our inability up until recently to produce the right single genius from a million (such as our own president Nursultan) has become something which has set us back in the great historical struggle of peoples. Real sovereignty and absolute independent will achieve this for us!

The value for us of the celebrated round number 10 million, with its wonderful zeroes, is that our native

people has attained it, better late than never, after some serious disasters of the twentieth century, as a result of renewed growth after loss of demographic balance, that is to say, as a consequence of demographic explosion and renewal. Letting demographic facts themselves do the speaking, in only 45 years we have increased two-fold over the more or less 3 million remaining alive at the end of the Second World War, which broke out fifty years ago and was an extreme disaster for us.

Akhmet Baytursynov, the great Kazakh scientist, said in 1915: "But my dear, we are not a few. We are 6 million Kazakhs." It is clear to us that the Kazakhs who had attained 6 million at that time had 30 years later fallen below that level as a consequence of three powerful demographic disasters, one after the other (the years 1916-21, 1931-33, 1941-45, a period of about 15 years). And in Kazakhstan itself these great demographic catastrophes seem to have reduced our numbers from a previous five million in 1915 to barely two million in 1945, when the war ended. (Note that, to be sure, the official statistics of the period lump together "Black Kirghiz." Keep this in mind!). In the end, while the old nomadic generations were destroyed, they were able to give birth, triumphing over difficulties, to a young nationality such as ourselves. There is nothing remarkable about it.

However, the bitter truth of history is not expressed for us in this alone. If colonialists and tyrants had not subjected our people in this twentieth century alone to evil slaughter, to political persecution, our scientific genocidists to catastrophic disaster, if we have not been destroyed in this way, if we had not been subject to forced migration and aggression, then the total number of Kazakhs in the republic would be three times as great as it is today. We could have a whopping figure, a substantial 21 million and the percentage of Kazakhs in the republic would never have fallen below 60 percent even during the years of Virgin Lands development. Such catastrophes and oppressions in their history have not only greatly decreased the numbers of a people such as the Kazakhs, living from hand to mouth. It is clear for demographic science today that these disasters have greatly decreased the Kazakh national thought and the quality of Kazakh citizens.

Due to their combination of artificial internal demographic crisis with external flows of migration, such sharp changes have given rise to large contradictions within the Kazakh steppe. For example, during the years 1690-1990 more than 7.5 million newcomers arrived in Kazakhstan in an organized manner or on their own. However, it seems that from 1645 until 1945, due to three centuries of invasion and war, catastrophe and terror, violence and doom, the actual quantity of losses of Kazakhs living in their present homeland from destruction and dispersal is up to 5.5 million. Drawing conclusions from this, as a result of such enormous ethno-demographic changes of up to 13 million in the total number of Kazakhs, that is to say, in the general

balance of Kazakh numbers, there have been fundamental changes in the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan and, as is well known, Kazakhs have become a minority in their own lands. That is to say, the percentage of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan has declined greatly from 92 percent prior to the beginning of colonialism, down to its lowest point of 29 percent after the Virgin Lands campaign. Moreover, during the years 1822-1962, during a 140-year period, the percentage levels were "disturbed" in this manner by the great artificial force of purposely organized colonialism and proportional relationships between native people and newcomers were stood on their heads. Leaving aside ancient history, is it not true that in very recent days, after the December Incident, that as a result of the percentomania of the time, 50,000 Kazakh young people were forced to go elsewhere and leave Kazakhstan for work or for study? There also came to our republic during those difficult years, 1986-1988, an additional 50,000 official migrants on work tours to Kazakhstan. But all of this has proved unable to limit more than temporarily, if at all, historically inevitable ethno-demographic development which has today once again restored the proportion of Kazakhs within the total republic population to 41.5 percent. Moreover, whereas the total proportional weight of Turkic-speaking peoples in the republic grows regularly by 0.6 to 0.7 percent a year, the situation for Slavic-speakers is the opposite, and they are decreasing gradually by 0.3-0.4 percent a year. Thus a favorable relationship has appeared, grown up out of new demographic conditions, whereby Turkic speakers are regularly gaining on Slavic-speakers by an average of 1.0 percent a year. (By the year 2000 the relative proportions will be 53:41, whereas the original percentage proportions were 33:55 in 1962.)

Conclusions from these facts are: the descendents of a once proud nomadic people have now been oppressed by an aggression which has in truth lasted 300 years, by some 200 years of unceasing colonialism and some 70 years of struggle and tyranny, and has been reduced from what it was before, from its heroic disposition, by such gradual psychological degradation. A heroic seed has become resigned, the seed of the resigned has become gentle, the seed of the gentle, degenerate, and the seed of the degenerate, treacherous. And in the very end the seed of the treacherous has become oblivious. While we have been made to say that the child of a hero is the more heroic seed, and the seed of a bai the child of a servant, artificial class struggle has in this way become a struggle of ancient tribes. Thus, instead of defending one another, the practice of pointing fingers at one another has gained broad ground in recent times. Stern expressions have appeared in the Kazakh language contrary to its mild characteristics, such expressions as: "I will have you shot" "I will kill your eyes" "I will make you rot in prison" or "I will wipe out your seed" That is the way it is, and three times as many Kazakhs as Uzbeks, as a percentage (three as opposed to one percent), were directly executed during the 1937 Stalinist political oppression. In order that the bad habits which emerged in such a difficult time not remain irrevocably a part of

the national personality, we must come out these days against obliviousness, intolerance, and envy, and we must move ahead to national solidarity, social unity, national concord and state sovereignty. My friends! We must not forget the wise words of our ancestors: "You cannot make a rock out of sand, or a head from ashes."

It is true after dangerous and repeated demographic disasters of the sort described that a renewed development of our people quantitatively and qualitatively has gone forward side by side with its revitalization. Demographic explosion gained ground after the end of the war. This wave reached its highest point only in 1962. It abated again until 1970. Thus we expect the continual increase in absolute numbers of children being born which went on for 20 years to slow and birth rates per thousand to fall drastically. The reason is that the heavy losses due to famine and war have been replaced three-fold. (By 1970, males, who were sharply reduced in numbers, began, a generation later, to be supported by their grandchildren. Since their grandparents were greatly decreased in numbers in their time, their parents in turn were unable to increase, and for that reason their grandchildren were unable to increase rapidly. The fourth wave, even if 25-26 years later, is weak. This weakness will also be repeated in the great-grandchildren.) In conformity with these waves, the number of children born by Kazakh women in the republic in 1988-90 decreased from 209,000 to 201,600. The value of childbearing is different, and the difficulties which lie ahead cannot exert an influence.

We expect in the immediate future, probably during the years 1993-94, the beginning of a 19-to-20-year third renewal of a demographic wave which took place in the past. (The coming increase will be wave-like in structure after the temporary fall in numbers of births which took place during the years 1989-92. During this fall there has been a gradual weakening as total numbers of births do not decline uniformly but birth rates are limited by the influence of the fall.) In this manner past crisis and explosion waves are replicated and the second echo to take place in the future will be turned into a third, the third into a fourth, the fourth into a fifth, until the echoes gradually die away. And today, in spite of all present economic difficulty, our demographic resources capable of still another free repeat, replicating the echoes of the past, are manifold. This is because our demographic structure is still young. In 1989 the average age of the Kazakh population was only 22-23. We are twice as young as one people living in the republic, the Russians (44-45). This makes clear our great potential for demographic growth. We must learn how to employ this potential in a meaningful way. My friends, we must not forget that demographic youth comes only once for a people, as in life itself. If we know how to use our time of youth well this will, to be sure, have a favorable influence upon our quick adaptation to new future conditions of a market economy.

We should touch on the question of who started the demographic high water which is so happy for us today

Our beneficial demographic renewal was started by soldiers returning victorious from the front. (If 12 of their members were not healthy, their thirteenth member, so important demographically, was healthy.) This was the second great victory of those soldiers who came back victorious from the front. At that time the traditional demographic habits of our people were still unchanged. The passion to compensate for disasters which had just taken place was also substantial. For example, some had lost brothers or sisters in the hunger, and others had lost relatives in the war. Although at that time the number of male Kazakhs was small, there were many hardy women who had raised several children without being married. Then no one reproached, as they do now, those "single heroes, the single mothers," who did everything for the blood of their people, and sacrificed themselves to raise the younger generation. They always lived for their people, trying to make it numerous again. For example, when I was small there were a number of good families growing up started by single women from my village alone. I know now that they gave rise to strong men.

Our ancestors compensated for the losses caused by the Dzungarian invasions in 75 years. They restored the previous prosperity of their nation with the points of their lances, with the strength of their forearms. The later losses due to the red excesses were restored in 25 years only due to a demographic explosion. Thereby the process of compensation was speeded up three to four times. One peculiarity of the present era: those creating our general demographic biography today are not Qabanbay batyr of the Qarakerey, but pretty girls Quralay, etc., who are among us, not Qanzhyghaly bogenbay batyr, but our sister-in-law Bibizhamal, called "heroic mother," not Olzhabay batyr of old, but our younger system Orynqul, not batyr Malaysary, but the Qulsara of the old ways. Our progenitor is not Qarakesek Qaldyrbay but simple Qaldyguls, our grandfather is not Rayymbek, etc., but our own Rayguls. We honor those wonderful mothers who have raised our numbers to 10 million. We must call upon them to fulfil completely their honored maternal duties on behalf of the people. If the young Kazakh women of today are able to continue the tradition of raising many children like the great grandmothers, grandmothers and mothers who have given birth to them, and if they teach them the Kazakh mother tongue, our nationality will grow quickly and flourish. As a result our numbers will grow still another three-fold in the future. Thereby our people will become prosperous again. Relying upon this and upon the honor of the children mentioned above-given special names, I say to our honored women: I charge you with this task.

Now let us return to specific figures, to demographic facts. I am utterly sure that these figures and facts will have a greater impact on the minds of the people than my words of agitation. (Editors: The facts and tables are published below.) I believe completely that they will provide much for Kazakhs, once a shrinking people, to think about.

I think it suitable to begin with one of the principal demographic indicators, the fertility of women. During former nomadic times, or just 60 years ago, Kazakh girls came of age at 16-17 years on the average, married at an average age of 17-18, and gave birth to their first child at 18-19. Thus Kazakh girls who started families at an early age had 10-12 pregnancies in their lives. Unfortunately, only two-three of their children seem to have survived. Even today any of our grandmothers will tell us this. However, because the demographic explosion was in full force then it may be that there was a great deal of limitation of the numbers of children. More specifically, according to figures for 1958-59, every Kazakh woman produced 7 children on the average. That figure 30 years after, or during the years 1988-89, had fallen sharply to four. Most of the children were coming from rural areas (five-six children born per woman in rural areas, only two-three in the cities). Today Kazakh women, in birth control, are quickly overtaking levels attained by Russian women at the end of the nineteenth, beginning of the 20th century. Our wise ancestors have said: "Learn an art, hate what you learn." It would be proper to caution Kazakh women to restraint in this area by saying "not so fast." To be sure, Kazakh women needed eight years to go from seven to six children, 10 to go from six to five, and indeed, 12 years to go from five to four. If it takes 40 years to go from four to three, and we lengthen the time it takes to go from three children to limiting families to two to 60 years, we will then be able to harvest as much as possible in our general era of demographic growth, and to be able to extend our future national growth up to one century. This will make possible a tripling of our numbers. However, we will need peace and prosperity for this. Also, we must make a new advance in this direction under conditions of a new market economy.

Right now, that is, in the middle of 1991, we are growing again and we have exceeded 10 million by a considerable 250,000 and 8,665,000 of our people, that is 85 percent, nearly a major nation, lives in its own homeland in the Soviet Union. The remaining 1,585,000, or more than 15 percent, lives in foreign countries. Some 6,950,000 of all Kazakhs in our country (68 percent) live in Kazakhstan itself and 1,715,000 (17 percent) live in adjacent areas. Thus 3,300,000 of our dispersed people (more than 32 percent) lie scattered in areas outside their motherland of Kazakhstan. While this number is not greater than the number of fraternal Turkic speakers, people like the Kirghiz, it is no smaller. Some two-thirds of these Kazakhs have become refugees and live in difficulty after fleeing "Stalinist oppression and Goloshchekin genocide." Thus we must again remember that there are those of our brothers who, as a result of bad politics, have become involuntary wanderers due to red excesses. We think that their repatriation to our homeland as "honored returnees" is an honorable duty of our sovereign nation.

Considering that our republic is divided into three regions by history, climate and economics, populations

of these areas were the following in 1990: southern Kazakhstan (five oblasts), 3,185,000; northern Kazakhstan (10 oblasts), 2,290,000, and western Kazakhstan (4 oblasts), 1,315,000. In any case the demographic center of the Kazakh people, the fortunate region which strongly "buttresses" the west and east of Kazakhstan, its north and center, what is outside and what is inside, is the south, in other words Shymkent Oblast. In former, pastoral nomadic times, the demographic fountainhead was in the broad and rich Saryarqa. However, during the difficult times of aggression the focus of our people moved as indicated progressively towards the south. After the enemy was driven away, the broad Kazakh steppe was resettled. We can determine through presently deeply entrenched demographic fact just how these circumstances gained broad ground during the time of the Dzungarian invasions. But secondly, a new demographic center that is becoming progressively more consolidated in the same manner is forming and gradually growing in the Zhetisu Region where our capital of Alma-Ata is located. At present, along the great Ile-Altay Chain alone, there are more than 700,000 Kazakhs, and their numbers will grow still more rapidly in the future as a consequence of migration. (In 14 to 15 years the number of Kazakhs in the capital and nearby will reach one million.)

The maximum figure for our countrymen in Central Asia is 991,000. But the number of Kazakhs in the Russian Federation and in other republics is more or less 684,000. Most of these Kazakhs (1,100,000) live in oblasts adjacent to Kazakhstan. For example, there are 125,000 in Astrakhan Oblast, 80,000 in Saratov Oblast, 112,000 in Orynbol Oblast and 75,000 in Omsk Oblast (there are 25,000 Kazakhs in Omsk City alone).

There are up to 300,000 in Tashkent Oblast (40,000 in Tashkent City itself), 100,000 in Bukhara and Nawai Oblasts. The number of Kazakhs in Astrakhan Oblast alone is considerably more than the number of Kazakhs in Northern Kazakhstan Oblast, while the number of Kazakhs in Orynbol Oblast is about the same as the Kazakh population of that oblast. Thousands of Kazakh young people work or study in remote Pribaltika, Belorussia, the Ukraine or Moldavia, and in the Caucasus. (Something to bear in mind: not included in our 10 million are a marginal 1,500,000 of our kinsmen, Kazakhs living in Uzbekistan, but hybrids of two nationalities. Those included in the tables are only those called Kazakhs in the census. This difficult, inter-ethnic question must be examined in future censuses. However, we must make clear that negligent reporting in stating one's nationality in past censuses has still not been corrected sufficiently. One cannot also fail to mention that the old tyranny of the difficult years and resulting ill winds have greatly contributed to this problem!)

One interesting fact is that Kazakhs appear to be numerous (some 350,000) not only in union republics, but also in nationality autonomies. If this is primarily a matter of nearby Qazaqstan (315,000), Kazakhs are also numerous in the east in the Tawly Altay (11,000)

and in the west in Kalmukia (7,000), in the north in Bashqurtstan and Tatarstan (6,000), in distant Buryatia, in the distant Saka country (Yakutia, 3,000) and even in neighboring Qarshay and Balqar (2,000, most in mixed marriages there). In this connection I would like to draw the reader's attention to the following issue. If it is thought that our soldiers, most of whom serve in republic republics and autonomous regions, oblasts and areas where they are serving their tours, have been left out of consideration, this is incorrect. There is a good explanation. Soldiers (for reasons of military secrecy) are not listed in the census where they are serving, but where they were recruited. For that reason those Kazakhs in remote areas are essentially those who have gone to work there, on job duties, or vacation, on shift, to visit or to study. During the 10 or so years between the two censuses those Kazakhs living in remote areas increased three-fold. This makes it clear how migration of our young people is on the increase. It is no secret that the flourishing percentomania of the period of Kolbin (1986-88) has had a great influence. The reason is that young people unable to find work or a school in their native republic were forced to go to those remote places in search of education or work. If we do not put a quick end to this new flow of diaspora there is the danger that it will gain broad scope. If we fail to do so, it is altogether possible that few Kazakh young people will remain in their own republic, and that most will disperse elsewhere, producing a situation resembling that of our Tatar brothers and Mordva neighbors. This something very dangerous for our future as a nationality.

This time 200,000 Kazakh soldiers in military service, 25,000 Kazakh prison inmates and 5,000 Kazakhs abroad were subsequently added to our union figures through official registration. This in one respect shows our growth, in another it must also show our gradual dispersal, and in a third respect as well that our young people have often gotten themselves involved in bad things. Just the round number of Kazakh soldiers in the Soviet Army is a number equal to the standing armies of large European countries such as Yugoslavia. However, they are not defending the sovereignty of their own republic. In addition, each year 800-900 Kazakh soldiers in military service die under accidental circumstances. Cannot we say that this is comparable to losses from a small war?

Leaving aside the question of external migration, internal migration has assumed major proportions itself. The complexity of this phenomenon has surprised us and there are aspects of it which alarm us. For example: in recent years more than 40 percent of those migrating to cities within the republic have been Kazakhs while 85 percent of those remaining settled in cities and towns are Kazakhs, our modest youth. Thus the difficult social, economic and living standard problems of young people in the cities are becoming the problem of our nationality. And there is something else which surprises me very much as a demographer. In the last 10 years Kazakhs in cities have grown by up to 53 percent, due to migration,

but they have grown by only a little over 10 percent in rural areas. This makes clear that while rural inhabitants provide most of our national growth, two-thirds of labor forces which have grown up there are flowing into the cities. This is, on the one hand, very much weakening demographic conditions in our rural areas (as in the RSFSR in nonblack soil areas). On the other hand, it is lowering the living standard of young people in the cities, and may sharply reduce the present rate of demographic growth. Scientific research alone is too little to prevent this. Systematic efforts of every kind must be made in this area on the part of the state. We must do it now since it is possible that five to six years from now will be too late. To this end living, housing and work problems of young people in the cities must be resolved quickly, and various kinds of enterprises based upon individual families must be developed rapidly in rural areas. I think it very important that the republic president, N.A. Nazarbayev, devote attention to all this, and during one of my meetings with him it seemed that he would do so.

In order to prevent the future worsening of demographic conditions in Kazakhstan we must increase care shown for Kazakhstan agriculture, and, more specifically, for Kazakhstan's 37 most backward remote rayons. In this regard we must carefully consider how not just to accept, as one of life's bitter lessons, what has happened due to disregard at the time to the problem of demographic irregularities gradually taking shape in the nonblack soil region of Russia. We must not repeat the same bitter experience in Kazakhstan. To prevent such things from happening even in the former Virgin Lands areas, it would be sufficient for us to move to new homes in the northern oblasts at least one-fourth of the 1.5 million Kazakhs and our Qaraqalpaq brothers living in the area of the Aral ecological disaster. We would gain in two ways from this useful campaign. However, due to ignorance in demographic matters, republic leaders are not devoting enough attention to such weighty suggestions. I think this is a sign of our social inadequacy.

However, as we turn to Kazakhs living in foreign countries, it would be altogether proper for us to touch on their numbers and the history of their past movements in particular. Regarding the diaspora of Kazakhs, we are in third place behind the Russians and Ukrainians among Soviet peoples in terms of absolute numbers in foreign countries (1.6 million), but in terms of percentages (15 percent) we are also one of the leaders, in third place behind the Armenians and Latvians. (Azeris living in their own lands in Iran and Afghanistan Uzbeks are not included.) Most of them, more specifically more than half, are a race of political refugees forced to flee their homeland in times of various difficulties and suffering, refugees from red oppression. However, those who left earlier are our kinsmen who pitched their tents in Kazakh lands during the era of Czarist colonialism, but were shifted from the good lands, and became refugees in the face of this force from the Altay, Yertis, Zhayyq, Kokshetaw, Tobyl, Yesil, Zhetisu and Manghystau. Among most of them our national thought and traditional crafts, our mother tongue and ancient practices,

our religion and traditional customs are preserved better than among ourselves. It is logical that those who are persecuted and likewise have had to go on a diaspora to very distant lands should be devoted to preservation of their own ethnic peculiarities. This fact not only makes clear the unity of historical experience of our native people, but makes clear that its deeply struck roots are full of great spiritual and material riches.

From this perspective, at present there are up to 1,420,000 Kazakhs right now in China and Mongolia, countries located adjacent to us, and close to us in history and in culture. (There are three Kazakh oblasts, two rayons and one aymag. Their total land area is 450,000 sq. km) For them our essence as a people is broad and in an unbroken state. However, there are 84,000 Kazakhs at this time, few to be sure, in Muslim countries of the Middle East rather close in culture to us. They live separately, in isolation from one another, and only engage in marriage exchanges. If this continues the only way will be for them to survive as individual nations. Regarding the developed Western countries, 31,000 Kazakhs are numerous in all of them. But if Kazakhs number in the thousands in large Western nations (e.g. the United States, France, Germany), in the smaller countries they number several hundreds, even several tens, and occasionally only a few. In recent times a few rare Kazakhs have begun to appear in cattle raising countries such as Australia and Argentina, very distant from their usual haunts. They are largely Xinjiang Kazakhs put to work herding animals with the permission of the Chinese government. Kazakhs in the Near East, in Turkey in particular, are a race of once politically persecuted refugees from Xinjiang. Their young people work, earn a living and go to school, and have now gone as far as the Western European countries. When I was in Paris, in the autumn of 1988, I met and became acquainted with some Kazakh young people whose 12 ancestors, descended from a man named Shaqabay of the Abaq-kerey, had fled from Barkol in Xinjiang (the present Kazakh Rayon) where their parents or grandparents had suffered Guomindang persecution in 1938. I was also able to talk to some Altay and Tarbaghatay Nayman at the same time.

There are many possibilities for protecting and demographically increasing Kazakhs in the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Since those persons in North America and Western Europe were held prisoner during the war, and have been unable to return home and are thus forced to remain and have taken non-Kazakh wives, there is difficulty for the children in keeping themselves Kazakh, to be sure, now that several generations have passed. And their fathers have gradually grown old and are leaving life. This situation is dangerous for our distant relatives in the United States and Canada who are not numerous.

The great dispersal of this sort of our people will not be a barrier to the Kazakh desire to become a unified people in the future, if, starting from now, we know how to exploit international connections broadly in the area of

protecting human rights. We believe that under conditions of perestroika and new thinking, the opening of our doors to all in international relations will have a beneficial influence. However, we will also need initiative and diligence to realize all such new possibilities. It goes without saying that there is great danger that even if Kazakhs formerly divided up among three hordes are now numerous, that they will gradually lose contact, divided up into seven peoples without mutual connections. Just now the differences in our languages and in our hearts are increasing. For example, while Russian Federation Kazakhs are one thing and Central Asia Kazakhs another, differences between Mongolian and Turkish Kazakhs are increasing, not decreasing. Under such conditions we think that our consolidation as a united nationality is very important for us. (Having gone this far let us now say that knowledge of tribal affiliations in early Kazakhstan by our ancestors was not something promoting division but unity. Even if we do not devote attention to this in today's demography, for purposes of unity it is possible to calculate numbers of members of the three hordes approximately by residence: the Great Horde is comprised of 2.7 million, the Middle Horde of 4.8 million, the Little Horde of 2.5 million. If various major historical events have greatly altered the numbers of those in each horde, it would seem also that the numerical relationships between them have not changed greatly. For example, whereas the Dzungarian invasions damaged in particular the Great Horde greatly, the 1920-22 social breakdown affected the Little Horde while the red oppressions of 1931-33 and the famine affected the numerically most numerous Middle Horde. As Kazakh clans, some 200, tribes, up to 20 and hordes, three in number, were divided and weakened, there is no doubt that their consolidation as a unified people became more pronounced. However, we will leave aside the question of whether or not the divisions were historically necessary. Even forming small units, the 3000 Kazakhs or so forming each of them traced their descent back to seven ancestors.)

We must regard the devoting of special attention to the investigation of Kazakh diaspora in the future as a question whose time has come. It is necessary for us not only to have cultural and spiritual connections with Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan but to continue economic connections as well. In this regard I think that there are some meaningful suggestions in the article "We Are 10 Million Kazakhs." For example, Western European Kazakhs can teach us about the market economy and establish various industries. And Kazakhs from Muslim countries are not only developing national handicrafts but are building mosques and organizing schools for us, while Kazakhs from the east have gradually brought us back to our hearts and to our religion, to our good customs and traditions.

When we talk about our quality together with our quantity, we cannot fail to mention great changes in our national psychology. Kazakhs are a people given heroic characteristics by their nature, a people which loves

freedom and liberty, as is well known. These forceful characteristics from our nomadic past have been weakened by 200 years of colonialism and 70 years of tyranny and have turned into mild, sheepish qualities. These mild, sheepish qualities are being overthrown, and if we do not return to the forceful qualities which ran in the blood of our ancestors, it is doubtful that we will become masters of our land and riches. For a young fertile people what is needed is a broad expanse for the new pasture of race horses, pure springs and pure freedom. There are many demographic foundations for us to say so. This is because the demographic composition of our peoples is very young. As stated above, the average age is 22 to 23.

In terms of European magnitudes Kazakh numbers are equal to the number of Greeks and Czeches, and have now risen to the level of Portugal and Hungary. In essence it will be possible to increase Kazakh numbers three-fold over today's 10 million. (Some 35 to 40 years will be needed to double our population. Then Kazakh numbers will approach the populations of larger European countries of today such as Poland and Spain. If we know how to preserve our motherland well, even if we grow many times it will not become too small for us. The problem is how to become complete master of it.)

In this regard, in order that our sovereignty not remain something on paper, but something realized in practice, we must put into force an immigration policy in the national interest of our country. If we do not do so, we will be happy to sing the song, "The Guest Controls the Host of the Bad House." We think that a sovereign republic must, while setting quotas for immigration flowing in from outside, set in motion a "honored returnee" movement, a repatriation campaign which can bring happiness and prosperity to our sovereign nation. We must confer the necessary political status on our 3.5 million kinsmen or so who have migrated as a result of Dzungarian invasion, who were destroyed by red excesses, who were scattered by Stalinist tyranny, and who have become destitute due to present ecological problems and thus have been hopelessly scattered. We must collect them all again for their own fatherland.

Has it not become utterly clear to us all that demographic impotency was the heritage of the Kazakh people for long years after the disastrous Goloshchekin genocide, colonialism and tyranny, and that the Kazakhs have to date remained a minority in their own country? What is at stake here is that strangers from outside, throwing in our faces manufactured deficiencies due to our extensive use of the land, after first destroying us and driving us away, have shamelessly said, "We are here! The house is ours." Taking advantage of our weakness due to such injustices, they are setting in motion separatism as a nasty means for dividing Kazakhstan. Whether it is Cossacks in the west, conservatives in the east, outsiders in the north or settlers in the south, they have adopted this means to destroy the present difficult interethnic relations of Kazakhstan. It is suitable for us to undertake preventive measures against a new crime of this sort directed at a multiethnic, unified Kazakhstan.

In any case, we have no choice but to raise quickly our percentage weight (see census data table) in the northern oblasts through demographic growth and migratory flow.

But to be sure, as stated above, it is clear that our numbers cannot remain at the present 10 and seven million. The pace of our demographic development is not weakening in spite of economic deficiencies. If our rate of growth remains like this, and if there is prosperity when future years gradually begin to rid themselves of market difficulties (which are in certain respects a repetition of an historical wave arising from past difficulties), then we will be able to increase at least twice, even three times the present pace. To be sure, a future three-fold increase will not be like that which has taken place in the past 45 years (1945-1990). It will be twice as slow and may last as long as 90 or even 100 years. Thereby, when our numbers have reached 27 to 30 million, our people will stop growing. All the most developed nations of the world are near to such demographic stagnation. It is a social inevitability of history. I can say that if such considerable demographic growth in the future goes forward along with the development of social quality, with a vitalization of national customs, a transition to the new type of economic management, and political advances, then the Kazakh nationality will become in all respects truly a people, and we will be able to say that as a united people this will be our completely new age. We must provide as preparation for this new, purposeful and high quality national thought. We are a young nationality, a young people and as such we stand before great change.

We think that one very dangerous threat capable of inflicting great harm to our multifaceted demographic development, the quality of demographic development in particular, is ecological calamities. We must come to grips with them. According to my calculations, at least three of our 10 million live under conditions of ecological calamity. Our national genofund bequeathed to us by our ancestors is our primary wealth. If we lose it we lose everything.

Such an educated leader as Mirzhaqyp Dulatov could proclaim "Wake up Kazakhs!" at the beginning of the 20th century. We are forced to offer as a special slogan to our young people only now growing in numbers the words, "Think about It Kazakhs!" If we offer such words they come forth only as a last "succor," like some sustenance left over from our history for our Kazakh people, which has shriveled, is lethargical and has a modest disposition. Our Kazakh people is demographically a very young people just awakened, and is still soft-minded. However, even as dawn breaks it is still unable to shake off sleep entirely. Who will guarantee that the Kazakh people will not fall asleep again? However, if we combine together the complex demographic nature being developed by our nationality, our nation's sovereignty, and the joy of its language, and future harsh trials of the market place, it is clear that cultivation of the people's "mind as well as body" is tempering our people and energizing it.



The fact of the Kazakh people's attaining 10 million (30 June) as well as the fact of the Kazakh mother tongue's achieving in practice the status of an official language (1 July), coming together at one and the same time, in the middle of 1990, was something haphazard, but deep connections are to be perceived between the two events. If a linguistic environment created through demographic growth does not totally retain its balance, we will not be able to pass on our language to future generations. We think that the demographic front is the decisive one in the difficult struggle for the fate of our mother tongue. In conclusion, the difficult fate of the Kazakhs in developing as a separate nationality has, in its time, come into contact with demographic determinism due to aggression and colonialism, and ignorance. Only the powerful force of demographic development has been able to extract the Kazakh people from this historical cul-de-sac. Is not today's reality proof of this? Life itself has shown that the insufficient maturity of the "total seething" in our national thought is something born of our shortness in numbers.

The celebration marking our people's 10 millions is being carried out as one expression of the international "Voice of Asia" Festival. For me as a demographer, this watershed number gave rise to great joy and thankfulness in my mind as soon as it was calculated.

Happy celebration, masses! May our horizon grow! May our thoughts be enhanced as our numbers increase! May the great watershed of our nationality prevail in our sovereign country! May our own numbers grow and grow again! My people, having influenced our thoughts in this way, grow anew a demographic life.

Figure 1. The difficult, watershed demographic dynamic by which the Kazakh people were recently able to attain seven million in Kazakhstan alone.

Past and present census are indicated in the figure by dots. Projections are given in their lowest ranges and indicated by dashes. The influence of external migration upon pure natural growth has been intentionally disregarded. Our people have been forced to devote their very productive youths over a period of 62 years (1915-77) in order to compensate for three times repeated disaster. How the rate of our people's demographic growth has slowed after the explosion is shown by the following comparisons. If we grew at a rate of 100 percent during 1950-1970, we grew at 60 percent during the years 1970-1990, and will grow at 36 percent during 1990-2010, 22 percent during 2010-2030, 14 percent during 2030-2050, and only at 6 percent during 2050-2070. According to the lowest range of demographic projections, we expect the populations to double, to increase 2.5 times according to the middle range, and to increase three-fold according to the highest range. The reason that the data from past censuses are below the line of the dynamic is because nomadic numbers were not fully taken into account in them.



The vertical column shows numbers of Kazakhs in millions. The horizontal line years.

Figure 2. The complex historical-demographical development of total Kazakhs and the numbers of those dispersing, the gradual widening amplitude of diaspora.

Coupled with the demographic projections (30 years for Kazakhstan), the figure shows a 180-year dynamic. The upper line (III) comprises all Kazakhs, including those counted in foreign countries. The lowest line (I), on the other hand, shows only the numerical levels of indigenous peoples living within the present boundaries of Kazakhstan. The middle line (II) shows changes in the number of Kazakhs living within the present boundaries of the Soviet Union. Thus the difference between the upper and lower lines indicates the quantity of the Kazakh diaspora to areas outside present Kazakhstan. (The space between I and II shows the number in Union republics, and the space between II and III the number in foreign countries.) The figure shows how the number of Kazakhs dispersed here and there, in all directions, due to being driven off their lands, by force, starting with colonialism, has gradually increased. We observe that our diaspora was suddenly and broadly increased by the oppression of the years of civil war in particular (1916-21). In this way migration to foreign countries became numerous. Another sudden broadening (that is, increase) of the diaspora is observed in the era of collectivization and sedentarization (1930-33). In this way since the frontiers were closed, migration to neighboring union republics grew greatly in scope. It is not difficult to observe how such forced migration increased the number of Kazakhs living outside the republic. Whereas 40 percent of our people were forced outside of Kazakhstan during the years of the civil war, at the time of forced collectivization 70 percent of survivors remained outside of Kazakhstan. Although the number of those dispersing has abated subsequently, the absolute numbers of the diaspora will grow still more in the future (3.3 million in 1991). If these Kazakhs do not return to the homeland in the future, the Kazakh diaspora will reach five million in the year 2020. Thirty years of destruction, demographic disaster, coming one after the other like a single disaster, have set back and disrupted the total number of Kazakhs by 100 years, and in Kazakhstan itself by 225 years. As a result, instead of a total of 30 million Kazakhs, with 24 million in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs have with difficulty attained only one and seven million respectively.

**Selected Census Data
Facts and Figures**

**Totals Number of Kazakhs
(according to an estimate for mid-1990)**

Republic	
Oblast	Number
1. Shymkent	1,060,000
2. Qyzylorda	530,000
3. Zhambyl	525,000
4. Semey	445,000
5. Almaty	425,000

**Selected Census Data
Facts and Figures (Continued)**

**Totals Number of Kazakhs
(according to an estimate for mid-1990)**

6. Aqtobe	420,000
7. Guryev	375,000
8. Taldyqorghan	370,000
9. Oral	360,000
10. Pavlodar	280,000
11. Almaty City	275,000
12. Eastern Kaz.	260,000
13. Qaraghandy	240,000
14. Zherqazghan	235,000
15. Tselinograd	200,000
16. Kokshetaw	195,000
17. Qostanay	190,000
18. Mangghystaw	165,000
19. Torghay	125,000
20. Northern Kaz.	115,000
Total	6,790,000

By Region:

Southern Kazakhstan	3,185,000
Northern Kazakhstan	2,290,000
Western Kazakhstan	1,315,000

In Sovereign Republics:

1. Uzbekistan	850,000
2. RSFSR	655,000
3. Turkmenistan	89,000
4. Kirghizstan	40,000
5. Ukraine	14,000
6. Tazhikstan	12,000
7. Belorussia	5,000
8. Georgia	3,000
9. Moldavia	2,000
10. Azerbayzhan	2,000
11. Latvia	1,500
12. Armenia	1,000
13. Lithuania	800
14. Estonia	700

By Regions of the Soviet Union:

1. Central Asia	991,000
2. Russian Fed.	655,000
3. Western Rep.	21,000
4. Caucasus	6,000
5. Pribaltika	3,000

Selected Census Data Facts and Figures (Continued)	
Totals Number of Kazakhs (according to an estimate for mid-1990)	
In National Autonomies (within Republics):	
1. Qaraqalpaqstan	315,000
2. Tawly Altay	11,000
3. Kalmukia	6,500
4. Bashqurtstan	3,700
5. Tatarstan	2,200
6. Komi	2,000
7. Saka Land	1,900
8. Buryatia	1,400
9. Daghystan	900
10. Sheshen-Ingush	600
11. Karelia	500
12. Qarashay and Malqar	200
13. Tuva and Khaqas	100
Total	346,000
In Various Regions:	
1. Amudariya Basin	370,000
2. Yedil Basin	310,000
3. Tashkent Area	300,000
4. Oral Region	160,000
5. Siberia	125,000
6. Tamdy Region	100,000
7. Myrzashol	60,000
8. Interior Russia	45,000
9. Far East	10,000
10. Northern Qaptaw	5,000
In Foreign Countries:	
1. China	1,270,000

Selected Census Data Facts and Figures (Continued)	
Totals Number of Kazakhs (according to an estimate for mid-1990)	
2. Mongolia	150,000
3. Afghanistan	40,000
4. Turkey	25,000
5. Iran	15,000
6. United States	10,000
7. Germany	7,000
8. Canada	5,000
9. France	4,000
10. Pakistan	3,000
11. Great Britain	2,000
12. Sweden	1,000
13. Australia	900
14. Arabstan	800
15. Austria	600
16. Argentina	400
17. India	300
Total	1,535,000
By Region of the World:	
1. Eastern Countries	1,420,000
2. Muslim Countries	84,000
3. Western Countries	31,000
World Total of Kazakhs 10 million (10,000,000)	
Including:	
Kazakhstan	6,790,000
Sovereign Republics	1,665,000
Foreign Countries	1,535,000

Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstan Oblasts (mid-1990, in percent)

Unit	Kazakhs	Russians	Others
Kazakh SSR, Average	41.5	36.9	21.6
Including:			
1. Qyzylorda	81.5	12.6	5.9
2. Guryev	75.0	19.0	6.0
3. Shymkent	58.2	14.7	27.1
4. Oral	57.5	34.0	8.5
5. Aqtobe	57.1	22.9	20.0
6. Semey	54.0	34.5	11.5
7. Zhambyl	52.5	24.0	23.0
8. Taldyqorghana	52.1	31.9	16.0
9. Mangghystaw	52.0	33.0	15.0
10. Zhezqazghan	48.2	34.0	17.8
11. Torghay	48.0	33.9	18.1
12. Almaty	43.5	29.8	26.7
13. Kokshetaw	31.5	39.0	29.5
14. Pavlodar	31.0	45.0	24.0
15. Eastern Kaz.	30.5	63.0	6.5
16. Almaty City	25.0	57.5	17.5
17. Tselinograd	24.5	44.0	31.5
18. Northern Kaz.	20.0	62.0	18.0
19. Qaraghandy	18.5	52.0	19.5
20. Qostanay	18.0	47.5	38.5

All tables calculated and constructed by the author.

IZVESTIYA Cleared of Exaggerating Number Serving Time for Economic Crimes

924B0147A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by M. Krushinskiy: "From 15,000 to 127,000—That Is the Range of Estimates of the Number of Persons Sitting Behind Bars for Economic Crimes". (Cited article from September published in JPRS-UPS-91-043)]

[Text] The chief of the USSR Ministry of Justice Legal Statistics Department, Z. Yakovleva, has accused IZVESTIYA of distorting the facts. The reason for her letter to the editors were the following lines from the notation published in September (No 229), "Amnesty is Being Prepared":

"There are currently 127,000 people serving time in Soviet jails and camps who have been convicted of economic crimes under long ago outdated criminal statutes from the Stalin era. This count was made by specialists from the Society for Protecting the Rights of Condemned Economic Managers and Economic Freedoms, based on official data from the Ministry of Justice."

The author of the letter complains that the indicated figure is a "fabrication," that no one ever queried the Ministry of Justice on this subject, and in turn she presents the following data:

"According to the statistical reports of the courts, no more than 2,000 persons each year are imprisoned for committing economic and job-related crimes specified by Articles 6 and 7 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and the appropriate articles of the criminal codes of other republics. Moreover, their stay in ITK [correctional-labor camps] is limited on the average to 1.5-2 years. According to USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] data, on 1 January 1991 there were 11,778 persons held at places of imprisonment who had been convicted for misappropriation of state and public property performed by means of abuse of their official position. Thus, there are no more than 15,000 of the so-called 'economic prisoners' convicted for committing specific crimes in the sphere of economics who are currently being held at places of imprisonment."

"Well, there you are!", exclaimed the hero of that IZVESTIYA publication, Society for Protecting the Rights of Convicted Economic Managers and Economic Freedoms Chairman Viktor Sokirko, after having familiarized himself with the letter. "Literally for years, we have tried unsuccessfully to get at least some information from the official organs, including also from the Ministry of Justice. I personally had occasion to speak with the author of this letter, Z. Yakovleva. She telephoned me once and began to rebuke me for 'incompetent intervention' in statistics. So I said: 'Well, let us meet, compare our accounts and correlate our methodology'. But no! There were no meetings. And zero

specifics. Here, thank you very much, there are at least some figures, so that there is a subject for discussion."

[Correspondent] And so? Do you admit that your figure of 127,000 distorts the actual situation?

[Sokirko] Certainly not. At least, in any case the letter is not convincing in this respect. Obviously, my computations and those of my colleagues which are based on fragmentary information from that very same Ministry of Justice which has found its way into the press may vary from the truth in one direction or the other. We never aspired to unconditional accuracy. But that which is presented in the letter...

[Correspondent] What specifically seems incorrect to you?

[Sokirko] First of all, these data are incomplete. For some reason only the persons sitting in jails and in the correctional-labor camps are counted. But what happened, for example, to the "chemists," and the "settlers"? Or those who are being held in investigative isolation facilities while awaiting trial? After all, there are many of these, and their waiting time may drag on for years. One of our defendants spent his entire eight-year term in the SIZO [expansion unknown], and received the appeal confirmation of his sentence after he had already served it. Yet according to the logic of Z. Yakovleva, it is as if he had never been imprisoned!

And furthermore, in regard to the over 11,000 persons who had been convicted for misappropriation "through abuse of their official position," the letter's author for some reason forgets another part of that same chapter of the Criminal Code, which talks about "misappropriation in especially large amounts." I dare assure you that the number of economic managers convicted under this article, and often without lawful grounds, is measured in the tens of thousands.

[Correspondent] Is what you have said enough to eliminate the variation in estimates ranging from 15,000 to 127,000?

[Sokirko] I might add something else. The average times of imprisonment for crimes in the sphere of economics have been clearly underestimated in the letter. Without having the full set of data at our disposal, we are forced to proceed from practice, to rely on our own samplings, thereby using the principle of extrapolation. But even according to the most modest estimates, those who have been convicted of speculation will get an average of five years, and not 1.5-2, as Z. Yakovleva affirms. And for cases of "bribery" most quite recently received a sentence for the full 10 years. There are still many economic managers serving such sentences, people who have been arrested supposedly for taking bribes even during the time of Andropov, when in the name of "purification of socialism" they went behind bars by the thousands.

So, I must admit that I do not trust the figures which my honorable opponent from the Ministry of Justice presents. Even the union procurator's office, in developing a draft resolution on amnesty for economic criminals, proceeded not from 15,000 but from 25,000 prisoners, although even this indicator seems to me to be greatly understated.

[Correspondent] By the way, about amnesty. Will there be amnesty or not? Will it affect the contingent of prisoners who are of interest to us?

[Sokirko] The draft on a general criminal amnesty, in whose development our specialists also participated, is currently being reviewed in the committees of the Russian parliament. Unfortunately, in spite of our efforts, it has turned out to be far from perfect. For example, as applied to economic crimes it touches upon only those who have been convicted for a term of no more than 5 years and have served no less than one-third of their sentence. We believe such a limitation to be excessive: Everyone must be freed. Even if there are some who are really guilty among them. After all, these are not murderers or rapists. The loss which society will incur as a result of the liberation of these people is immeasurably small as compared with the fact that a huge mass of potential entrepreneurs, frightened by our outdated legislation and its barbaric interpretation, is still afraid to enter the entrepreneurial structures.

Background of Krasnoyarsk Prison Camp Strikes Detailed

924B0094A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 16 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent Vitaliy Pyrkh: "A Camp Is Manning the Barricades: Why the Upheaval in the Prison Camps of Krasnoyarsk Would Not Die Down"]

[Text] *Even old-timers cannot recall anything like this. Entire production facilities began to grind to a halt in Krasnoyarsk in October at the rubber goods plant and the medical preparations plant... Disruptions occurred even at the enterprise producing the Biryusa refrigerators renowned throughout the Union for their quality.*

The plants did not halt production because their partners failed them but because of strikes by convicts—the very convicts behind the barbed wire...

Militia Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Shaeshnikov, deputy chief of the service for correctional affairs and social rehabilitation of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Executive Committee UVD [Internal Affairs Directorate], said: "The prison camps of the kray manufacture products worth a quarter of a billion rubles annually. This includes consumer goods: furniture, garden sheds, household utensils. However, deliveries under contracts account for 80 percent of our production."

In other words, many of the things we use in our households, such as refrigerators and TV sets, are manufactured in part over there, in the compound. This is why prison camps were located closer to industrial centers—in order to reduce freight charges to a minimum and maximize profits. At the time, hardly anyone thought about the urban population.

As I walked along Parashutnaya Street I looked at toddlers playing in sandboxes and at smoking "hussies" coming to "visit" their friends, and... I hardly envied local residents. How is it rewarding to observe a prison compound stirring across the road from the balcony of a nine-floor high-rise?

Everything began at the high-security prison camp located across the road, along that street. Drunken convicts refused to obey a guard detail, and when the detail tried to get its way, fists and sticks began flying... Within minutes, "No. 6" was out of control. "The officer of the day was thrown out of a second-floor window; two detachment chiefs had their feet broken; the deputy chief for educational work was beaten up. Twelve convicts were delivered to the hospital with fractures, skull and brain injuries, and stab and incision wounds." The mutiny soon spread to other prison camps of the kray through "messengers."

I found one of the leaders of the Krasnoyarsk militia at "No. 6." The situation there was not getting better.

He observed bitterly: "It is not a problem to toss a bottle of vodka or drugs over the fence, or even weapons. Incidentally, there are weapons in the compound now. Previously, punitive isolation cells quickly brought all of them back to their senses, but now..."

Is this to say that the drunken party was merely a pretext?

My interlocutor was an experienced man. I could not help developing a respect for his profession as I listened to his narration. Every morning he goes to work in the zone without a weapon, as is the procedure. Any day may be his last. Two hundred and thirteen murderers, 700 bandits, and 97 rapists—these are the "inmates" of the rebellious "No. 6." Given an opportunity, they will not be ceremonious.

When the events in the Krasnoyarsk prison camps became known to the public, opinions were mixed. Some were sincerely indignant and did not conceal their feelings about the criminal underworld: What is their problem?! Most Siberians squeezed into lines have already forgotten the taste of butter or vegetable oil. Is it not so? What about the camps?

I sought information from the appropriate organs. It turned out that the convicts receive their "rations" without fail even in our hungry times. At present, 650 grams of bread, 48 grams of meat, 100 grams of fish, 30 grams of sugar, 20 grams of vegetable oil, 550 grams of potatoes, and so on are allocated per convict. If a convict

has "TB," which incidentally is frequent behind barbed wire, then nutrition is of even a better grade: As much as 150 grams of meat, 40 grams of butter, 20 grams of vegetable oil, half a liter of milk, 50 grams of cottage cheese, and an egg every other day...

How many of our unfortunate retirees may afford such a fabulous set of foodstuffs at present?

However, no matter how good the food, freedom is freedom... and this is why other voices were heard. They said that the existing system of corrective labor facilities has become obsolete and should be changed. For example, tell us why the convicts should definitely be given haircuts "à la Kotovskiy?" What has this got to do with imprisonment? In addition, taking the climate into account, such a procedure is dangerous in Siberia.

Another point: Why must people serving time wear high boots all the time? What if someone has a foot disease? Why is it forbidden to wear wristwatches?

A militia official joked bitterly: "In general, it looks like perestroika has spread to prisons too." Speaking in earnest, why not? Only the naive could think that criminals who ended up behind barbed wire failed to notice changes underway throughout the country, especially here, in Siberia. After all, it is no secret at all that over the last centuries Siberia was precisely the favored location for prisons and exile. All kinds of people have been sent there under guard—godless Social Revolutionaries, advocates of the faith—followers of Avvakum, willful nobles, and plain bandits... Even now, toward the end of the 20th century, more than 42,000 convicts—an entire criminal army!—are confined in the 70 prison camps of Krasnoyarsk Kray. How could it fail to influence the people?

Militia Colonel V.I. Vasilyev, chief of the management organization service of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Executive Committee UVD, said: "Many settle right here, in Siberia, after they are released." He gave us the data: 32,800 people residing in Krasnoyarsk Kray have already served time behind the barbed wire. This is almost one resident in 100, senior citizens and infants included!

Local residents do not want to put up any longer with the fact that one act of banditry in two and one theft or robbery in three were committed by repeat offenders last year, that at present up to 500 of them per year settle in the kray, and that dozens of prison camps dispersed throughout Siberia do not even make up to the authorities moral and material damages inflicted on the jurisdictions.

At this juncture I am coming to what I began with—the niche and role of the "prison camp" economy in our life today. At one time the custom was to not discuss it. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, with its tremendous contingent of personnel, existed as if it were a state within a state. What was being produced behind barbed wire, and for whom, was a secret.

However, supply disruptions set in, and economic relations in the republics began to be severed. The convicts were the first to feel the advent of a market economy. They began to give up the services of prisoners first because plants had difficulty keeping their own personnel busy. This year alone the Krasnoyarsk "GULAG" lost orders worth 30 million rubles (R). This meant that thousands of convicts ended up without any work at all!

However, unemployment behind the barbed wire is even more frightening than on the free side.

Let us be realistic: Criminals will not disappear from our country today or tomorrow. Moreover, the statistics for Krasnoyarsk Kray, for example, indicate the opposite: Last year 55,000 crimes were committed in the territory of the kray, most of which were crimes against individuals—robberies, murders, rapes... This is almost as many as were committed several years ago in two years. Murders alone claim up to 500 human lives a year! In 10 years you have an Afghanistan all of your own.

There is no way to make up the losses inflicted on the people by robbers or rapists. However, it is also absurd when, due to confusion in the great state, the convicts begin to "leech off" the state, primarily because the state cannot provide work for them.

Vladimir Konstantinovich Shayeshnikov, chief "labor expert" of the prison camps of Krasnoyarsk, complained justifiably: "Privatization is underway in industry. Meanwhile, an instruction in effect bars us from dealing with anyone except state enterprises. We cannot deal even with cooperatives! Is this normal? A prison camp could very well operate under economic accountability or on a lease. After all, we deprive people of freedom but not of the right to be useful."

He hit the "nail" right on the head, as they say. Whatever else they do, the criminals must be as useful to our society as possible. Besides, never before were the prison camps dependents from the point of view of financing. They earned their keep. Even now, in a troubled and uneasy time, the "prison camp" economy of the kray is providing a substantial increment: In nine months, the output of consumer goods increased by 10 percent compared to last year. The overall volume of production also increased. However, there is a price to be paid for all of this. For example, in one of the male camps they produce bras, a very piquant and delicate type of merchandise... This is going far enough! But what are they to do?

Prison camp staffers themselves try to establish new relations in order to improve business and make up the losses caused by industrial enterprises "shedding" the criminal underworld. They travel to the four corners of the world. For example, they have just returned from Mangyshlak Peninsula in Kazakhstan.

V. Novikov, chief technologist of a high-security prison camp, told me: "We went to the city of Aktau, formerly Shevchenko. We wanted to start up joint production of

polyurethane foam. There is no way to embark on producing padded furniture without it."

"So, did it work out?"

"How should I put it... They are prepared to employ the workers of our camp right away, but on one condition: The entire profit generated should go to Kazakhstan."

Quite an approach, virtually a colonial approach, but this time on the part of sovereign republics rather than the center... Siberia has provided cheap oil, gas, and timber for the country, and now they also seek cheap labor from Siberia.

The times are different now, and the "prison camp" economy is ceasing to be a secret. Products worth R189 million have been produced this year in the prison camps of Krasnoyarsk Kray, and yet the inertia is still great! Local leaders do not wish to overcome their timidity and truly take charge of the previously forbidden "shop." A recent session of the kray soviet of people's deputies, which discussed the issue of the status of crime in the kray, referred to all kinds of things—the need for the leaders of law enforcement organs, which have failed to bring the crime rate down, to resign, and the need to restore order on our streets. However, not a word was uttered about ways to use the labor of tens of thousands of people behind the barbed wire, as if there were no such problem in the kray.

Some deputies were not even averse to taking advantage of the situation in order to establish contacts with the authorities of the criminal underworld.

City Soviet Deputy Vladimir Tetelmin appealed on the pages of *VECHERNIY KRASNOYARSK*: "We deputies support the justified demands of the prisoners and will facilitate their implementation. In turn, I, as an authorized representative of the people, am entitled to appeal to the authorities of what they call the criminal underworld with a sincere plea. Gentlemen, if this is up to you, do everything possible so that no crimes against persons are committed in our city at this uneasy time. Help the democrats to transform our life."

God forbid if there is such an alliance between the criminals and the democrats! It appears that this has already occurred in the history of our motherland... They opened the jails and let the common criminals go... Subsequently, murder and violence became rampant, which was invariably in someone's interest.

However, it is truly necessary to "fit" the "prison camp" economy into the framework of the coming market economy. At present, the prisoners do not even have an incentive to work productively. No matter how they labor in production or in logging operations, the state will still confiscate half of their incomes. The state will also withhold money for clothing and food... and this is how an individual who had already breathed the air of democracy before entering the "slammer" will end up

with just several dozen rubles in hand, which do not go very far given current prices. It is not even enough for smokes.

What if he ends up being unemployed? What if he is left idle for years rather than months or days? What is to occupy him over there, behind the barbed wire?

So, it turns out that whichever way we slice it, we must address the needs of the "prison camp" economy. Otherwise, it will make our life, which is difficult to begin with, even harder.

KGB To Partially Declassify Oswald Files

924B0106A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 25 Nov 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by S. Mostovshchikov: "KGB Intends to Declassify Dossier on the Murder of John Kennedy"]

[Text] In the words of Vadim Bakatin's assistant Vyacheslav Nikonov, the five volumes of operational information from our counterintelligence, which investigated Oswald fairly closely, will not be fully declassified. More likely, information on the results of the tapping of certain purely personal telephone conversations and the disclosure of private correspondence will remain confidential. But practically all the rest of the dossier, which, for example, it took Vyacheslav Nikonov three evenings to read, will soon become accessible to journalists. This will probably be the first case in which the broad public becomes familiar with a file that contains purely operational KGB information.

...Lee Harvey Oswald, who lived in the USSR for about three years from October 1959 through May 1962, was considered with a greater or lesser degree of certainty by many services engaged in the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the murder of John Kennedy to be, in addition to everything else, a KGB agent. As one can see from the dossier, the KGB actually did have an interest in Oswald, but—of a different kind. The Soviet state security tried fairly energetically to establish whether or not he was an agent of the CIA or other intelligence services.

Moscow pinpointed Lee Harvey Oswald after he had come to the USSR in 1959 as a tourist and announced his decision to remain in the Union and asked for political asylum and also citizenship. He stood up for his socialist option so energetically that as a sign of protest against the red tape involved in resolving this issue he even slit his wrists.

Of course, a suicide attempt for the sake of the triumph of the Marxist-Leninist idea and a thirst for citizenship and work in the USSR arouse suspicion even in the ordinary person, but all the more in the counterintelligence, and especially at that time. And therefore in "working up" Oswald, in Vyacheslav Nikonov's words, the KGB applied all the means and methods at its disposal: listening in on telephone conversations,

external surveillance (to put it more simply—tailing), monitoring of correspondence, and agency data. In essence, the dossier consists of reports from various services of the state security system on work they had done to monitor the life of the suspect—Oswald, who was given two nicknames in the KGB documents which are still absolutely secret—"Burbot" and "Dapper."

It would seem that Oswald actually was an evil person. The KGB even asked about his mental health, true, unofficially and they did not ask a specialist—they asked the physician in the Botkinskaya Hospital who put stitches in the American's severed veins. The doctor told the committee that Oswald seemed to be normal, although he was an extremely effusive person. It was precisely because of what the KGB considered his inappropriate behavior, judging from the dossier, that the committee's interest in him remained constant.

For example, the operatives could not understand Oswald's extremely half-hearted love for the study of the works of the theoreticians of communism, the love he swore to the Soviet authorities he felt. As the materials in the case show, his attendance of political classes was poor and he did not read the necessary books. He no longer loved Marx; instead he loved girls and fast crowds. It even seemed that the committee through its own people tried to interest him in political maturity but, evidently, unsuccessfully.

"Dapper" was not a great master at work either. They got him a job at a radio plant in Minsk where they now make "Gorizont" television sets. They chose precisely this nonsecret industry since Oswald, in his own words, had served in the army and worked with navigation instruments, and so he was familiar with the specifics of the industry. But in the USSR he broke his own radio, was unable to fix it, and had to ask his coworkers for help. And the KGB found out about this. Like, for example, the fact that the person who would later be suspected of murdering Kennedy almost never attended trade union meetings.

Lee Harvey Oswald apparently attended with regularity only parties and dances where, incidentally, he also met his future wife, Marina Prusakova, who worked as a pharmacist in a drugstore in Minsk. As the materials from the case show, "Burbot's" chosen one was not a KGB agent. But KGB agents monitored their first meeting.

There are also other extremely curious details in the dossier. For example, the KGB found out that Lee Harvey Oswald, having joined a hunters' society, once acquired a TOZ rifle and had taken it into the forest several times. The committee checked to make sure that the American had not gone near any secret facilities. Nothing suspicious was found, but the counterintelligence found out from Oswald's bird hunting companions that "Dapper" was a fairly mediocre marksman and frequently missed. In the words of Vyacheslav Nikonov, this fact causes one to wonder if Oswald could have fired

that fateful sniper shot at President Kennedy. At that time, true, the KGB could not have been interested in this question and simply recorded: Lee Harvey Oswald, somewhat subdued, sold his TOZ to a second-hand store for 18 rubles.

As Vyacheslav Nikonov asserts, all these materials might not have been preserved up to the present day, since they had lost their operational interest for the KGB, were it not for a note in the file saying that the information that had been gathered was of historical value. The KGB made this entry after Kennedy's murder and the widespread discussion in the world of various versions of the murder. Even today there are many versions, but the mystery of the attack has not yet been revealed. The KGB dossier on Lee Harvey Oswald, of course, does not dot all the "i's" but it will undoubtedly add new details to one of the most mysterious murders of the century.

PRAVDA Article on KGB Defector Levchenko Criticized

924B0128A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by I. Kalinin under the rubric: "Opportunity To Speak Up, Please:" "Cannot Be a Hero"]

[Text] *Lately, quite a few materials have appeared in our press about traitors to the motherland: Gordiyevskiy, Levchenko, Kuzichkin. All of them are presented as opponents of the "former system," as "fighters" against it and the hated KGB. Thus, consciously or uncounsciously, an attempt is being made to justify what has always been the most cardinal sin—treason.*

It is a pity that so far no moral judgment in this respect has been offered by the former or current keepers of the morals—of whom we have plenty.

Taking into account the eternal interplay of "fathers and sons," such judgment is necessary in order to preserve the moral foundation for the generation coming of age. It is very important that we do not lose the commonsense perspective here. Some ask themselves: Who are these people—traitors or dissidents? Is this question appropriate at all when we are talking about officers who took an oath and then violated it?

In his PRAVDA article (24 October 1991) "Three Meters High..." Vitaliy Gan writes from Washington about Levchenko, a former KGB officer who defected to the West in Tokyo in 1979. This article, as well as others of this kind, evoke a gamut of feelings.

The author portrays his hero, if not lovingly, at least without a shadow of condemnation. Not a word about treason as such, about the trampled oath, about the great sin the man committed. Levchenko emerges as a character from Le Carre. Remember—he who "came in from the cold"? Except that Stanislav Levchenko did not come "in from the cold"; he betrayed his motherland.

He simply took off and left. Forgot about the honor of the uniform, about the oath of loyalty to the motherland. A man betraying his motherland does not just leave. He does it furtively; he moves with stealth, hiding his intentions from friends and comrades at work, even from his family. A man who has betrayed his motherland cannot be a hero.

The author says that it is not his "intention to defend Stanislav Levchenko," that the latter does not need it and can, if necessary, defend himself. A very questionable statement. Besides, it is not possible to defend Levchenko. Even a hint that treason can be justified sounds like blasphemy.

There are eternal moral notions: duty, decency, love of motherland. We should not try to destroy them. We have already succeeded in destroying a lot of things, including the economy, and have brought the country to collapse. Why also destroy people's souls by encroaching on the values on which higher human morality is based?

Judging by the "Three Meters High..." material, Levchenko, in his pursuit of a better life, abandoned (precisely—abandoned) his family—his wife and teenage son. Now he is complaining that his son, who is now 26, has been prevented from finding a place in life, that "he is an unemployed Soviet," and that some time in the past, in school, he was forced to write a composition about a traitor to the motherland based on the example of his own father.

Yes, this deserves utter denunciation; this shows an absence of boundaries on the part of the powers that be toward family members who are not responsible for the head of the family choosing a criminal path. But what about Levchenko himself? He is not a naive child; he knew very well the habits of the Lubyanka masters; he knew how his family would be treated; he knew that in cases like this families are not showered with gifts. Did his hatred for the system really overcome his love for his own son and push him irreversibly toward treason?

Many people felt indignation toward the system; Levchenko was not alone. But these many others did not jump into committing this terrible sin. Why burn the house down just because one does not like the mistress? Besides, there was another solution, despite Levchenko's contention to the contrary. One can name many examples of people, seeing the vices of the system, nevertheless did not betray the motherland; rather, they proudly raised their voices in an attempt to change the system at any cost.

It sounds strange coming from Levchenko: "Thirty pieces of silver to sell the motherland? This is nonsense. I have not sold it and have no intention of selling it." Why pretend to be naive? Forgive the comparison, but this is like a prostitute trying to maintain that she is still a virgin. Levchenko and his ilk end up in the tight embrace of gentlemen who know their business well and will not forsake their gain. Meditations on decency simply have no place here.

The author saw in Levchenko a knowledgeable person who "can tell a lot" about corruption in the KGB, potential reforms, etc. I am not sure we need an expert who has been enlightening his new masters for 12 years now. According to Levchenko himself, "there are many normal, honest people in the KGB." Will they not sort out for themselves where to go from here, without Levchenko's profound—judging by the interview—recommendations?

A few words about his tale of his codename "Arthur," attached to him by the KGB." He used to spook his wife by saying that when he dies she should list all the names he used in his life on his obelisk. This obelisk, he says, would be about three meters high..."

I think that at the age of 38, which is when Levchenko settled his score with the motherland, all his "names" would have fit in the palm of a child's hand. Besides, obelisks are not put over the graves of people like him; they are foreigners in a foreign land. They are buried quietly, unnoticeably, and immediately forgotten. While they still live, however, what are they to do with their memories and perhaps a gnawing conscience? What to do with reminiscences?

Let us remember what Sadko said to the Sea Czar in reply to his promises and offerings (A.K. Tolstoy):

"Do not hold me with your reaches; All this luxury and indulgence I would give up for the cry of a quail in the rye, And the squeak of a Novgorod cart!"

Pity those who, like Levchenko, will probably never hear it.

History of Yekaterinburg 'Reserve' Russian Government Hideaway Revealed

924B0124A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Dec 91 p 4

[Article by V. Chelikov: "Yekaterinburg Caverns Shrouded in Secrecy. Now It Is Also State Secrecy"]

[Text] As we know, a reserve Russian government headed by O. Lobov arrived in Yekaterinburg (then still Sverdlovsk) on the most tense day of the coup—20 August. It was intended that, in the event that the White House was taken, government would be carried out literally from underground—from a depth of several dozen meters under the earth, from a reserve government center located a hour's drive from the city. The coup, fortunately, failed, and on 22 August the reserve left the underground residence. But information about its stay appeared in the press, arousing a wave of conjectures and rumors about Yekaterinburg's old and new caverns.

Like all cities in the stone belt, Yekaterinburg used to have a ramified network of underground passageways and installations. The fabulously wealthy families of the Demidovs, Kharitonovs, Zotovs and Ryazanovs minted

their gold coins in underground caverns. These coins in no way differed from the tsar's, except, perhaps, in having a higher precious-metal content. Thus the factory owners, who were perpetually at odds with the law, concealed a substantial portion of their riches. Moreover, nearly all of them were Old Believers. People crossed themselves with two fingers in underground chapels, and Old Believer schools and small monasteries were opened under the mountains, financed by fabulous sums of money. It was nothing for the tunneling specialists to build a passage even under a river or lake—molten lead, which prevented the entry of water, was used as a cement. Only a few of such passageways have yet been found.

One of the city's most enigmatic places is Voznesenskaya Hill. At its very summit stands an extremely beautiful building known as the Kharitonov House, in which the Palace of Young Pioneers and Schoolchildren is presently located. Everything connected with the house is shrouded in mystery and legend. The only thing known about the architect is that he was a convict sent by Pavlov I to the Tobolsk Prison. For a large bribe paid by the merchant Rastorguyev, he was transferred to Yekaterinburg, where under the fear of punishment by 500 blows with the stick, was forbidden even to mention his own name. Rastorguyev promised the anonymous man that he would organize his escape once the construction of the building was completed. But he did not fulfill his promise: the architect was hung in the Tobolsk Prison.

It took a full 12 years to build the building since, in addition to its visible part, it also had a secret underground part that became infamous. In the underground cellars the cries of opponents were muffled, and the mentors of the Urals Old Believers came by underground passageways to worship.

The revolution and the retreat of the White army filled the underground hiding places with hidden treasures. The owners were afraid to take them with them, and what's more, they believed that the Whites were only temporarily retreating. For example, it is reliably known that a huge collection of Sevres and Saxony china, Gardner dishes and unique plates bearing portraits of the heroes of the War of 1812 is hidden in Sysert, which is near Yekaterinburg. The house's owners, the Turchaninov and Solomirskiy factory owners, had one of the best technical libraries of the time, a collection of expensive pictures, and a writing desk made of Karelian birch, the only one in the world, which was masterfully crafted. Not a single item from the house has yet been found. And that means that they are still lying in caverns.

It is said that clandestine artels of treasure hunters exist in Yekaterinburg. In any event, old buildings that have been prepared for razing are taken apart the first night after the owners have left.

Who, if not the state, it would seem, should be concerned with searching for the treasures? But this is where the present-day legends about the caverns, which are still

just called rumors, begin. According to rumors, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense have simply larded the Yekaterinburg catacombs with various apparatus and facilities. A certain group of hoboes, known as the "Green," also supposedly lives in these catacombs. This organization is strictly secret, since it performs the functions of guarding the facilities. The Green consists of runaway soldiers and officers and criminal elements who have not come to the surface for years.

In response to my direct question, A. Okrugun, director of the press group of the Yekaterinburg KGB Administration, said that this was the first time he had ever heard of any caverns. And as for the hoboes, State Security simply did not have the money to waste thoughtlessly. Well, you can't complain about not getting something that doesn't exist. But let us turn once again to the story of the enigmatic Kharitonov House. In 1936, when it was decided to turn it into a Young Pioneers' Palace, the house was remodeled. The NKVD kept careful track of the process. Subsequently, on orders from the security agencies, all blueprints and plans for the remodeling were destroyed, and the people who had been involved in it were subjected to repressive measures.

In 1941 the Military Air Academy imini Zhukovskiy was evacuated to Yekaterinburg, and it functioned in the Urals until 1943. It was located in none other than the Kharitonov House. According to certain fragmentary information, one might draw the conclusion that the military district's communications cable passed through the old passageway. There were also strange rumors among the first Young Pioneers, who believed that the militia eavesdropped on all their conversations in the palace.

In the early 1980s an expedition from the Yekaterinburg Terra-80 Architectural Institute made studies of the caverns around the cities of the stone belt. The expedition was headed by V. Slukin, an instructor at the institute who subsequently wrote a book titled: "Tayny uralskikh podzemel'nykh" [Secrets of the Urals Caverns]. Vsevolod Mikhaylovich told me that the search for the caverns was done using geophysical equipment, that is, the presence of cavities was determined from the earth's surface with the help of instruments. But when the expedition started to set up its instruments on Voznesenskaya Hill, a militia officer appeared and politely asked that instruments not be set up far from the Kharitonov House.

One of the expedition's chief difficulties was that all documents connected with the caverns had strangely disappeared. Thus, there had existed a diary of Komsomol member Sasha Starkov, who had stayed in the cavern beneath the Turchaninov House shortly after the revolution. Starkov's diary was turned over for safekeeping to the library, from which it disappeared. It cannot be ruled out that the NKVD had a hand in this. Starkov himself died at the front.

Slukin has another interesting story, which was told by native Yekaterinburg resident A. Krokodilov. In 1927 their brigade set up equipment in a building on the city's central square, 1905 Square. There workers moved a massive granite slab, beneath which they uncovered the opening of an absolutely dry well shaft with a side entrance. The slab was put back in place that same day. There are grounds for conjecturing that this was the Siberian Bank's safe room. Across the road from this building there is a house that was formerly occupied by the NKVD and is now occupied by the KGB and city Internal Affairs Administration. It is conjectured that there was a passage from this building to the Siberian Bank, and peasants who did not want to join a kolkhoz were kept in the safe rooms.

However, Vsevolod Slukin believes that extensive use of the old caverns is impossible. For the most part they are half-collapsed and damp. But he is extremely surprised by the speed with which the sinkholes that appear rather often in Urals towns are filled in. Scientists practically never have a chance to visit an opening to underground caverns that has appeared—the sinkhole is surrounded by a militia cordon and quickly filled in. But if certain agencies have such an interest in getting rid of the catacombs, why haven't the principal underground labyrinths, which constantly threaten to cause cave-ins, been found to this day?

Slukin is also interested in the caverns because they represent a significant, albeit invisible, part of the city's architecture. Only by knowing about the passageways can one understand the significance of the strange rotundas that are absolutely out of keeping with the surrounding architecture. In reality, it turns out that they serve or served as ventilation ports.

One might think that it was long past time to clear away the cave-ins and build museums in the caverns. Moreover, all the work involved in clearing them out could be paid for by the treasures discovered. But it appears that the authorities are not particularly interested in doing so. Isn't this grounds for the obviously strange rumors about the Green?

I tried to find about present-day underground installations in the oblast soviet executive committee. But V. Mokhov, deputy chief of the Administrative Installations Department, told me that all information about present-day underground caverns is a state secret. For some reason, I immediately believed him. Granted, the doubt remains: aren't there yet other secrets here that are unknown even to the state?

Moscow Suffers Growth in Drug-Related Crime

92W'D0166A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*
in Russian No 21 May 91 p 12

[Article by B. Kalachev, instructor at the USSR MVD Moscow Higher School: "The Narcobusiness: Lowering the Barrier To Stop the Mafia"]

[Text] If we are to believe foreign studies, in Western Europe alone income from illegal drug traffic exceeds \$200 billion. It is logical to assume that in our country as well the traffickers derive quite a substantial profit from such trade. There are no precise data but domestic experts quote figures ranging from 300 million to 15 billion rubles. Still, what could the real situation be?

Criminal statistics provide a certain reflection of the destructive activities of narcocriminals.

Western information sources provide almost weekly information not only about large amounts of drugs confiscated from the mafia but also about the huge amounts of money ranging into tens and hundreds of millions of dollars, in addition to the confiscation of real estate and other valuables. Unfortunately, in our country things are different, and not only in the area of the struggle against the narcobusiness. Yet the situation is critical.

Diagram No 1 shows that the overall material damage resulting from mercenary crimes in Moscow over the past five years rose by 573.1 percent, whereas restitutions dropped by 435 percent. Within such a short interval, even the BKhSS [Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] agencies has turned into an extremely unprofitable "institution" from a "profitable" controlling authority. As to the struggle with illegal drug traffic, according to official statistics, no positive financial changes at all have been noted (see table). And all this is despite increased drug-related crime, by a factor of 2.9 and the increased frequency with which drug pushers are apprehended, by a factor of 1.5. Furthermore, diagram 2, which reflects the amount of confiscated drugs in the capital, according to the statistics of the Zonal Information Center (ZITs) of the Moscow City Executive Committee GUVd (Main Internal Affairs Administration) shows that their number has been reduced substantially (by a factor of 13.8 over the past four years).

Material Damage From Crimes in Moscow and Its Retribution in Rubles and Percent Compared to 1986.


**МАТЕРИАЛЬНЫЙ УЩЕРБ ОТ ПРЕСТУПНОСТИ В Г. МОСКВЕ
И ЕГО ВОЗМЕЩЕНИЕ, В РУБ. И В ПРОЦЕНТАХ К 1986 ГОДУ**



Compensation for Material Damage From Detentions, Confiscations, Voluntary Repayment Along All Lines of Work of the GUV, BKhSS, and Criminal Investigation, in Percent

	1986	1988	1989	1990
All lines of work of the GUV (from the sum total of the damage)	75.1	4.2	2.5	2.1
From the sum of the damage. BKhSS	167.6	66.1	33.5	6.6
From the damage. investigation department	29.6	14.9	0.005	0.001
As per Articles 224, 226.1 RSFSR Criminal Code (damage. criminal investigation)	0.3	0.006	—	—
As per Article 224.1 RSFSR Criminal Code (damage. BKhSS)	—	—	—	—

Articles 224, 224.1, and 226.1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code are articles according to which property confiscation is stipulated for illegal drug traffic



Based on these figures, one may think that the personnel of the UUR and BKhSS are engaged in so-called petty matters. This may be indeed partially the case. However, a study of the information in the data bank of the ZITs and information available to the eighth department of the UUR of the Main Administration, which deals with the struggle against drug traffic, indicates sharp disparities between the two. The curve of the confiscation of drugs kept steadily sliding upward, reaching 362 kg by 1991, or 36 times higher compared to the report which the Main Administration provided the ZITs. Furthermore, while admitting the existence of an ever increasing amount of confiscation of "hard" drugs such as domestically produced heroin, we note that the personnel of the Moscow militia have blocked the use of 300,000 doses of strong-acting drugs by Muscovites. Taking into consideration the established share of drugs extracted from the total volume of their illegal trade (15 to 20 percent) it would be logical to assess the entire amount of toxic substances remaining on the streets as something like

two tons or two million doses, which conventionally is the equivalent of an annual stash of nearly 10,000 drug addicts, not including occasional users.

What would be the equivalent of these indicators for the entire country, considering that in 1990 48 tons of drugs were confiscated on Soviet territory? We can assert that the 1,412 drug users registered with the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department in 1990 do not constitute the real number of drug users. This is confirmed by the results of sociological studies and by the personnel themselves of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department. Therefore, the amount of illicit drug money should be assessed differently. It is hardly possible to believe that in 1989-1990 not a single kopek was confiscated from pushers, thieves, and den owners. Meanwhile, the ZITs Main Administration personnel have no complete information on this subject in their data bank, for the agencies on the lower level do not bother to supply them with such data.

In all likelihood, such disparities in statistical figures may be found elsewhere in the country as well. Yet by some unknown way the reduced figures are supplied to the international UN data bank. It is on their basis that the scientists draft their projections, investments in rubles and foreign exchange are appropriated, and the public opinion on the situation with drug addiction is developed.

This clearly indicates that we must establish a mechanism for the gathering of even relatively reliable statistical data on this problem on all levels of state management. Ignorance of the quantitative-financial potential of the "enemy," dooms the law enforcement authorities to developing an obviously defective organization in counteracting the influence it has on society.

It is necessary to develop a differentiated economic-legal state policy applicable to the different natures of drug traffickers. Let us take a look at the following unseemly example.

For an entire range of reasons, trials of some individuals suspected of committing drug-related crimes are thrown out of court, and the data on the trial of such individuals are converted into administrative procedures. This applies to members of cooperatives and establishments showing an income of no less than 500 rubles monthly. However, for some reasons said citizens pay small fines. Possibly it may be to the greater advantage to the state to sentenced someone to a corrective labor term of no more than two months and confiscate 20 percent of his earnings not only from his regular job but also from any other source, barring few exceptions. This approach refunds the cost of the internal affairs authorities incurred during the subsequently terminated criminal and resolved administrative case, which usually amounts to 500 rubles. Today, unlike the situation in other countries, this practice is not applied in full.

There also exists an economic reason for actively levying on nonworking drug addicts (the number of their criminal actions based on hooliganism has risen 37 percent

over the past five years) a penalty consisting of administrative detention, which provides an opportunity not only to identify the source of income for buying drugs but also involves drug addicts in intensive labor therapy by making them work on city improvement projects, for instance. Today this is more profitable to society than making a criminally unemployed person pay an "inflationary" fine. For the time being the use of administrative detentions does not exceed three percent of the overall number of crimes related to drugs and drug addiction.

Naturally, the implementation of such suggestions demands a sensible approach and further close studies. However, we must mount an offensive before the disease has sunk deep roots.

The time has come to learn how to control the state money which goes into the USSR MVD budget. What is the current practice? A minimum of 500 rubles is spent on activities preceding the detention of a pusher, caught red-handed. A similar amount is spent in the preliminary investigation of the crime. This is followed by substantial trial costs and this entire financial process or legal farce ends, in accordance with a formal observance of the letter of the law, by sentencing the individuals to a certain period of deprivation of freedom with confiscation by the state of, shall we say, 14 rubles. On a national scale, this negative balance can total substantial amounts and turns into irreplaceable losses. The drug addicts call the suppliers "animals," and such "animal" money should be actively restored to society.

Today the situation throughout the world and, to a certain extent, the domestic situation lead to the assertion that the leader of this criminal community, unless deprived of his illegal capital, which is the key to organized crime, is successfully continuing to conduct his illegal operations even if kept under observation or serving time in jail. Therefore, training the personnel of the Soviet law enforcement authorities in methods of operative, administrative, investigative, judicial, and other areas of work aimed, above all, at finding, controlling, and subsequently confiscating the material possessions of organized criminal societies, including the so-called "general criminal funds," are promising activities. It is precisely such a policy, in our view, that could erect a decisive obstacle to the already initiated transformation of a regionally organized crime into an interregional and interethnic mafia. Separating the "clandestines" from their capitals is an excellent prevention in the struggle against drug addiction. However, any hope for a positive change, for achieving a positive balance, would be futile without the soonest-possible adoption of suitable legislation.

As to official professionalization in the organization of internal affairs, for instance, it obviously should begin at the special schools of the USSR MVD, on the basis of specific scientific developments in the areas of those same financial laws, economic criminology, sociology, analysis, and operative-investigative activities and other areas of knowledge, which should be as closely related to practical problems as possible. All of this requires substantial changes in the way such subjects are taught.

Along with developing the struggle against the mafia structures, we must pay equal attention to the attitude of the individual states toward general crime, which is the nutritive medium for its organized forms. Such work must be comprehensively energized and all population strata must become involved in it, upgrading the interest of employees and citizens in the final result of their anti-criminal effort, if one may use such an expression. The experience of our Western colleagues, which is acceptable to our socialist society, should be accepted more energetically.

For example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has the right to include in its departmental budget the material values confiscated from the criminals, in addition to the annual appropriations of the Department of Justice which, six years ago, was \$125 million. In some cases, in the course of a single operation of confiscation of mafia property, that administration has acquired sums of money exceeding its legal annual budget. However, all such material funds are spent by the administration's management not in raising the salaries of its personnel but in supplying them with first-rate and expensive equipment and in creating comfortable working conditions and other prerequisites needed for fruitful work.

Substantial dollar amounts are spent on intersectorial and international coordination in the struggle against the drug business. Preventive measures in controlling drug addiction and the treatment of drug addicts are the concern of other governmental institutions and public groups working in close contact with the administration and also actively encouraged on the basis of end results. Citizens, whose strictly confidential information has helped to identify the money acquired by the mafiosi are very generously rewarded by the administration. In this case it is a question not of a system of fiscal policy but of rewarding the country's population for fearlessness in its sincere struggle against organized crime.

I am deeply convinced that the mafia structures which for years have existed in our country on the basis of the laws of the black market should be countered by a set of measures which are part of the government's policy of developing market relations. The law enforcement authorities must, under such circumstances, upgrade the efficiency of Soviet laws and display real professionalism which will yield positive results.

M. Nishanov Urges Protection for Book Trade

PM1811145391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

["Three Questions to Mikhail Nenashev," USSR minister of information and the press, by Viktor Kozhemyako; date, place not given; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction: "All About Sex and Detectives"]

[Text] For many years he was a very prominent figure in our public life. Chief editor of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, chairman of the country's State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade, then chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting... This summer Mikhail Nenashev was confirmed as USSR minister of information and the press—and, strange though it may seem, he at once disappeared from the public horizon. But it has recently been learned that the ministry which he heads is being eliminated along with many other Union departments.

[Kozhemyako] First question: What is happening now in your ministry?

[Nenashev] A process of disbandment and of replacing managers. Of course, this is not a very happy thing for us. But it is inevitable and so must be perceived naturally, i.e. calmly.

A month ago we ourselves put a proposal to the USSR president for the disbandment of our ministry. This is a result of the changes that are taking place in the country in connection with the center's changed position. At the same time this decision is a derivative of the serious changes that have been implemented—and that includes with the participation of the ministry itself—in state book publishing over the past three or four years.

What is the essence of the matter? Creative and commercial independence has become the norm in the life of publishing houses. Most administrative regulations and prohibitions have been eliminated. At the same time a quite wide network of alternative publishing houses operating on a commercial basis has emerged. There are already more than 1,000 of them in the country today. For purposes of comparison, I can say that there are somewhere in the region of 300 state publishing houses.

Of course, this could not fail to change the book market conditions. Having great financial freedoms, commercial publishing houses react more promptly to market demands and so force state publishing houses to look sharp. The subjects covered by the literature being produced have also changed substantially. The reader has noticed, of course, the emergence of a large number of detective and fantasy stories. More and more so-called sex literature is appearing, as well as books on folk medicine, marketing, and various kinds of entrepreneurial activity. Once-banned works by Berdyayev, Florenskiy, Rozanov, Merezhkovskiy, Nabokov, and many

other remarkable representatives of Soviet philosophy and literature are appearing with massive print runs.

It was under these new conditions that the central ministry was called upon, while doing all it could to promote these democratic processes, simultaneously to defend state publishing houses in their concern for the production of socially necessary, noncommercial literature. While successfully promoting the first task, it did, alas, prove incapable of coping with the second one. For it was unable, within the last Cabinet of Ministers, to uphold its new position and did not get the economic and legal levers essential under modern conditions for influencing tax and price policy in book publishing.

I will emphasize: It seems to us that the present transfer of most central publishing houses and printing enterprises to Russia's jurisdiction requires the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Ministry of the Press and Mass Information to take account of this sad experience of the central ministry.

[Kozhemyako] What is of particular concern to you in the transfer of the publishing sphere to market relations?

[Nenashev] The commercialization of publishing, which leads to a reduction in the production of children's, teaching, and scientific-technical literature. That is, the very literature that preserves and develops society's intellectual potential. Here is how this appears in actual indicators. Over the past 2.5 years the total production of books by state publishing houses has fallen by 700 million copies. It is significant that a slump in book production has occurred only twice in the past in the whole of USSR history: in 1937 and in 1941-1942. Note, during the most difficult and tragic moments for the country in history. And the saddest thing is that production of children's literature, which is particularly essential to society, is falling sharply. During these same 2.5 years, of which I speak, the number of children's books fell by 200 million copies. Last year their print run fell by 33 percent, that of teaching books by 15 percent, and that of scientific-technical books by 14 percent. And prices are rising. Threefold, fourfold, and more. Of course, this seriously limits access to books for a wide range of potential readers.

[Kozhemyako] Where is the way out of such a complex situation? What must be done to protect book publishing, which represents the material basis of Soviet culture?

[Nenashev] It is necessary most of all for the state in the persons of the USSR president and the Russian president to abandon its years-old destructive policy of making superhigh profits out of state book publishing. The annual commodity turnover in the country's book trade today stands at approximately 4 billion rubles, and approximately 55 percent of this makes its way into local, republic budgets and the central budget. I believe that a system of state and public protectionism in respect

of book publishing must be set up as a counterweight to this consumer policy. It should be based on the optimum tax model.

However difficult the financial situation in the country today, it would be correct to free children's and educational publishing houses from state taxes right now. This accords with the best experience in world practice. In general, it is necessary to fund in every possible way books which make a loss but which society needs. There is, for example, the idea of creating a press and book publishing fund. As a self-managing organization outside the budget, endowed with the right of publishing, trade-economic, and foreign economic activity. The fund's chief task would be to provide material and financial support for the production of socially necessary literature.

We are not creating the fund from scratch. The "Moscow Printing Yard" joint-stock company, of which I have become chairman of the council of directors, has already begun work. Our own exchange and small publishing enterprises have been set up, and a publishing bank already exists. The interests of such an important matter as protection for books which people need create hope that the Russian Ministry of the Press and Mass Information will support the fund and the "Moscow Printing Yard" joint-stock company and will participate in their activity. We are pleased that the Journalists Union and the Academy of Sciences, the Academies of Medical and Pedagogic Sciences, the Slav Foundation, the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Association of Book Publishers, Printers, Book Distributors, and Publishers of Periodicals have expressed an interest in the fund's creation. We have also met with understanding and support from the capital's City Hall and Moscow City Soviet, and this is the city which is the center of Soviet book publishing, you know.

Uniting around the new initiative, we are all firm in our intention to do something good and actively promote the publication of books which will help our people to lead a happier and more honest life at this difficult time.

RIA's Plans for NOVOSTI Takeover Examined

*PM2811131791 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 47, 24 Nov-1 Dec 91 p 2*

[Dmitriy Sidorov report: "A News Agency Without Regimentation and Socialism"]

[Text] More than 4,000 staffers of the former NOVOSTI Information Agency (NIA) are to vacate its building at 4 Zubovskiy Boulevard in mid-December. The building will be taken over by the Russian Information Agency. Unlike its predecessors (APN and NIA), the new agency will emphasize news and facts rather than ideological comments and analysis.

Director-General of the RIA is Andrey Vinogradov, 36, who worked for NOVOSTI Press Agency for 12 years. He thinks that the sluggish and carefree life of that agency is over. All Soviets working for the NOVOSTI

bureaus in other countries have also been served notices of dismissal. They will soon return to Moscow. According to A. Vinogradov, many bureau chiefs sent him cables condemning the failed coup and pledging their support of democracy in a bid to secure positions in the RIA.

Coming back are also nearly one hundred Soviet spies who used the NOVOSTI press cards as their cover worldwide. Their return was negotiated by A. Vinogradov with their former KGB Chief Leonid Shebarshin. A. Vinogradov has also secured consent from the military intelligence agency. Still, the new director would like to keep some of the Soviet spies because they are really fine journalists. This is only possible if they resign from intelligence.

There is a bigger problem with regard to the sacking of a great number of foreigners who worked for NOVOSTI in many countries. They all are protected by the laws of their countries and by their unions. The RIA will have to pay them some 50 million dollars in damages. The disbanded news agency was financed from the state budget and thus it has no funds that could be used. In fact, it only earned 10 percent of the money spent on it. A. Vinogradov is going to ask Russia's government for the dollars. He is sending a letter to this effect to Boris Yeltsin soon. He is going to set up RIA bureaus in industrial countries and regional offices in third-world countries. The new agency cannot afford 100 bureaus, as NOVOSTI could.

Only some of the former staff in Moscow will be rehired and this is going to cause serious problems. Former staffers of NOVOSTI say in leaflets pasted outside the building they are going to stage an indefinite strike in December. They demand that Andrey Vinogradov and his deputies be arrested allegedly for having caused the collapse of the prestigious news agency. The director-general is gearing up for numerous court actions. He is hopeful that his agency is not going to resemble NOVOSTI run by Valentin Falin and Albert Vlasov who only increased the staff.

Central TV Embarrassed by Manner of Russian Takeover

*PM1912101191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Dec 91 p 2*

[Nikolay Krivomazov report: "Central Television News, Which Central Television Missed"]

[Text] This upcoming event was first reported by the presenter of the nighttime edition of Russian Television's "Vesti" news program. Thus: Within the next few days Central Television is being transferred to Russia's jurisdiction, and the well-known Russian businessman Konstantin Borovoy is being appointed economic adviser to Central Television Chairman Yegor Yakovlev.

The next morning, i.e. yesterday, the presenter of the "Utro" program repeated this news item, noticeably embarrassed. He cited "Vesti."

At the same time it is known that Ye. Yakovlev, appearing on an internal television channel as long ago as Monday, had told his subordinates: The rumors of the death of Central Television are greatly exaggerated. Yes, it is passing under the Russian flag, i.e. as early as next year Ostankino, which has been totally ruined, will be financed by the Russians. All commercial services are being centralized. This is evidently in order to rule out the possibility of personal enrichment for those involved in advertising. Henceforth a kind of race is being announced on the television screen, and the only programs and broadcasts to survive will be those that survive the race. (The latter point strikes me as doubtful because, as is known, Yakovlev has already driven our "PRAVDA Street" off the screen—which we intend to deal with in future issues).

Central Television will suffer a 30-percent reduction, affecting approximately 1,200 people. Nevertheless, of the four television channels under Central Television's auspices, there is now just one, the first, that will evidently also become an interstate one.

As regards the "marriage" of Yakovlev and Borovoy, it began, as is known, with an argument. Borovoy sent Yakovlev a letter describing how highly he appraised Central Television's creative and technical potential. He appraised it by no means highly. Yakovlev took umbrage at the Russian businessman's tone. A new message followed. And now the outcome, whose details are still not known at Central Television. This is evidently why they cite "Vesti" at present...

In order not to miss the next news sequence, I am suggesting the topic in advance. In the next few days they will be sure to lower the red flag from the Ostankino television tower: Don't miss it, guys. But our "PRAVDA Street" can no longer take these shots—Yakovlev forbids it. Or maybe he is forbidden...

TRUD Future in Question

924A0324A Moscow TRUD in Russian
17 Dec 91 pp 1,3

[Unattributed commentary: "TRUD: To Be or Not To Be?"]

[Text] *If a society loses mass-circulation independent newspapers, it may cause most ruinous consequences for the society itself and for the cause of democracy.*

On the threshold of the new year, when everybody seems to be summing up the results of the past 12 months and trying to peer into the hazy troubling distance of tomorrow, the issue that suddenly came into main focus for both our editorial offices and those of many others is the fate of most popular publications: Are they, or are they not, to be? This cannot help but trouble millions of readers

for whom the newspaper is not just a source of news, a forum for varying opinions and viewpoints, but also, using one of our subscribers' figurative expression, "a breath of fresh air that we have attained in such a hard way."

Therefore everybody should know that an independent press and glasnost, which are prerequisite conditions for the development of democracy, are in danger of economic strangulation.

Let us look at the facts. The cost of paper, typesetting and printing services, and distribution services—these are the three whales on which the financial foundation of the press rests. At the beginning of last year, newsprint cost R280 a ton. Make a guess how much the price will be up next year compared to this amount? A threefold increase? Fivefold? Wrong. Prices of paper are expected to be raised to **more than 20 times that level!**

In April-May of this year, when paper cost R880, the Ministry of Communications and the Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for the Distribution of Printed Materials of the Ministry of Communications] demanded that we set a subscription price for TRUD for 1992. We at the editorial offices were racking our brains at that time trying to guess how much paper would cost in 1992 (cellulose and paper combines were mum on the issue), and how much the printing houses and distribution will demand. We had to solve an equation with many unknown variables.

Strictly speaking, it is a ridiculous, bizarre situation. More than six months in advance, the newspaper is required to name a subscription price while nobody can even make an educated guess as to what the future "components" will be. Thus, we (and the reader) become a hostage to a vicious system, "outsiders" in these strange games. What happens next? In December, or sometimes even in the beginning of January, monopolist paper producers, monopolist distribution organizations, and so on, jack up the prices on their products and services (because other monopolists—the railroads, the power industry, the lumber processing industry, and others do the same), while the editors are being held responsible and have to explain this to the reader. Nothing of this kind could be conceivable in any civilized country...

Nevertheless, we had to set the subscription price for 1992 in May. It was clear that it had to be raised considerably. But by how much? Those who subscribe to TRUD—the largest mass-circulation, truly people's daily newspaper—are workers, office workers, young people, pensioners... After long considerations, we set the annual subscription price at R28.92. We based it on the assumption that the price of paper will not exceed R1,500 per ton (this is five to six times higher than last year). We sent a notice to the Soyuzpechat and started waiting...

Now in December it becomes clear that the financial noose thrown around the neck of the press may be

tightened so much that we may be facing our last gasp. Paper producers still have not named the final price on their products: They are waiting for the general price liberalization expected on 2 January; however, there is already talk about R5,000 or more per ton (for mass-circulation newspapers).

The distribution also demands outrageous sums for its services. By preliminary data, tariffs for delivery of newspaper and magazines will be 3.6 times higher! We have never had anything like this in our experience.

This destructive approach is typical today for many of our partners. As a result, a literally phantasmagoric picture emerges. Taking the December situation as a basis, by preliminary calculations the price for an annual subscription for a mass-circulation newspaper should go up many fold. For instance, for TRUD it should be about R120-140; for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA—up to R150-180... What these figures may be in January, after prices are liberalized and the hyperinflation spiral swiftly unfurls, is anybody's guess.

Sometimes we hear: This is what a market economy is, "nothing can be done about it." But the current situation has nothing to do with a real market. This is more of an anti-market, the perversion and discreditation of the idea. An antimarket appears in the environment of an unprecedented monopolism of producers, non-convertibility of the ruble, hyperinflation, and unpredictable economic processes.

It is as clear as it can be: In this complex transitional period, sovereign states cannot simply stand back, letting the spontaneity of the market run its course. It is not accidental that a price ceiling will be established for basic types of bread, dairy products, and a number of others. Otherwise there may be mass famine and a social explosion.

But man does not live by bread alone. People need the independent press today—perhaps no less than they need daily bread. So far, however, it is outside the field of vision of the power structures. We would rather not think that the press would be deliberately left to die by the government. The government does have the means to help popular newspapers: use economic preferences

for newsprint suppliers, limit paper exports through taxation so that a greater share would go to the domestic market, etc. No matter how prickly and inconvenient the press may be for the government, it needs it, too. Without a free press, the situation in the current society can become unpredictably acute...

Of course, TRUD, backed up by millions and millions of subscribers, does not give up easily. Economists are joining us in searching for ways for the paper to survive. They propose, for instance, to boost advertising and commercial activity, such as creating joint small enterprises whose profits would be used to cover the losses from newspaper publishing. All of this will take some time, however. Besides, it is not going to be easy to make up for losses that may run into billions with the exorbitant prices for paper and services.

Others propose to appeal to the readers, to announce a quarterly surcharge for TRUD subscriptions. After all, the R30 paid in October for the annual subscription today carries a completely different "weight." It is, for instance, the cost of 150 grams of sausage that sells in the store on Mayakovskiy Square in Moscow. The comparison is truly stunning. Specialists believe that with the average per capita monthly income of R500-600 expected in the first quarter, it is possible to set aside R10 a month for the "subscription indexation."

There are other proposals—for example, to reduce the number of issues, to publish an advertising supplement, and so on. All proposals are being looked at carefully and studied. We will gratefully accept any suggestions from our readers that would allow TRUD to survive and to free itself from the financial noose.

Our uniquely popular newspaper has been in existence for more than 70 years. Together with readers, we must do everything we can not to let it die. If, as sociologists tell us, each issue is read by three or four people, TRUD has tens and tens of millions of people behind it. This is a formidable force. We hope that their voice will be heard—primarily in the government of Russia (almost two-thirds of our subscribers happen to be in Russia), as well in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other republics, in labor collectives, trade union organizations, new entrepreneurial structures, and by potential sponsors. It would be a crime to let such a newspaper perish.

MOSCOW NEWS Examines USSR Environmental Crisis

Map of 'Ecological Distress'

92WN0142A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 3-10 Nov 91 p 11

[Article: "Our Time Is Up...Our Home Is Unclear and Unhealthy. Solutions Must Be Found"; first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text] The reader has in front of him the chart of the most acute ecological situations in this country drawn up by scientists at the Institute of Geography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. On the Soviet Union's territory they have identified about 300 areas of regions whose environment is now unfavourable for human population. These territories occupy 3.7 million sq km or 16 percent of the country's total area. Including the reindeer pastures ruined in the tundra, however, this figure rises to 20 percent.

The chart published here does not show the administrative boundaries dividing the former Union Republics which are now sovereign states. These boundaries do not exist for the long "tongues" of ecological distress stretching over thousands of kilometres. Foul deeds were committed in collaboration, fulfilling without a murmur the directives issued by timeservers who were seeking

"parities", "priorities" and the fulfilment of plans at all costs—everything to ensure their personal rule.


A fifth of the Union's population (c. 40 percent in terms of city dwellers alone) lives in ecologically unfavourable conditions.

Scientists have identified acute situations as seen against the general backdrop of ecologically distressed areas. There are 17 of them on the chart. In regions of large-scale industry, people inhale its discharges and exhausts, and drink water poisoned by it. A real threat has been created to the health of the multimillion population of such megametropolises as Moscow and St. Petersburg; the inhabitants of the Donbas and Kuzbas (coal fields); and the industrial centres of the Urals, Azerbaijan and the Krivoi Rog area.

Yet tragedy has come not to industrial zones alone. The loud campaign to save Lake Baikal has subsided, but the lake is still being destroyed in the production of the paper on which the literature on saving it is written. The flow of toxic wastes into Lake Baikal annually exceeds 100 million cu m.

A territory exceeding 10,000 sq km has been radioactively contaminated as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station. Located on it are 640 inhabited localities with a population over 230,000.

ECOLOGICAL SITUATION IN THE USSR



Now we shall have to climb out of the ecological pit. Shall we do it separately, one by one? Or can we find a means of doing this all together as well? And what can we pin our hopes on in the long run? The mobilization of efforts at all levels of power? New legislation? Changes in the economy and technology? Ousting the tainted manner of thinking from our mentality?

Today we give the floor in this complex discussion to professional ecologists who are also representatives from power structures, i.e., those who in line with their duties must assist the country in extricating itself from the ecological crisis.

Vorontsov Decries 'Ecological Sovereignty'

92W0142B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 3-10 Nov 91 p 11

[Article: "May I Have the Floor? In a Single Ecological Space Nikolai Vorontsov, Minister of Nature Conservation and Environmental Protection of the USSR"]

[Text] The concept of a single economic space within the boundaries of the former Union has been coined today. But there is even more reason to discuss a single ecological space. The majority of boundaries of ecological zones does not coincide with administrative frontiers, everything overlaps. Therefore I am greatly concerned about the present-day separatist trends. Not as a Union minister caring for the preservation of his official position, but as a specialist well familiar with the problem from the "inside".

It may not seem to be a paradox, but the economic and social consequences of national egotism in the sphere of ecology may jeopardize sovereignty. To avoid this, some "arbitration court" as represented by an interrepublican body is absolutely crucial. On the same level some common standards, as yet undeveloped, are also vital.

I am convinced: "ecological sovereignty" can and **must** be waived. Otherwise we shall be in even deeper trouble. Needless to say, on-site control or inspection by experts—all this must be controlled by the Republics. But the Centre must retain a single methodology for ecological maintenance. Many problems can generally be solved only at the world community level.

Let's not beat around the bush. It would be naive to think that once the Republics were headed by progressive presidents, the republican administrations would also consist exclusively of progressive officials. For this reason alone it is unfeasible to destroy the Union system of environmental protection departments which it took us great pains to set up a mere three years ago. It will doubtlessly have its part to play in working out and implementing the principles of the utilization of nature with regard to the established traditions.

Incidentally, there is definite connection between ecological calamities and the outbreak of ethnical conflicts. Ferghana and Sumgait are the most cogent points in this case. The conditions of congestion and constant pollution, besides everything else, generate aggressiveness.

I want to cite just one example to demonstrate what the trend to pull apart all the Union structures for various Republics can lead to. Today the country knows no plague, but ten percent of its territory may be described as pestilential nidi. The anti-epidemic service has worked with dedication. When, for instance, an epidemic broke out in Kyzyl-Kum in 1968, antiplague units were urgently dispatched there from Tuva, the Trans-Baikal area and Astrakhan. Four years later an alarming situation took shape in Tuva, and everything was concentrated there. And, indeed, how is it at all possible to eliminate the single epidemiological service?

Today, the Republics (including the Baltics) have no experience in the questions of the market economy. Yet mechanisms for the economic regulation of natural resources exploitation, an ecological market and environmental technologies must be created. Life will necessitate doing this together, on the basis of interrepublican and international programmes. There are plenty of examples to prove the point: take the problem of preserving the population of sturgeon in the Caspian Sea. It concentrates 90 percent of their world population. But sturgeon must not be caught at sea, because if they are the herd will disappear at a very rapid pace. This can only be done in rivers during the spawning period. But not all the Republics located on the shores of the Caspian have rivers flowing into it. And Russia and Kazakhstan must share part of their Volga and Ural catch with Azerbaijan and Turkmenia only in exchange for the latter's not catching sturgeon at sea. And the latter can take part in building fish factories and in fish-breeding activities. It would also be advisable to involve Iran in this comprehensive programme.

Studying the consequences of the Chernobyl accident is important for more than just our country. But this work has been organized in a most wretched way. For example, no one actually deals with analyzing the genetic consequences of the disaster. Whatever newspapers publish from time to time, various photographs of calves with six legs, are not genetic deflections, but violations of individual development. **Pravda** recently wrote with delight that the number of genetic diseases in the Chernobyl zone did not increase in 1987 in comparison with 1986. But that is nothing to rejoice over. Most mutations that arise are of recessive nature, and all specialists know this well enough. They surface only after a generation and it's very difficult to take stock of them. Nobody deals with this, the problem is simply being profaned.

Drawing on the world community for support, we could create an excellent international institute for studying this problem. But the solution to the problem has been twisted in the whirlwind of apparat games.

USSR Deputies Present Environmental Priorities

92WN0142C Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 3-10 Nov 91 p 11

[Article: "Express Interview"; first two paragraphs are MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text]

What's Your Greatest Headache?

This question posed by MN was answered by USSR people's deputies: Alexei Yablokov, adviser to the President of Russia, and Vitaly Chelyshev, editor of the all-Union environmental newspaper "Spasenie" (Salvation).

[A. Yablokov] Two important measures must be effected—the introduction of fines for pollution and taxes for the use of natural resources. Spoiling nature must become economically disadvantageous, as happens in the West. It is the latter circumstance that has enabled developed nations to extricate themselves from the ecological crisis.

A few words about the North. The specific situation in this region results from the majority of its population being time-contract workers who do not care about the state of this land. Veritable monsters have grown up on it—the Norilsk complex, the Severonikel complex on the Kola Peninsula. Now diamonds have been discovered in the Arkhangelsk Region... It must be saved before it is too late. If the development of this deposit starts the "Yakut way", the cost of extracted diamonds will be nothing in comparison with the environmental damage.

Our ice epic has upset the ecological system of the White Sea. Powerful icebreakers pass across areas where seals use to herd, moreover precisely during the season when the animals gather on the ice for the whelping period. Thousands of seals die. This is even economically unprofitable, to say nothing of the complete immorality of such actions.

The situation of the Neryungri coal field discovered in Yakutia is tragic. Borrowing huge credits from the Japanese, the Soviet region started supplying them with Yakut coal. Japan thrived on this coal, providing us with different kinds of machinery in exchange. Now this machinery has been worn out, and we are giving coal for spare parts.

Today the Neryungri deposit is a crater hundreds of metres in depth and several kilometres in diameter. It will be depleted in ten to fifteen years. We shall be left with a heap of Japanese scrap metal and mutilated soil.

Eighteen months ago Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush suggested that a summit conference be held on environmental problems which should become a turning point in the history of keeping the planet intact. It is expected that agreements will be signed on the preservation of forests, climate, etc. Our country is in a position

at this conference to come forward jointly with the United States in a "Strategic Ecological Initiative".

[V. Chelyshev] Armand Hammer used to bring us dirty technologies.

I see danger in the opportunities of the Republics, in conditions of economic independence, to conclude deals with foreign firms which may look very profitable at first glance, but which are environmentally impermissible in actual fact. There have been examples of this in our past as well. For 70 years we have taken pride in "fruitful" cooperation with Armand Hammer, who commenced the joint efforts with Lenin's blessing. Yet specialists know all too well what dirty technologies he dragged into our country. Today, it is true, our affairs are being handled by the Council of Ministers of the European Communities which recently passed a decision on banning environmental dumping and the export of dirty technologies into the Soviet Union. We must implement the safety concept, developed by Academician Yuri Ryzhov's group, an integral part of which is environmental safety.

Entry in the market implies encouraging ecological entrepreneurship. I drafted such a bill and adopted it as part of the Law on Entrepreneurship in the USSR. Let me cite just one example testifying to the immense opportunities of environmental business. I have never had warm feelings for the KGB, but I tenderly loved one of its subunits. The Committee's military-medical service had people who were developing sorbents—at a time when the Ministry of Public Health still banned this. Today they work outside the KGB framework and have set up an international centre known as Sorbtsia. The success of their products on the international market may be envied even by the luckiest entrepreneur.

Continued Soviet Presence in Antarctica Questioned

92WN0194A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Dec 91 Union Edition p 8

[Article by I. Gritsenko: "We Are Not Leaving Antarctica"]

[Text] Will we stay in Antarctica or not? This question acquired a political hue after teletypes in foreign agencies spread a sensational announcement made by the Chilean newspaper EPOKA all over the world. The Chileans were worried that due to the disintegration of the once powerful empire, the South Pole might be left without a single representative of the former USSR. "Even in 1973, after the military came to power in Chile, our polar explorers continued their work hand in hand,"—comments EPOKA.

I went to Artur Chilingarov, deputy chairman of the liquidated Union State Committee for Hydrometeorology, for an explanation. Recently, he was appointed advisor to Ruslan Khasbulatov on issues concerning the Arctic and the Antarctic.

—This is the first I've heard about our leaving Antarctica, although this is not impossible, it could happen. The Soviet Antarctic expedition is finding it extremely difficult to secure equipment and funding. For this reason, we were forced to cut back the national research program. Last year, we closed two scientific stations, and this year we have decreased the staff by more than half. However, we intend to develop the more important studies, including the international programs. And these more than anything else are concerned with the ozone layer, the so-called "hole in the ozone". The anxiety felt by the international Antarctic community is not unjustified: literally very soon, our research vessels could be stuck, because we cannot receive the funds that were allocated to us through the end of this year.

It is likely that the participants of the joint Soviet-American expedition "Weddell-1" will come up against this problem. This is probably the first international station to be located directly on an iceberg adrift in the sea. Weddell will be conducting a study of global atmospheric circulation and the interaction of those processes with the Earth's climate. It took three years for the idea of forming the expedition, submitted by Soviet scientists, to bear fruit. The expedition is of a noncommercial type, and is subsidized by the state. The Americans, for example, are subsidized by the U.S. National Science Foundation—a major financier of basic science. If the question of funding for the Soviet side is not resolved, we can only guess at the reaction of the American partners. How will this failure to fulfill our obligations affect us, and who can estimate the damage done to our nation's prestige in the basic sciences?

—There is no money, but we scrape by as well as we can,—says Valeriy Lukin, head of the Soviet Antarctic expedition.—We resolve problems that have to do with our cooperation with the Americans on the basis of equal contributions.

Maybe Valeriy Lukin's optimistic attitude is justified, and business at the station will proceed as usual. IZVESTIYA plans to keep its readers informed in the future about the research being conducted at "Weddell-1"...

One might wonder what use a half-starving and half-clothed country has for faraway Antarctica? "Leaving Antarctica would mean invalidating our own history, forgetting the great names of Belinsgauzen and Lazarev",—reflects Chilingarov.

An announcement for trivia lovers: a presence in Antarctica is not all that expensive to maintain at current prices for the country's budget. Nine million rubles. The salary for polar explorers working under extremely difficult conditions barely reaches a thousand...

Now in Antarctica, preparations are being made for the next polar year. Almost all of the specialists have gone there. At the Soviet stations, the tri-colored Russian flag is flown together with the red one. Evidently, this is fully

in order: according to the latest information, Boris Yeltsin has been made responsible for the Russian presence in Antarctica.

Russia, Ukraine Sign AES Safety Accords With FRG

92WN0166A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Dec 91
Union Edition p 6

[Ye. Bovkun report: "A Bomb Producing Electricity"]

[Text] Bonn—The FRG's cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear-reactor safety continues at republic level. Klaus Toepfer, federal minister for environment, recently signed the corresponding agreement with representatives of Russia and the Ukraine in Munich. The Germans are prepared to render urgent assistance in view of the "disturbing situation" which has come about, according to Toepfer, at Soviet nuclear electric power stations [AES].

The minister employed sparing words. The situation is in fact simply catastrophic. In the opinion of a group of experts who recently presented the Bundestag with the "Report on the Safety of Nuclear Power Stations and Environmental Aspects of Power Supply in the States of Central and East Europe," all the AES built by Soviet specialists could be called "bombs temporarily producing electricity."

"Your economic planners," an author of the 50-page document told me, "believed that they were building their facilities for ages, but their safety is diminishing with every passing year in view of faulty operation."

The German specialists have involuntarily studied the history of the ailment of our nuclear power engineering—at reactors given to the GDR, primarily in Greifswald and Stendal. The economy of the new, eastern lands of the FRG cannot cope without nuclear energy, but dependable Western-model reactors will operate there.

But what is to be done with ours? Were FRG legislation to be in effect on the territory of the Union, all the reactors would have been shut down long ago as posing great danger for the public and the environment. Purely theoretically, Bonn believes, this could be the case with us also. Were the coal, oil, and gas used for the generation of power as efficiently as in the West, losses upon a transition to nonnuclear power engineering could be avoided. This in theory, but in practice this is utopia.

The situation is being made worse by certain departures from the standards in construction and operation and also shortcomings in the organization of the labor process at the AES and in the qualifications and motivation of the personnel. A. Birkhofer, an expert in reactor safety, saw this for himself during a visit to Ukraine. He discovered the total absence of any engineering program for the staged shutdown of Chernobyl-type reactors whatever. That they need to be shut down is understood by everyone. But no one could tell him where, for example, those managing the AES intend to obtain steam, which is needed in a quantity of up to 50 tons an hour for the lengthy period of this procedure.

How might Germany help us? By way of the use of Western technology to make our reactors somewhat safer. For a certain time, of course. A radical reorganization would require expenditure such as the budget of even so wealthy a country as the FRG could not sustain. The modernization of just one unit would cost no fewer than DM200 million, it has already been computed here. Billions would be required all in all...

The delayed-action nuclear mines are continuing to count down the years, days and hours. They can only be rendered harmless with the assistance of the entire world community. But this does not mean that we should stand idly by in expectation of assistance from overseas. The most dangerous thing now is the dependency virus, which is already beginning to affect some leaders of the new economic structures.

Greenpeace Renews Charges of USSR Nuclear Waste Dumping

92WN0174B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Dec 91 p 4

[Article by A. Lyutyy, PRAVDA staff correspondent reporting from London: "The Arctic Ocean—A Nuclear Dumping Ground"]

[Text] *London was recently the scene of the 14th consultative meeting of the parties to the International Convention on Prevention of Oceanic Pollution. Unfortunately, it did not begin on a happy note for the Soviet delegation.*

The convention, still known as the London Convention, was enacted in 1975. We are among its 65 signatories. One of the document's passages forbids the discharge of radioactive wastes into the sea from ships, aircraft or other means of conveyance.

Unfortunately, judging by information from the world-famous environmental protection group Greenpeace as well as several of our own environmental movement activists, the USSR was secretly violating the convention, at least right up until 1986... At issue are nuclear waste dump sites at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean.

This practice began at least as far back as 1964, according to USSR people's deputy A. Zolotkov, who made a special trip to London at the invitation of Greenpeace. While on the staff of the Atomflot Association, which operates nuclear-powered icebreakers, he had an opportunity to make a thorough study of the problem and see documents which remain classified to this day.

For example, the deputy is convinced that civilian vessels belonging to Murmansk Shipping Lines regularly dumped radioactive wastes in the Kara Sea for over 20 years. The sea near the island of Novaya Zemlya is especially polluted; for a long time it was one of the areas used for underground nuclear testing.

Zolotkov brought along a map showing that the toxic fuel was dumped in relatively shallow water and could present an ecological hazard even today. He explained the technology of the pollution in a special report.

Here is a typical excerpt from that document: "The radioactive wastes dumped in the vicinity of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago consist of containers, metal structures and other equipment from nuclear power plants. The documents on these operations which I saw were very interesting from the standpoint of how the wastes were disposed of. The very term 'container,' for example, assumes a hermetically sealed structure which should prevent even momentary contact of its contents with the environment. But it turned out that the containers remained afloat. This problem was solved very simply: two openings were cut and water poured into them, thus ensuring that the containers would sink."

"In 1984," the report continues, "in a certain gulf a container was found which was emitting a radiation level of 160 roentgens per hour. It was successfully sunk after additional work was done on it."

If Zolotkov is to be believed, then in the 1960's several malfunctioning reactor units from the nuclear-powered icebreaker "Lenin" were dumped off the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. Both Greenpeace and the people's deputy possess other facts indicating what could be termed a serious violation of ecological law and complete disregard for the convention statutes. Yet that convention bears the signatures of our representatives, and all these years they have been claiming that no dumping has taken place.

But could Zolotkov be distorting the facts? Let us suppose he is. Then why have there not yet been any official denials, even though this is not the first time he has made this claim? Nor have there been any other explanations, incidentally.

At a press conference held at Greenpeace headquarters journalists naturally wanted to know whether the dangerous practice of disposing of radioactive wastes in this manner continues at the present time. The people's deputy is virtually completely certain that it has stopped insofar as civilian ships are concerned. With regard to military vessels he is less certain.

How can we help Greenpeace? In reply to this question of mine, the Soviet visitor commented that the international environmental organization could use its authority in support of the Union's ecological movement. And that movement is working, firstly, to learn the whole truth about nuclear wastes in Arctic waters and, secondly, to put a stop to this practice and ensure full compliance with the London Convention. In Zolotkov's opinion the whole world has a stake in that because this is a problem that extends beyond Soviet borders.

Greenpeace representatives in turn told me that during the current consultative meeting of London Convention

signatories they intend to appeal to our official delegation with a request that it either confirm or deny the people's deputy's statement. Furthermore, they will attempt to win guarantees of compliance with the convention from Moscow.

As for monitoring of the level of radioactivity at the dump sites and a possible cleanup of them, Greenpeace feels that all the signatory countries should render the USSR collective assistance in view of the seriousness of the environmental problems that are heaped upon us.

Air Pollution Emissions, Cleanup Costs Detailed

92W/N0143A Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI
in Russian No 10, Oct 91 pp 64-65

[Two Tables on Pollution and Cleanup in USSR Cities]

[Text]

The Following Data Is From Press Releases of the USSR State Committee for Statistics

Pollution of Air in the Atmosphere by Industrial Enterprises During the First Six Months of 1991

	Tons (000)	% Compared to First Six Months of 1990
Total of Harmful Substances Discharged Into Air	26,192	93
Including, from Cities Over One Million Pop.	2,578	99
Cities include:		
Alma-Ata	22	102
Volgograd	107	96
Dnepropetrovsk	126	106
Donetsk	84	98
Yerevan	23	121
Kiev	37	137
St. Petersburg	107	114
Minsk	57	117
Moscow	168	113
Novosibirsk	121	78
Omsk	220	96
Perm	78	102
Samara	64	97
Ekaterinburg	30	85
Tashkent	20	88
Ufa	130	94
Chelyabinsk	191	97

Emissions from industrial enterprises that pollute the atmosphere decreased by 2.1 million tons in comparison to the first six months of last year. At the same time, they increased by 1.5 million tons at nearly one-third of the enterprises. In addition to the cities listed, emissions of harmful substances increased at industrial sites in Archangelsk, Irkutsk, Angarsk, Zaporozhye, Makeyevka, Almalyk, and Rustavi.

Progress in Taking Measures To Decrease Emissions of Polluting Substances Into the Atmosphere in 1990

	Total Est. Costs as of Start of Measures		Decrease of Emissions from Stationary Sources of Pollution (in 000 tons)	
	Rubles (Millions)	% of Est. Costs	Actual	Incl. Amts. Due to Measures Taken
Total for Industrial Enterprises	2,471.5	77	3,363.7	2,026.3
Including cities with more than one million pop.	192.1	72	301.4	246.2
Cities include:				
Alma-Ata	8.8	75	2.7	5.2
Volgograd	6.4	90	5.6	2.3
Dnepropetrovsk	12.9	69	23.4	13.4
Donetsk	11.7	115	2.2	6.2
Yerevan	2.3	79	4.0	0.6
Kiev	8.6	79	7.7	4.8
St. Petersburg	33.0	83	4.4	6.8
Minsk	7.0	69	10.2	2.0
Moscow	10.3	99	17.1	12.1
Novosibirsk	3.8	54	8.7	3.2
Omsk	20.2	72	8.6	5.8
Perm	4.6	23	23.7	15.1
Samara	4.5	79	15.2	4.5
Ekaterinburg	5.2	66	3.9	4.6
Tashkent	2.3	89	8.7	3.5
Ufa	7.0	86	31.6	13.4
Chelyabinsk	4.3	33	+0.7	1.4

Due to not completing the measures proposed for safeguarding the atmosphere, the decrease in emissions of harmful substances was only 4/5 of the total expected. The actual decrease in the impact of emissions on the atmosphere was determined not only by implementing measures to safeguard the quality of the air, but also by a decrease in the extraction and processing of oil, coal, and iron ore and a decrease in the output of many types of products made by metallurgical and chemical-wood pulp industries.

Dioxins Reach 'Extremely Dangerous Levels' in USSR

92WN0194B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by N. Danilov]

[Text] If before, we imagined the apocalypse as an instantaneous act destroying life on enormous expanses in the fire of nuclear war, then now, when science has turned to face our ecological problems, it is seen as the slow and torturous process of extinction for the human race in a polluted environment that is no longer suitable for life.

The dioxin. This chemical substance can be called, with every right, a synonym for the coming ecological apocalypse. One trillionth of a gram of it causes irreversible genetic damage in humans, blocking the immune system and depriving it of all protection against any kind of external force, whether it be a virus, bacteria, radioactivity or stress. The first warning of the extraordinary danger of dioxins was heard in 1969 in the work of American scientists sharing their pacifistic ideas. They

pointed out that the herbicide "Agent Orange", which was used by American military forces in Vietnam, contains an admixture of dioxins. It was this that caused genetic mutations and diseases of the liver and immune system that do not respond to any kind of medication in thousands of Vietnamese, yes, and in American servicemen who came in contact with the herbicide, as well.

Of course, the data on the genetic consequences of the use of herbicides containing dioxins that were intended for military purposes, which has miraculously filtered into the scientific press, was not enthusiastically received by the leadership of the American military apparatus. A genuine disinformation campaign was launched against the scientists, during which for each truthful article on dioxins, tens of materials were printed that "disproved" their toxic effects. The propaganda attack on the scientists was continued through 1984, although the U.S. Administration had a sufficiently complete profile of that toxin, and although Congress had, back in 1969, held its first closed expert consultation on dioxins.

Again, in a closed session held a little later, the U.S. Congress examined questions concerning urgent ecological rehabilitation having to do with dioxin contamination in humans, agricultural areas and bodies of water.

By that time the waterfall at the Great Lakes was dead due to dioxin pollution. Ecological measures taken in the United States had made it possible to decrease the dumping of substances containing dioxins into the environment by almost 100 times! According to publications in the Western press, by the mid-seventies, practically all the sources of dioxins and its concurring substances were known, and treatments had been developed for dioxin poisoning.

A curious detail: in the United States, there is an anti-stress law that is unique and so far the only one of its kind in the world. It forbids employers and managers to create stressful situations at the work place. This is because under conditions of dioxin contamination, stress leads to a sharp decrease in mental and physical capacity to work and to a drop in immune system activity. A large portion of the studies on dioxins done in the United States were kept secret from the very beginning.

The USSR has had practically no opportunity to acquire the equipment for determining the presence of dioxins in agricultural products and chemicals. The first set of devices appeared here only in 1984. The export of this apparatus fell under COCOM's [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] prohibitions. Whereas Finland, for example, had those opportunities. And what happened? From the results of analyses of imported produce published yearly in the open press, it appears that the Finns sometimes return up to 30 percent of their imported grain or demand that its suppliers cover expenses for its disposal! In Canada's southern provinces an enormous amount of dioxins are found in the grain, as well, but the Canadians insist that there is still less there than in grain from the United States.

I would like to examine separately the attitude of Soviet scientific organizations towards the dioxin problem. I will say first off that the warnings of progressive Western scientists have been voices crying in the wilderness. In the flood of information and disinformation on dioxins, our country could not and did not even attempt to determine the sources for the formation of this dangerous substance. In the USSR, chloric technology has not been discontinued as it has in the United States; it is becoming even more widespread.

In the USSR, 12 patent certificates have been issued on seed treatments employing industrial hexachloride. But this isn't all. Until very recently, we would buy up thousands of tons of pesticides containing admixtures of dioxin in FRG, Switzerland, Japan, France and Great Britain. In all, in the USSR widespread use of more than 80 similar preparations was permitted that are categorically forbidden in the West!

Dioxin contamination has reached extremely dangerous levels in a series of regions in our country. The cotton- and rice-growing republics suffer the most. We can already say that in certain localities the immune systems in the population have been so blocked by dioxins that no medical treatments can prevent a gradual genetic

degeneration. Yes, the fact is that the situation in Moscow, itself, is not much better. The capital has indeed become one of the cities that is most polluted with dioxins. Specialists say that the level of dioxins in the breast milk of nursing mothers in Moscow constitutes a danger for newborns. It is safer to feed them artificial formula. But here we have difficulties, as well, as there is almost no place in our country that produces milk that would not contain traces of dioxin substances and DDT. Ten grams of cream contain the maximum permissible daily dose of these substances for an adult person!

No Evidence Found of Chelyabinsk Radiation Leak

92W'N0156A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 27 Nov 91 p 4

[Report by L. Leonov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent, Chelyabinsk: "In the Smoke of the Cock-and-Bull Story"]

[Text] Our correspondent on the traces of a newspaper 'sensation'.

And so, our press has given birth to a new sensation: the Mayak Chemical Combine, the cradle of the Soviet atom bomb in Chelyabinsk Oblast, secretly released something radioactive in the atmosphere. This was precisely according to the 1957 scenario, when as a result of the overheating of one of the banks with radioactive waste some radioactive substances were released in the atmosphere. This accident was described by the people as the "Aurora Borealis in the Urals." The sensation published in IZVESTIYA in its 16 November issue was precisely given the same name: "Mayak Started Glowing Again."

With a great deal of interest both at Mayak and in the city the nuclear power industry personnel of the Chelyabinsk-65 studied this type of blood-freezing information. For even high school students know that if, as A. Illesh writes, "the population of the Novogornyy settlement, located eight kilometers south of Mayak saw on 4 October in the area of the industrial space a fire and a pillar of smoke shaped as a mushroom, it is hardly likely that such witnesses of an atomic mushroom would have remained among the living."

A government cable reached Mayak: "In accordance with the IZVESTIYA publication of 16 November of this year, entitled "Mayak Has Lighted Up Again," please submit available information on this presumed release of radioactive substances in the atmosphere and the emergency situation related to it." It was signed by V. Menshikov, deputy chairman of the Committee on Problems of Ecology and Rational Utilization of Natural Resources of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

What type of emergency situation? Generally speaking, what had taken place?

I visited Mayak and here is what I was able to establish.

First (let us follow the IZVESTIYA article). There were no fires, not to mention nuclear mushrooms. The report issued by the chief of the fire safety department reported that "in the shift of 4-5 October 1991 no firemen reported a fire-accident situation in the various Mayak industrial association, in the city or at the construction site."

Second. It is true that N. Mironova, oblast soviet deputy, submitted a query on this case to the Mayak Industrial Association. The answer, signed by the association's chief engineer, quoted by IZVESTIYA, included a rather original postscript: "Possibly, on that specific date the military may have been testing their searchlight systems...."

We were unable to find the question submitted by N. Mironova. We were told that it was asked by telephone. Yet, something else may be found in the answer of Mayak's chief engineer: "The reason for the lighting may have been a testing of searchlights by the Army unit."

Therefore, witnesses from Novogornyy say smoke (i.e., this must have occurred during the day, for at night no smoke is visible), while N. Mironova was interested in the light (i.e., something which occurred at night, for it would be useless to test a searchlight during daylight time). Had A. Illesh made use not of the gossip based on a "bad telephone connection" (compare the quote published in IZVESTIYA and the actual answer of Mayak's chief engineer) he may have realized that what one can see during the day is not something visible at night.

Third. The radiation meter at the city of Kasli. "Instead of the habitual 20 microroentgen per hour, the indicator lit up initially showing figures reaching as high as 90 and, subsequently, 140! The device was then turned off."

Once again we have a case of a "bad telephone connection." Actually, here is what happened. Mayak is applying a widespread open policy of informing the surrounding population about the radiological situation, for which reason it purchased three radiometric panels. Last autumn one of them was installed in Kasli. However, because of structural defects and frequent interruptions of electric power in the city, on dozens of occasions the radiation meter turned itself off and, after turning itself on, registered random figures. Representatives of the manufacturing plant were sent to the city to repair their machine.

Fourth. In a private talk a Mayak official acknowledged that "yes, recently a tank containing radioactive waste took fire...."

It is at this point that the bad telephone connection resulted in playing a more serious trick. The IZVESTIYA writer should have known that containers with radioactive waste are never referred to as tanks at Mayak and are usually known as "cans." As to the "burning" tank, it is indeed true that there is a tank at work at Mayak or, to be more accurate, there is an "engineering machine for clearing of obstacles" based on a T-72-model tank. This machine to which an eight-meter long arm is attached is used for unloading the concrete blocks used to fill up the

radioactive Karachay Lake. Here an accidental fire extinguishing system was activated. An investigation is being conducted on this case.

Finally, fifth. IZVESTIYA reported that someone asked the local hydrometeorological center for isobaric charts for the beginning of October, which had been allegedly destroyed by hooligans. No one knows why it was necessary to turn to the hydrometeorological center, when it was possible to telephone R. Kantorovich, the chief of the comprehensive aerial survey expedition which was established on the basis of Decision No 755-r of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, dated 12 July 1991 (Moscow telephone 209-72-22). In September and October this expedition was engaged in making a planned gamma-aero survey of the radioactive background in the Mayak area. It is equipped with supersensitive instruments and enjoys an independent status. R. Kantorovich's answer was categorical: There were absolutely no changes in the radioactive background as recorded by the expedition.

During the time of such "secret release," brigades from the Central Television, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA were at work at Mayak and a Soviet-American seminar attended by specialists was taking place. In a word, the number of people equipped with dosimeters was such that such an IZVESTIYA secret could not have remained secret to anyone.

That is what makes the Mayak people indignant at the publication of false information which created panic in the area (but, naturally, not at Mayak, where the people know that all of this is a stupid and harmful rubbish). In the telegram addressed to all interested individuals in Moscow and Chelyabinsk Oblast, the enterprise's management demands an investigation in order to identify the source of this false information, and that a retraction be published. Mayak is seriously contemplating to sue IZVESTIYA, which has repeatedly published fabrications about the nuclear workers in the Urals and refused to publish retractions.

The explanation, perhaps, may be quite simple.

IZVESTIYA publishes a telephone number and a request for money to be sent to independent experts from the socioecological alliance, who had caused this all-Union panic. We rang up and there was no answer. No one has ever heard of this socioecological alliance. All that we were able to determine is that the telephone line led to Russia's "White House." It is apparently there that all the traces lead to. It is possible that someone is doing everything he can to destabilize the situation in our already thoroughly worn-out Republic.

Speculations about Mayak or, to put it more simply, lies are already becoming intolerable. Last summer the population of this nuclear city was angered by the fabrications of A. Penyagin, USSR people's deputy representing Chelyabinsk Oblast. He stated to the press that as a result of the lengthy effect of radiation the people may become

mentally deranged, for which reason, he claims, one-third of the personnel of one of the Mayak plants committed suicide and that 6,500 signatures were collected in the nuclear city in a protest addressed to A. Denisov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Ethics Commission. No answers whatsoever followed and the aggrieved people had to console themselves with the thought that before being elected USSR people's deputy, A.N. Penyagin had lived for decades in Chelyabinsk, where the radiation background is higher than in the city of the atom workers by a factor of 1.5-2. That fact may have indeed affected that individual....

Ecological Rescue Plan Proposed for Volga Basin
92WN0143C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Nov 91 p 8

[Article by Natalya Pchelina: "Will the Public Save the Volga?"]

[Text] The "Revival of the Volga" program was developed through the initiative of the Volga Ecological Parliament, a public organization whose members are deputies of the Volga Basin oblasts. Approval of the program is planned for December.

For 1991-1992, practical measures have been planned to eliminate the most dangerous pollution, as well as pollution whose elimination will require a minimum expenditure of material resources and time. There has been a sharp decrease in the discharge of untreated sewage.

In 1993-1995, a unified system for the ecological monitoring of the Volga Basin is supposed to be established. Planning has begun for large-scale implementation of minimal-waste and no-waste technologies, closed and circulating systems for water usage, and systems for thorough purification of gas wastes.

The years 1996-2000 will mark the beginning of a practical implementation of a complex approach for resolving problems of the efficient use of natural resources. And by the year 2000, there should already be ecologically safe levels achieved for the anthropogenic impact on the natural environment.

Finally, between the years 2001 and 2005, basic conditions will be effected for an ecological balance in the interaction of man and nature in the Volga Basin.

Experts who took part in the discussions noted that this idea involves corrective but not preventive measures. One does not have the feeling that there will be a transition to a market economy, because the politicians look at a different kind of distribution of authority. Incidentally, six or seven years ago America changed to direct government regulation, having turned down indirect market relationships. Here, however, our politicians have not yet clearly determined the interrelationship with users of natural resources.

Skeptics believe that our economy will not be able to withstand a drastic reequipping of our large chemical and hundreds of other plants which are in the Volga Basin. In order to do that we would have to "reach," in an economic sense, at least the 1985 level, otherwise any plan is doomed to failure, and citizens would be faced only with increases in the costs of communal services and goods produced by industrial enterprises.

And anyway, who, given our present conditions, would provide the money for this kind of program? Basically, our hopes lie in a new mechanism for setting prices and paying taxes, including differential payments for natural resources. It has been decided to petition the RSFSR Council of Ministers to appropriate the necessary funds from their central resources for each year. It has been recommended to the leadership of the republics and oblasts located in the Volga Basin that they accept their financial share of the costs to implement this program.

Resources can be found if funds are not allocated to "destructive" branches of the economy and if Russian raw materials are not squandered. It would appear that it is necessary for public forces, together with the Soviet government, to inventory all production on the Volga.

According to members of the Volga Ecological Parliament and the public, the time has come to introduce a legislative initiative in the Russian parliament on approving a law regarding the Volga. Ultimately, someone will have to take the responsibility for the Volga's future.

Islam's Past, Present Status in Soviet Society Examined

924B0115A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Dec 91 p 3

[Interview with Shaykh Ravil Gaynutdin, president of the Islamic Center, by G. Bilyalitdinova; place and date not given: "There Should Be No Privileged Religion"]

[Text] *Down the ages man has believed in something. Today, when the Union is disintegrating before the eyes of us all and when a deadlocked economic situation has taken shape and moral values are being flouted, many people see their salvation in religion.*

The questions of PRAVDA's correspondent are answered by Shaykh Ravil Gaynutdin, imam-prayer leader of the Moscow Central Mosque and president of the Islamic Center.

[Bilyalitdinova] Esteemed Imam-Prayer Leader Ravil! Many PRAVDA readers from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tatarstan ask in their letters: Why is it that in newspapers and on television we see the active role of the Orthodox clergy in peacemaking activity, but there is practically nothing about the activity of the Islamic clergy? Yet there are in our country approximately 100 million Muslims, and their numbers in the world are over a billion.

[Gaynutdin] We understand the concern of Muslims living on the territory of the former USSR, they ask us about this constantly also. But not only is there in the press and on the television screens no Islamic religion, there is no Jewish, Buddhist, or other religions either. It is profoundly regrettable, but the ideology of the tsarist empire, which believed that only the Orthodox religion should be the privileged, that is, the official religion, persists in the country. But let us recall our history. Russia annexed territory on which the Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimean, and Nagay khanates were located and also Siberia and the Crimea. They had their own customs, traditions and religion. For example, the Tatar people, who in 1989 commemorated the 1,100th anniversary of the adoption of Islam on the territory of the Volga region and the Cis-Urals. Greater Bulgaria—as Tatarstan was called—had its own Muslim universities, at which representatives of the Arab peoples were taught. The Tatar-Bulgarian language was considered the international language of instruction. All this has been forgotten, and many people are ignorant of the history of their own people and the history of their own religion. Under tsarism Mohammedanism was a tolerated religion. In the 70 years of Soviet power attempts were made, if not to destroy Islam, at least to reduce its role to the utmost. It is for this reason, most likely, that on the European part of the country's territory and in Siberia, where there were more than 14,300 mosques, only 80 have been preserved, and we have lost over 30,000 clergy.

Yes, we often see the beautiful and grandiose service in churches. Much light and brilliance, and all this, of

course, evokes journalists' interest. With Muslims, on the other hand, the service is extremely modest and simple, and no outward effects distract the person at prayer.

The Orthodox religion remains the focus of attention for the added reason that members of the government and the leaders of Moscow are its frequent guests. This is a kind of recognition of the Christian religion as an inalienable part of the official religion. And if the newspapers report that highly esteemed Aleksiy II, patriarch of all Rus, is received by U.S. President G. Bush, is this not proof that the Christian religion is privileged? And Islam remains merely a tolerated religion, although a law on freedom of worship also, which guarantees the rights of all believers, has been enacted. We are equal before the law, as are our religions. Consequently, we should coexist and develop on a par, and no religion should enjoy privileges.

[Bilyalitdinova] Esteemed Imam! Do not consider this immodest advice, but perhaps the leaders of the Islamic religion themselves are today lacking in assertive action? There are many methods of enhancing the significance of political actions. Any meeting at head of government level will be the focus of press attention. The main thing is what lies behind this meeting.

[Gaynutdin] Our spiritual leaders are meeting with heads of state. Unfortunately, the media remain silent about this. For example, an important meeting with the king of Saudi Arabia went unnoticed, nor was there any information on a meeting with M. Qadhafi. Or another example: Prof B. Rabbani from Afghanistan conducted Friday prayers in our mosque. Yes, he is a leader of the Afghan opposition. His arrival here was something of a sensation. After 12 years of bloody war, a representative of the mujahidin was beseeching of the Almighty peace for our land and wishing good health for its inhabitants. Is this not the way toward a truce? Following prayers, I introduced to the professor young Russian men who had adopted Islam. There was an interesting talk. All this, unfortunately, remained "outside the frame."

[Bilyalitdinova] There are in the country's field of vision two flash points currently—Checheno-Ingushetiya and Tatarstan. What is the influence of the clergy on a settlement of the situation in these Muslim regions? What is your position on the desire of the republics in which Islam is confessed, in the main, to obtain independence?

[Gaynutdin] I will say right off that I am not a politician and do not for this reason have the moral right to make any recommendations. Of something else I am certain—a person cannot be dependent his whole life. And whatever political structures take shape as a result of the struggle, the main thing is that it is essential that each person feel himself to be on a par with any nation not only of the country but of the world also. There has today been a growth in the people's self-awareness. And their agitation is a kind of protest at the relations which have

come about both in politics and in economics. B. Yeltsin was right once when he said that there should be no junior republics, they should all be equal. But how difficult it is to break with age-old traditions and switch from words to deeds. I believe that each republic should obtain the independence which it can itself handle. Truly, an extremely tense situation has taken shape in some Muslim regions. It is the clergy's task to pull the people back from bloodshed. It is on such a mission that I am flying to Grozny.

[Bilyaltdinova] I remember the opening of the Islamic Center in Moscow. The ambassadors of almost all the Arab countries were present, and members of the country's government, cultural figures and scholars were there also. What is the nature of your activity, are you managing at this difficult time to get done what you intended?

[Gaynutdin] We are. We are not only popularizing the spiritual values of Islam. We have created for the Russian-speaking population a special group for the study of Arabic and the traditions and culture of Islam. We are building and modernizing the mosques and we plan to build a school, library, and lecture hall. We are involved in charitable work also.

It is important also that the Islamic center has been recognized by scientific circles. We have signed an agreement on cooperation with the Institute of Oriental Studies, and an agreement has been signed with the Muslim Coordinating Center in the Syrian capital of Damascus. The Moscow Islamic Center-Saudi Arabia Charitable Foundation is being created at this time. Friendly relations have been established with the Organization of European Muslims in the FRG and also the Islamic Society in Finland. We have good prospects for relations with the Tatar Association in the United States and the Islamic Center in Chicago and with the Tatar Association in Australia.

Common plans with the Tatar-Turkish community in Japan have been outlined also. I would like to say a little about the latter. The vice president of this community, a doctor of sciences, and his wife, a doctor of medicine, incidentally, are from Kazan. His wife not only lectures at Tokyo University but also has her own clinic, where studies are being performed in the detection and treatment of cancer. Having preserved the language, customs, and traditions of its people, this family is now in the land of its forefathers building a mosque.

Medical Sciences President Reveals AIDS Statistics

LD3011234991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1625 GMT 29 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Marina Barinova]

[Summary] Moscow, 29 Nov (TASS)—Valentin Pokrovskiy, president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, stated in a TASS interview that in the USSR as

of mid-November 672 people were HIV positive and 57 were suffering from AIDS, of whom approximately 40 have died. The struggle against AIDS in the Soviet Union has not been helped by the disintegration of the Union, resulting in a division of effort. However, "fundamental AIDS research in the USSR is on a world level. The interaction of the virus and the cell are being studied, molecular-biological research is being carried out, and an original method for obtaining azidothymine has been synthesized."

Adoption of Soviet Children by Foreigners Examined

924B0127A Moscow KULTURA in Russian
No 13, 7 Dec 91 p 5

[Reader's letter followed by interview with Irina Volodina, chief of the department for health safety and social and legal protection of childhood of the RSFSR Ministry of Education, by N. Rusakova; place and date not given: "Children for Export"]

[Text] As we promised in our 19 November issue, today we continue our conversation about children. A larger part of the page, it so happens, is devoted to orphans whose "dawn of life" is being spent within government-owned walls: houses for abandoned babies, orphanages, and boarding schools. Next to this is a collection of letters about gifted children—they, as you will see, have their own problems. Everywhere, in all times, in any society, one of the main tasks has been to preserve the children, to raise the new generation to be morally and physically healthy. How can we manage this task today? After all, despite whatever may be, childhood is the brightest, happiest time.

Television recently showed our children being adopted by foreigners. The material was presented in rosy colors: a boy without legs immediately received prosthetics in Sweden; he is full of joy and is happy with his new parents. Here, nobody wanted to adopt him: we, they say, are egotists who demand only quality "goods"—fully-abled children. Let these accusers know that by our laws only healthy children are put up for adoption. And since this now an extremely rare phenomenon, the result is—enormous lines at the city education department, bribes, and abuses that have been described in the press many times.

But it was not even this that left me really indignant. In our insatiable desire to get a piece of sausage today we are ready to sell off anything: works of art, athletes, artists, beautiful women. Now it is the children's turn. This is incredible: There is a whole scandal because a few bars of gold were flown abroad, while the fact that our children are being taken out of the country brings out only sweet emotions. An acquaintance of mine said: "When it comes to these ones (I mean disabled), let them take them." Then let them take our elderly, too—they are of no use, either. But in this case we should not claim the right to be

called civilized people. Only barbarians adopted the custom of getting rid of the old and sick.

Everybody knows that our birth rate is very low. Instead of surrounding every child with love and attention, we dump them abroad. Is it not clear that without children we have no future—not only we personally, but the entire nation?

[Signed] L. Lukina, Tver.

We asked Irina Volodina, chief of the department for health safety and social and legal protection of childhood of the RSFSR Ministry of Education, to comment on this letter.

[Volodina] There is nothing particularly new in foreigners adopting our children. The Code on Marriage and the Family has long had an article envisaging such a possibility. It is another matter that in the past it was used in only one specific set of circumstances: if a woman who had a son or daughter married a foreigner, her husband could adopt the child.

Lately, however, foreign private agencies began coming to us very frequently. The families they deal with are ready to adopt any child: even one with aggravated hereditary problems, or one who is disabled. What awaits such children here is rather clear, I think: house for abandoned babies, orphanage, and boarding school, where he will be gluing boxes for the rest of his life. Nobody knows when the situation in the country may change. But a child has only one life. And if it is in our power to make him happy, why not try?

Of course, it was hard to part with the first kids: They were leaving the country for good—the country where they were born and where their so-called biological parents live; we did not know the people into whose hands we were placing the children. But when two months later we saw our legless kid in Sweden, running around the garden wearing lightweight artificial limbs; when we saw the warm, tender eyes of his new parents, our doubts were dissipated.

We have six children now—aged between three and six—visiting on a guest visa in America. We are preparing several more children for adoption abroad. Here is one of them—a boy from Magadan. I have his photo: a lovely face, intelligent eyes, but... he has no hands, and his spine is deformed. In official language, such children are called "not requested for a long period of time by Russian citizens."

[Rusakova] But is it really so? Our reader is right about this—sick children not only are not adopted, they are not permitted to be put up for adoption.

[Volodina] Until recently this was true. However, this situation changed in Russia in March 1991: now any child can be up for adoption. We inform prospective parents of his disabilities and the prognosis for development, and tell them what kind of family he comes from. Then it is up to them to decide whether they will be able

to raise such a child. Now the adoption procedures have been simplified; we will see whether this will relieve the waiting lists.

[Rusakova] I recently visited an orphanage and saw the director signing replies to those desiring to adopt a child: "We do not have such children." It turns out that some children have mothers, or fathers. The parents do not take care of the children, but do not give permission to put them up for adoption either.

[Volodina] In accordance with the new legislation, if the parents do not participate for more than half a year in the rearing of the child placed in an orphanage—do not visit him, do not take him home during school breaks, do not write—these children may be adopted by other people.

Not everything as simple as it may appear at first glance, though. Among the huge numbers of people who sincerely want to give love and warmth to an orphan there are also quite a few who take children for their own mercenary purposes. For instance, to qualify for an apartment. To be placed into the large-family category and enjoy benefits. Then afterwards... they return the child to the orphanage.

We are the only country in the world where adoption may be canceled. Here is a recent example. A childless family adopted two little boys—twins. Eight years passes, and then suddenly they have their own child. The parents file a court action to cancel the adoption. That is all. The boys get back their original names and surnames, which they had no notion of, and are returned to the orphanage.

I repeat, this is only possible in our country. Families abroad adopt children knowing them only from a photo and a description of their disabilities. The status of an adopted child is a given that cannot be changed. Yes, problems may develop, but they need to be resolved somehow. We do not give up our own children when they do not behave the way we would like them to.

Also, only here is there the adoption secrecy clause. Everywhere, in all times, it was considered a noble matter to take in an orphan, something worth doing for real people. Only in this country is it done this way: a closed rayon executive committee meeting is held, where all present are warned of the liability for disclosing the secret of adoption. A woman who wants to take a child has to imitate pregnancy, or sometimes has to change her place of work and residence. And she lives in fear all the time: what if somebody tells the child the truth.

Abroad, as a rule, adopted children know everything about themselves. It often happens that they remain friends with their biological parents while living with another family. I hope that our children adopted by foreign families will retain links with Russia and its culture. In any case, to the best of my knowledge people who adopt children from other countries tell them where

they are from, teach them their native language, and try to sustain their interest in their native land.

[Rusakova] I was told in one orphanage that in the spring they usually have a flood of "adopters" from the southern regions of our country. They say: We will take anyone—a hooligan, an academic disaster, or a mentally ill. The reason is clear: The sowing season is about to start, and they need hands. What about our children given up for adoption abroad—will something like this not happen to them?

[Volodina] We select families very carefully. The agency provides us with the resume of the prospective parents, their family, relatives, and colleagues. Medical certification and financial information are mandatory. They are as a rule well-to-do families with stable incomes. Thus, our children will not end up on a plantation or on the street. Besides, we plan to maintain contact with the adoptive family during the first two years. I think they will also be interested to learn more about the child, for instance, from the doctors and teachers at the orphanage.

[Rusakova] That the children are our wealth, our riches, and so on, has become a common phrase. In our time, when everything is sold and bought, do you give them away free?

[Volodina] We do not charge the adoptive family money. We do ask for help for the institution the child came from—a contribution for medical equipment, medicines, vitamins.

[Rusakova] In your opinion, as the cost of living goes up will there be more children placed in orphanages and boarding schools?

[Volodina] We do not have the statistics for 1991 yet. But I do not think that the number of children in state institutions will increase. A real mother will herself suffer from deprivation but will not give up her child. What we will probably have less of are people who want to adopt a child. Food shortages and high prices for children's clothing can cool even the warmest, noblest impulses. There are, however, many requests from foreign agencies. They have experience in international adoptions: in the past, it was children from Korea, Cambodia, and Africa. Now they are more oriented toward white children with European features. Besides, they know there—abroad—about our situation, and that life is not sweet for the children here these days—in every sense. And they want to help. What is wrong with that?

[Rusakova] Can it happen that all our children will be taken away?

[Volodina] No. This is not going to be a mass phenomenon. The children that are being adopted are those whom we cannot help at present; later in life they are doomed to stay on endless waiting lists for prosthetics and housing; some will have trouble finding jobs...

When we are talking about an opportunity to return a child to a normal family, about his health and happiness, I think all other considerations should take back stage to this.

Women's Groups Uniting for Survival Strategy

924B0145A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Dec 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by T. Khudyakova: "Women Today Have It Harder Than Anybody. Tired of Waiting for State Aid, They Are Uniting To Save Themselves and the Children"]

[Text] While the political whirlwinds are raging over the space that used to be called the USSR, then the Union of Sovereign States, and now the Union of Independent States, all presidents together and each one in particular, of course, have no time for women's problems. This is understandable, as understandable as the fact that neither women nor their problems have departed the boundaries of that "space." Yet the collapse of the state and parliamentary structures which did at least exist, has taken more than half the population of the country "out of the game."

In short, there is no longer anyone to turn to. This is why the Committee of Soviet Women (henceforth the Women's Committee) held a meeting of the presidium to discuss two important issues. First, four independent women's social organizations joined the Committee: The Federation of Women Writers in the (former) USSR Writers Union, the Family and Health Association, the Association of Female MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Officers, and the Association of Women With a Higher Education.

Second, four programs were approved focusing on problems that are most urgent and hard to resolve: "The Earth Is Our Common Home," "Charity and Health," "Democracy for All," and "For Survival."

Bearing in mind that the Women's Committee is a social/voluntary organization that is just getting on its feet in terms of financial independence, due credit must be given to its effort to alleviate women's lot in a most difficult time. Each program is important in its own way—the creation of conditions for women to take part in politics, to advance to the level of decision-making, to gain social status, by which the civilized world means equal opportunity without regard to gender; the desire to gain maximum benefit from cooperating with national and international women's organizations as embodied in joint projects, business schools and political leadership. By next year, for example, our women will be able to obtain the specialty of small business expert, with the help of Australia. American women are starting courses in the organization of public food service systems (private restaurants and snack bars) and so on.

But even a cursory look at the statistical "filling" of the two other programs is disheartening. Here are some

figures on the situation of the family. Every year the courts handle more than a million divorce cases, so that more than 700,000 children are left without one of their parents. Every year, 10,000 orphans are placed in children's homes, and there are another 20,000 orphans whose parents are living. Seven million writs to enforce alimony are "stalking" the country.

Statistics reflecting infant and maternal diseases and mortality are intolerably high—they are three to five times greater than in Japan, France, Germany, and the United States. One out of every five children is born ill; more than 70,000 children with birth defects are born annually. More than two million of our children are defective in physical development, and about 300,000 are certified handicapped.

Naturally, the Women's Committee cannot take the place of the health care system or state support. But it can, and intends to, carry out goal-oriented charitable efforts, providing direct material aid to mothers and children who are most desperately in need of it. Exercising its right of legislative initiative, the Committee is preparing to submit a number of draft laws to Parliament, concerning social equality, children's rights, and maternal, paternal, and child protection.

To the extent of its powers the Committee also intends to fight for fuller implementation of its: "For Survival" program, the essence of which is to find ways and means of economic support for women during the period of transition to the market.

Of the two million unemployed today, women make up 1.11 million. In Moscow and other major cities, more than 80 percent of the women are unemployed. Inevitably, "at risk" groups include young mothers with minor children and women specialists of pre-retirement age, such as engineers, economists, bookkeepers, teachers, and scientists.

On the one hand, the Women's Committee intends to promote entrepreneurship in every way, organizing business schools and courses based on European methods (this is already being done), training and retraining using standard programs corresponding to international standards and certification. Early next year there will be an exhibition and fair titled: "Today's Women—Creativity and Business," with women entrepreneurs taking part. Its purpose is not only to demonstrate the broad possibilities of our businesswomen in various spheres of creative effort, social innovations, and consumer services, but also to promote business contacts, exchanges of experience and information, and commercial sales.

On the other hand, the Committee will continue collaborating with state employment services in holding job fairs for unemployed women. It has already undertaken to form a data bank of job vacancies and to counsel women on matters of labor legislation and specific forms of social protection. Growing more popular every day is the Committee's "hotline" (209-74-32), which provides both specific advice and legal aid.

By the way, the next job fair will be held on Tuesday, 17 December, at the Women's Committee headquarters on Nemirovich-Danchenko Street. The results of the first fair, in November, have become widely known. It was attended by 742 persons; 263 were assigned to jobs.

Patriarch Aleksiy Interviewed on US Visit

924B0110A Moscow TRUD in Russian

29 Nov 91 pp 1,3

[Interview with Aleksiy II, patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, by TRUD correspondent V. Sisnyov; in Washington, D.C., date not given: "By Our Labor Shall We Be Saved"]

[Text] Before ending his visit to the United States at the invitation of the head of the American Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Theodosius, Aleksiy II, patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, received TRUD correspondent V. Sisnyov at his Washington residence and answered questions of interest to our readers, believers and nonbelievers alike, equally concerned with the fate of their much-suffering motherland.

[Sisnyov] Your Holiness, before your visit the American press wrote that the Moscow Patriarchate was "building bridges" to the Orthodox Church Abroad. If that is so, how successful was your visit in that sense? And in general, how important do you think the restoration of unity is?

[Aleksiy] Immediately following my election to the Patriarchal throne, I made consolidation of Orthodox unity one of my priorities. That is the objective I have set myself during official visits, including to America. As for the Russian diaspora, it is divided. In Western Europe it is gathered in the Russian Archdiocese, which is under the auspices of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. There are dioceses and deaneries of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in 34 countries.

The American Orthodox Church is our daughter church. In two years it will be celebrating the 200th anniversary of the Orthodox mission undertaken by missionaries of Valaam Monastery, who started in Alaska. In 1970 we granted it autocephalous status, that is, autonomy. There also is the Russian Church Abroad, founded in 1922 at Sremski Karlovci, Yugoslavia. It has parishes in the United States, Canada, Australia, and several West European countries. Unfortunately, we have no canonical or service contacts with it. This church is treated as a schism which formed as a result of political events after the revolution.

We have repeatedly addressed the Russian Church Abroad with proposals to unite or start negotiations, because the Russian Church Abroad is flesh of the flesh and blood of the blood of the Russian people. But the political stance of its leaders has always prevented this. And lately, too, ever new demands and conditions are being put forward for a dialogue with us. They accuse us of "Sergianism," that is, collaboration with Soviet

authorities, and demand that we refuse to participate in the ecumenical movement, which has the goal of uniting all Christian faiths.

Yet Metropolitan Sergius's declaration in 1927 was an attempt to save the Church in those terrible years of religious persecution, an attempt to say that the Church was not a political enemy of the state. The Church has always shared the fate of its people, their joys and sorrows.

As for the ecumenical movement, it was conceived not by the Bolshevik authorities and began in those distant years when the Orthodox mission was being implemented in America. I have been participating since 1964 in the Conference of European Churches, which was founded in 1959 to build bridges between East and West.

During my stay in America I visited the headquarters of the National Council of Churches of Christ and expressed my bewilderment at some of its actions, for example on the question of ordaining of women, on the attitude towards homosexuals, and so on. But at the same time we expressed our gratitude for the fact that during the most difficult times we felt their support, and we continued to meet and foster relations of friendship between our peoples. We shall never depart by an iota from our dogmas or the truths of our faith.

At the same time, in my addresses here I stated that we were ready to collaborate with the Russian Church Abroad at any level. Its Synod, however, responds only with accusations. We have too many problems, they must be solved together, without aggravating the confrontation. We need unity as never before.

[Sisnyov] You met with President Bush. This in itself was an historic event. Do you expect any practical results from this meeting?

[Aleksiy] Yes, I had a meaningful, profound and sincere meeting with the President. I told him about our country's current difficulties and the hope fostered in people's hearts by his words that no one in the Soviet Union would starve this winter. I said that we looked forward to help from the United States, and I sensed a warm response on the President's part. He assured that he would do everything in his power to help us.

[Sisnyov] Many people back home count on America or the West as a whole to get us out of our troubles. What do you think of such expectations?

[Aleksiy] I think that humanitarian aid is indeed necessary for the poorly protected members of our society. And I spoke of this repeatedly here. I have in mind the sick, the elderly, single people, large families. They are the ones who can and do suffer first from rising prices and the absence of food and medicine. I also told representatives of business circles that we need long-term help for the revival of our rural communities. Our villages suffered terrible blows of fate: hunger in the 1920s, the dispossession of the kulaks, collectivization,

strangulation of private enterprise with taxes, the fragmentation and, conversely, merging of collective farms. As a consequence of all this, today we have no peasantry. I have travelled a lot lately in the Russian hinterland and seen that people want to work, but they need milk-, poultry- and meat-processing equipment. This would, among other things, help attract people who will inevitably lose jobs in the big cities back to the countryside. I asked for such help, and I think we can count on it. But we also need to work ourselves. It is impossible to look forward every year only to American or some other emergency aid. The people themselves must make the prime effort for their salvation. We have forgotten how to work. But if we do not start working today for real, for ourselves, not for indicators or reports, then the future of our Fatherland will be highly problematic.

[Sisnyov] If I may, I would like to ask several questions concerning our domestic affairs. But first I would like to hear how you, that is, the Church, interpret the very concept "freedom". Marxists, as is known, declare that it is "a realized necessity." What is your definition?

[Aleksiy] Man is free, but he should have moral criteria which he must adhere to. These are the Ten Commandments and the Evangelical teachings for Christians, the Koran for Muslims, the Old Testament for Jews. As Apostle Paul states very clearly in one of his epistles, "I am permitted everything, but not everything is good." That is to say that freedom should not be confused with permissiveness. Moral law is necessary for people, although it restricts them in some ways.

[Sisnyov] You blessed Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin for the presidency. You have, therefore, to some degree assumed responsibility for him before God. It would seem that this implies help to him by the Church. To him—that is, to the democratic forces of Russian society which he as it were embodies. Do I understand this correctly?

[Aleksiy] When I blessed him I said fewer words of congratulation than words about the responsibility that Boris Nikolayevich was assuming. The Church is prepared to share that responsibility, it is ready to cooperate, and the blessing demonstrated that we support the democratic forces which, as you have correctly said, the Russian President represents. There are now some 12,000 parishes and 121 monasteries on our canonical territory, and they are contributing what they can to the revival of the Fatherland. I would like to note that formerly Orthodox monasteries were also models of cultivation of the land. Valaam Monastery on Lake Ladoga, for example, in spite of harsh climatic conditions, grew up to 60 varieties of apples. But in those days mainly peasants came to the monasteries; it is more difficult to teach a city person to work on the land. So today in this sense the monasteries are having difficulties. I think that with the restoration of the spirit, so will the attitude towards the land and the attitude towards work be restored.

[Sisnyov] Much is currently said and written about the spiritual vacuum that has developed after the collapse of the communist ideology, which had essentially been a mandatory state religion. Here in America, as well as in other countries, the Church plays a fundamental role in the spiritual upbringing of people. Political indoctrination is only capable of deforming them, as happened in our country. Do you think the Orthodox Church can regain the place it lost after 1917?

[Aleksiy] For more than 70 years our religion was called "opium of the people," "ideology of imperialism," and so forth. As a consequence, many people have entered the period of democratic change in our society with a spiritual void that various forces are now trying to fill. Among them are mystic faiths of the Orient and Krishnaites, there is a revival of paganism, although there seems to be no soil in our country for it. Societies of sorcerers are appearing; the Roman Catholic Church is carrying out a parallel mission on our territory; Protestant fundamentalists are striving by hook or by crook, by handing out gifts and literature to capture the souls of our people. Three generations have passed since the revolution, but the Russian people still remain linked with Orthodoxy by their thousand-year history, and they must return to their original roots, to their traditions. I address this not only to Russians, but also to Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Yes, the Orthodox Church can and must help the spiritual revival of our people. It has preserved ethical values which it is ready to share with the society. But when it is said that the Church wants to occupy the same place it held before 1917, I say categorically that we claim no government or political influence; our purpose is entirely different, it is moral. Our role is to reconcile, to help overcome confrontation, intolerance, and ethnic strife.

[Sisnyov] Is there any kind of general agreement on returning churches to the Patriarchate, and how satisfied are you with the current process?

[Aleksiy] We must be realists. It is impossible to return everything that belonged to the church all at once, but there should be a long-term plan. When Ivan Stepanovich Silayev was still Prime Minister of the RSFSR, he asked me to submit a list of churches we would like to open in the Russian Federation up to the year 2000. I gave him a list of 780 destroyed and defiled churches. Later new names were added: the people themselves are collecting money and starting to restore churches, appealing to us for help. This kind of enthusiasm, which I saw in many regions of inner Russia, enthusiasm which has helped the revival of sacred shrines in which their grandparents had prayed, is enormous. In some places services are being conducted even before the roofs are installed.

[Sisnyov] You quoted Tyutchev: "It is not the time to call forth shadows, for this hour is terrible as it is." But can we do away with the past without naming names, without saying who bears the blame for our misfortunes? Would that not mean just driving the sickness inside?

[Aleksiy] A search for one more "enemy" will do us no good. But if we are speaking of the social force which placed us on the brink of catastrophe, I can say the following. In a democratic society there is place for all parties, including communist. But not the party that ruled the country for 74 years and brought it to the present tragic situation.

[Sisnyov] And to follow up the previous question... You say that violence cannot make the world or people better. But doesn't this mean the denial of justice? A government, especially our fragile democratic government, must be able to defend itself, but defense without violence is impossible. And what, then, can be done about crime, which is literally sweeping the country?

[Aleksiy] Of course there must be justice. The wantonness, immorality and cruelty, the terrible cruelty which we see today all around us, especially among the youth, prostitution, drug addiction, alcoholism: this is a tightly interwoven scourge of society. And without taking some measures, even very severe ones, it would be impossible to deal with this with moral appeals alone. Unfortunately, much in our life today, for example, video rental shops which offer films advocating violence and sexual promiscuity, contribute not to spiritual revival but to moral depravity. And moral depravity is very close to crime. Depravity, drinking and drug addiction require money. Where is one to get it? So people commit crimes and burglary. Of course society has the right to protect itself. It must do so if it wants to be healthy.

[Sisnyov] There are quite a few people would blame the Jews for all our troubles. Some, the more intellectual, have invented theories of "small peoples," others directly attack "Jews and Masons." What do you think of this?

[Aleksiy] During a meeting with a large group of New York rabbis I told them about the attitude of our church towards anti-semitism, towards the pogroms of the past; I quoted many Orthodox Church figures who considered that the Jewish people should not be accused of all mortal sins and that they, too, deserved respect. The blame rests not on any single people or group of peoples, but on ideology. It was implemented by people of different nationalities. I reject anti-semitism and consider it a sin, just as I consider all inter-ethnic discord sinful.

[Sisnyov] The army is a part of the people. What is the Patriarchate's policy with regard to it?

[Aleksiy] I have often been asked about the possibility of some kind of pastoral participation in army life. This question was also raised during the debate on the law on freedom of conscience. Colonel Martirosyan even suggested that his regiment should have army chaplains—when in Rovno Oblast I visited that regiment. I replied that pastoral participation would be possible only after depoliticization of the army, which is happening now. We should think of training army chaplains, because the army has many problems today—not only hazing, but

actual crime. Today we have no trained army chaplains. One of the purposes of my foreign trips was to see how they are trained. In particular, in England I was able to see the work of a religious school which trains so to say special-purpose clergy: for hospitals, senior citizens homes, prisons, and for the military service as well. I hope that we will also come to this and that work among the military will in time yield beneficial fruit.

[Sisnyov] Your Holiness, the same as between lay leaders and the people, a numerous hierarchy stands between you and your flock. How do you overcome this obstacle, can you?

[Aleksiy] Indeed, the hierarch separates the patriarch. That is why formerly his life was life in a gilded cage. He was known only from his pictures in the calendar. I try to be closer to the people. In my 18 months as Patriarch I have visited 22 bishoprics, and not only oblast centers, but rural communities as well. I also try to overcome the barrier separating us through meetings with the press. Now you are asking me questions of interest to the numerous readers of the very popular newspaper TRUD. Thus, through you I can reach out to millions of people.

[Sisnyov] Your Holiness, TRUD is read daily by some 40 million people. I am sure that the issue with your interview will be read by even more people, both in Russia and the other sovereign republics. What words could you address to them in this difficult hour for all of us?

[Aleksiy] The concept embodied in your newspaper's name ["trud" means labor or work] is precisely what we need to deal with most of all today. Dedicated physical labor, as well as spiritual and moral efforts in the positions we occupy by God's will—therein lies our common salvation. I wish all the readers of TRUD that labor for them should be not an arduous duty but a moral necessity.

Russian Orthodox Church To Found Own Bank, Enterprises

924B0108A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by S. Kukhianadze: "RTSB First Here Too: A Meeting in a Monastery"]

[Text] Why is a road necessary which does not lead to a church, remember?

An excellent question: There are no good roads in this country and there never were, whereas all the churches seem to have been destroyed during the last 70 years. Nowadays, however, they are being restored little by little. Probably only God knows how much time this will take. At least when I put this question to Father Ioann, who heads up the Division of Religious Education and Teaching the Catechism, which was set up in February of this year under the Moscow Patriarchate, he merely shrugged his shoulders uncertainly.


We have to think that it's a question of time—and money. But the Church has virtually no money. And charitable contributions are also insufficient.

So what should be done to restore, for example, those 6,000 churches which have been turned over to the Russian Orthodox Church during the last two and a half years?

And then the Russian Orthodox Church decided to found its own bank. But where would it accumulate the necessary experience?

Yesterday a meeting took place in the Vysokopetrovskiy Monastery between Konstantin Borovoy, president of the RTSB [Russian Commodities and Raw Materials Exchange] and Father Ioann. During this meeting they discussed matters of the RTSB rendering specific assistance to the church. Mr. Borovoy emphasized that this pertains primarily to transferring our skills in the area of know-how and technology. But he did not rule out the possibility of rendering financial aid either, in case it is necessary.

By the way, in addition to founding a bank, the church also plans to set up various enterprises which will engage in commercial as well as charitable activities. It also intends to open its own university and to begin radio and television broadcasting. And in all these matters—insofar as I understand—the RTSB is prepared to render assistance to the Russian Orthodox Church. Moreover, their relations are bilateral.



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DATE FILMED

29 APRIL '92
